In early 2011, news emerged that United States authorities had begun to apply injections of pentobarbital, a substance provided by Danish pharmaceutical company Lundbeck, when executing capital punishments. Lundbeck reported to be appalled by such unintended usage of pentobarbital, which is licensed for treatment of refractory forms of epilepsy and for usage as an anaesthetic.

The human rights NGOs Reprieve and Amnesty International urged Lundbeck to ensure that pentobarbital was not made available to U.S. authorities for use in capital punishments. Lundbeck argued that complete halting of provision of pentobarbital would be detrimental to patients suffering from conditions of severe epilepsy for whom the substance was developed and intended for treatment for life-threatening epileptic seizures. Lundbeck’s Danish headquarters also argued that controlling the provision of pentobarbital was out of Danish Lundbeck’s hands because the substance is produced at Lundbeck’s plant in the United States. Eventually, after talks with Amnesty International and Reprieve, Lundbeck in July 2011 announced that it would seek to put a stop to using pentobarbital in capital punishment through the introduction of a “drop-ship” program (ensuring that the drug is distributed through one specific channel and buyers are required to sign a statement that the product will not be applied towards capital punishment).

America’s increasing obesity problem requires federal, state, and local lawyers, policymakers, and public health practitioners to consider legal strategies to encourage healthy eating and physical activity. The complexity of the legal landscape as it affects obesity requires an analysis of coordination across multiple sectors and disciplines. Government jurisdictions can be viewed “vertically,” including the local, state, tribal, and federal levels, or “horizontally” as agencies or branches of government at the same vertical level. Inspired by the successful tobacco control movement, obesity prevention advocates seek comprehensive strategies to “normalize” healthy behaviors by creating environmental and legal changes that ensure healthy choices are the default or easy choices. With many competing demands on diminishing municipal budgets, strategic coordination both vertically and horizontally is essential to foster the environmental and social changes needed to reverse the obesity epidemic.

The increasing life expectancy of terminally-ill people has raised many public policy concerns about end-of-life care. Due to increased longevity and the lack of cures for illnesses like cancer and heart disease, palliative care, particularly pain management, has become an important mode OF medical therapy. Palliative care providers feel that “[h]ealth care professionals have a moral duty to provide adequate palliative care and pain relief, even if such care shortens the patient’s life.” Practitioners of forensic medicine grapple with determining when to classify the death of a person formerly receiving palliative care as a non-natural death. Such classification may be paramount in the enforcement of new statutes that aim at preventing assisted suicide or monitoring the quality of health care, but it potentially places forensic medicine and palliative medicine in adversarial roles.

Using the case of Ebola Virus Disease as an example, this paper shows why patients at high risk for death have a defensible moral claim to access unregistered medical interventions (UMI), without having to enrol in randomized placebo controlled trials.

A number of jurisdictions permit and facilitate such access under emergency circumstances. One controversial question is whether patients should only be permitted access to UMI after trials investigating the interventions are fully recruited. It is argued that regulatory regimes should not prioritise trial recruitment over patient access, even if this results in drug research and development delays.

We describe how the moral duty to rescue impacts on others' duties to oblige patients seeking emergency access to unregistered medical interventions. The view that eligible patients are owed the provision of access to UMI regardless of their willingness to enrol in a randomised controlled trial (RCT) is defended.

The regulation of medicine has long been recognized as within the state’s police powers. Yet when the state regulates physicians’ professional speech, it potentially raises First Amendment concerns. Nowhere is this truer than in the abortion context, where state legislatures have attempted to influence women’s reproductive decisions with informed consent requirements. Although the Supreme Court, in Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, found a mandated disclosure provision constitutional some 20 years ago, it offered little to clarify the scope and reach of the First Amendment issues that arise with abortion informed consent laws.

Since Casey was decided, legislatures have enacted a range of informed consent laws that impose even more stringent abortion informed consent regulations than the provisions at issue in Casey.

A series of denialist state laws thwart efficacious public health emergency response efforts despite escalating impacts of the spread of the Delta variant during the COVID-19 pandemic.

In March 2000, President William Clinton signed Executive Order 13,147, establishing the White House Commission on Complementary and Alternative Medicine, to develop public policy proposals geared toward maximizing “the benefits to Americans of complementary and alternative medicine.” Disconcertingly, the Commission's charge presumed the safety and efficacy of complementary and alternative medicine (CAM). In so doing, it placed the proverbial cart before the horse by setting the Commission on a mission to “address education and training of health care practitioners in CAM; [coordinate] research to increase knowledge about CAM products; [provide] reliable and useful information on CAM to health care professions, and [provide] guidance on the appropriate access to and delivery of CAM.”

The Commission's final report (“Commission Report”), issued in March 2002, similarly skirts the fundamental question of whether evidence exists that CAM interventions are safe or offer sufficient benefit to justify their proliferation.

On June 25,1990, seven years after Nancy Cruzan lapsed into permanent unconsciousness following a car accident, the United States Supreme Court handed down its landmark decision in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health. The decision provided the Court's first ruling on the right to forgo life-sustaining treatment, addressing both the right of individuals to decide for themselves and the right of family members to decide on their behalf.

