Multidrug resistant organisms (MDROs) are a public health threat that have reduced the effectiveness of many available antibiotics. Antimicrobial stewardship programs (ASPs) have been tasked with reducing antibiotic use and therefore the emergence of MDROs. While fecal microbiota transplant (FMT) has been proposed as therapy to reduce patient colonization of MDROs, this will require additional evidence to support an expansion of the current clinical indication for FMT. This article discusses the evidence and ethics of the expanded utilization of FMT by ASPs for reasons other than severe recurrent or refractory Clostridioides (formerly Clostridium) difficile infection.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement on abortion rights resembles the dieter’s dilemma: one knows exactly how to get where one is going but lacks the willpower to follow through. In an opinion filled with exceptionally progressive, equality-based arguments for reproductive freedom, the Court nonetheless manages to back away from its own ineluctably drawn conclusions. In the end it not only ignores its own best arguments but eviscerates its previous analyses of fundamental rights and judicial protection of personal liberties from the excesses of the polity.

On March 31, 2000, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial court ruled that a contract awarding custody of frozen pre-embryos to the wife upon divorce was unenforceable because it violates public policy. This is the first reported case to address a contract between the clinic and the parties where the contract would have awarded the pre-embryos to one of the gamete providers. The decision in A.Z. v. B.Z. 431 Mass. 150 (2000) differs from decisions in the two other courts of last resort deciding related cases where enforcement of contracts was supported. This case represents an important development in the legal doctrines associated with frozen pre-embryos as it explicitly differs from the other courts’ decisions in addressing pre-embryos at the same developmental stage.

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) represents the most significant reform of the United States health care system in decades. ACA also substantially amplifies the federal role in health care regulation. Among other provisions, ACA expands government health care programs, imposes detailed federal standards for commercial health insurance policies, creates national requirements on employers and individuals, and enlists state administrative capacity to implement various federal reforms. In response, a persistent voice in the protracted, contentious debate surrounding ACA was, and continues to be, resistance from states. The rhetoric of federalism — states’ rights, reserved powers, state sovereignty, limited government, and local diversity — resonates deeply even around provisions of ACA that do not specifically implicate state interests. For example, the loudest and most persistent state objections target the new mandate that individuals maintain health insurance, a requirement imposed by ACA and enforced through federal tax penalties.

The passage of the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 — or GI Bill — opened up a dialogue about men’s physical and mental health, for it addressed very directly what ordinary men would need to recover from extraordinary violence. Political leaders identified veterans’ “welfare,” by which they meant general well-being, as a top priority of World War II’s recovery, and the GI Bill was the centerpiece of their agenda. The bill’s passage was an impressive legislative triumph, the collective product of massive medical, legal, and social science research, bipartisan politicking, and veterans’ activism. It provided education, housing, and small business assistance, along with mental and physical rehabilitation in government-funded hospitals. All of these programs, whether they served mind, body, or wallet, amounted to welfare — a set of government-sponsored policies and services designed to aid a soldier’s transition from enlisted man to healthy, productive citizen. Thus we have to think about the broad reach of the GI Bill’s welfare provision as one of the health legacies of World War II.

The term duty is used in philosophy and law to de scribe the obligation one person owes to another. Yet what these two disciplines mean by duty often differs. Perhaps even more important, a determination by the law that a duty exists has different social consequences than does a similar assessment by philosophy Moral or ethical obligations between individuals make living in society possible, but breach of these obligations usually results only in social opprobrium, personal guilt, or shame. A legal duty, by contrast, enables a person to use the power of the state to enforce claims against another, either by injunction to make the duty-ower fulfill his/her responsibilities or more commonly by award of damages in the event the duty-ower fails to meet these obligations. In some cases, society itself chooses to impose criminal penalties on those who fail to meet certain important obligations.

The use of the term duty in both disciplines creates the temptation to extend a definition formulated in one setting to the other discourse. Ronald Green does not bite this apple, but his efforts to draw on the law to support his moral arguments, while not clearly identifying the distinctions between legal and moral obligations, may make it easier for others to see moral and legal duties as the same. Yielding to the enticement to equate moral and legal duties can lead to a host of difficulties. My purpose here is to demonstrate why the duties and privileges proposed by Professor Green are not and should not be adopted and enforced by the law.

Physicians' duties to their patients traditionally have been construed narrowly in time and scope to focus on the specific episode of care or clinical encounter. Physicians generally have had no ethical or legal duty to notify patients about new medical information discovered after a visit, notwithstanding the health care benefits to patients that might flow from receiving the information. The rule was based on the relatively high burdens that notification would impose on physicians compared with the likelihood of benefits to patients. This established view, however, no longer may be appropriate in light of new physician-patient relationships and the reduced burden of patient notification using new types of health information technology (HIT). This article explores the duty to inform patients and former patients about relevant, medical developments subsequent to their episode of care. It concludes by recommending the recognition in ethics and law of a limited, ongoing duty to notify patients of significant information relevant to their health.

Serious concerns about pervasive, persistent, and unjustified social inequalities have prompted a small—but growing—number of academic commentators to raise some hard and troubling questions for those who would like to legalize physician-assisted suicide. In various ways, these commentators have asked: In light of existing social inequalities—inequalities that operate, for example, along sometimes intersecting lines of race, class, age, sex (including sexual orientation), and disability—how persuasive are autonomy-based arguments in favor of legalization of assisted suicide when those arguments depend (as they typically do) on a conception of autonomy that either presupposes social equality or does not expressly account for its absence? How compelling are arguments that we ought to legalize assisted suicide out of feelings of mercy for the sick and dying, when such affective expressions may actually be the socially acceptable manifestation of private ambivalence that includes merciless discrimination?

One fundamental barrier to eliminating health disparities, particularly with regard to the determinants of health, is the persistence of discrimination. Civil rights law is the primary legal mechanism used to address discrimination. Federal civil rights laws have been the subject of wider analyses as a determinant of health as well as a tool to address health disparities. The research on state civil rights laws, while more limited, is growing. This article will highlight a few examples of how some states are using civil rights laws to combat discrimination, particularly in more expansive ways and in the interest of new populations, presenting tools that can target determinants and address the goal of reducing health disparities.

The federal government is funding a sea change in health care by investing in interventions targeting social determinants of health, which are significant contributors to illness and health inequity. This funding power has encouraged states, professional and accreditation organizations, health care entities, and providers to focus heavily on social determinants. We examine how this shift in focus affects clinical practice in the fields of oncology and emergency medicine, and highlight potential areas of reform.

Biomedical research on advanced cryopreservation has spillover effects on innovation in the food and agricultural sector. Advanced biopreservation technology has three key domains of impact in the food system: (1) improving efficiencies in storage and utilization of gametes and organoids for plant and animal breeding; (2) isochoric methods for preservation of fresh food products; and (3) in biorepositories for storage of genetic resources for agriculturally significant plants and livestock species.

Interventional clinical studies of convalescent plasma to treat COVID-19