Inextricably linked to the Court's holding on individual rights were questions about the authority and responsibility of each state to fashion policy for treatment decisions on behalf of incompetent patients. The Cruzun case presented an opportunity for the Court to comment upon and reshape the patchwork of laws that define the right to decide about life-sustaining treatment in states across the country.

A decision not to hospitalize, dialyze or resuscitate a dying, elderly, nursing home resident is regarded as “possible abuse.” Any physician, nurse, administrator, social worker, aide or other staff member who learns of plans to withhold treatment is required to report this fact to a state official. That official will conduct an investigation “to determine whether the legal guidelines...are satisfied.” While the often protracted investigation is pending, “the facility itself (must) preserve the patient's health.”

A letter declaring this to be the requirement of current New Jersey law was recently sent to administrators of all nursing homes and psychiatric hospitals by the state's Office of the Ombudsman for the Institutionalized Elderly.

The policy has provoked strong protests from health professional organizations and advocates for the privacy of patients and families. Alert clinicians are reportedly maneuvering to place their patients beyond the Ombudsman's reach.

What medical care will I receive if I am too sick to make decisions about my care? Many people worry about this question, particularly about how they can retain control over such decisions. The portrayal in this case of physicians who fail to prescribe adequate pain relief and who feel threatened by active family participation in decision-making only reinforces such concerns. It seems that the hospice movement has had no effect on these physicians. Traditional advice, from wise grandmothers, might be to have a child who is a doctor or who marries a doctor. A more modern suggestion might be to give advance directives about future care. At first reading, this case illustrates the usefulness of both suggestions. But on closer reading the case reveals serious problems with both approaches.

Surrogacy is not an easy issue for feminists. On one hand, it raises concerns about exploitation; one is faced with images of poor women being enlisted to produce babies for wealthy men and their wives, either because of fertility problems or because pregnancy is simply too inconvenient for those women who can afford to hire someone to do it for them. On the other hand, there is the specter of the state passing laws, once again, that tell women what they can and cannot do with their bodies. If we believe, as many of us do, that the state has no right to prohibit a woman from selling the sexual use of her body, doesn't the also have the right to sell the reproductive use? And if many of us, doctors, lawyers, law professors, have been willing to employ other women, less privileged women, to take care of our children after they are born, what is so different in moving the date back a bit and hiring them to carry our children before birth as well?

Assuming that surrogacy is not legally prohibited, does that mean that surrogacy contracts must be enforced? If we find something abhorrent in the idea of babies being taken from their mothers arms because, after all, a contract is a contract, we might argue that the contracts can be legal but unenforceable.

I want to approach this difficult topic not from the professional perspective of a lawyer, but rather as the person I am in multiple relationships: wife, mother, step-mother, daughter, and step-daughter. I would suggest to you that none of us can avoid thinking about the role of families in making decisions for incompetent patients without viewing the questions that arise through lenses created by the roles we play in multiple relationships. I would also suggest to you that none of us can avoid thinking about the possibility of becoming incompetent ourselves without thinking about the relationships we have with our families.

My remarks here will be addressed primarily to the Cruzan decision, so they will be most obviously applicable to patients in a persistent vegetative state. However, I intend for my reflections to apply to decision-making about all incompetent adult patients.

Courts reviewing gun laws that burden Second Amendment rights ask how effectively the laws serve public safety — yet typically discuss public safety narrowly, without considering the many dimensions of that interest gun laws serve. “Public safety” is a social good: it includes the public's interest in physical safety as a good in itself, and as a foundation for community and for the exercise of constitutional liberties. Gun laws protect bodies from bullets — and Americans' freedom and confidence to participate in every domain of our shared life, whether to attend school, to shop, to listen to a concert, to gather for prayer, or to assemble in peaceable debate. Courts must enforce the Second Amendment in ways that respect the public health and constitutional reasons a democracy seeks to protect public safety. Lawyers and citizen advocates can help, by creating a richer record of their reasons in seeking to enact laws regulating guns.

This inquiry is urgent at a time when the Supreme Court's new conservative majority may expand restrictions on gun laws beyond the right to keep arms for self-defense in the home first recognized in District of Columbia v. Heller in 2008.

Human rights are basic, inalienable, interdependent, and universally recognized rights that are sine qua non for existence and growth of any human to be his best. These human rights are to be enjoyed by all human beings (individually or collectively) by virtue of being human, irrespective of their limitations or disabilities; due to the stated reason, the rights of disabled people as a “group right” are recognized as a third-generation human right.

Medication reconciliation for pediatric oncology patientparticipants enrolled in clinical trials often reveals the use of chemical complementary medicine alongside protocol therapeutic agents. Considering the blurry delineation between clinical ethics and research ethics, this paper demonstrates how complementary medicine-related protocol violations introduce ethical questions of who should be included and excluded from clinical trials and offers recommendations on how to manage physician-patient-family interactions around these challenging issues.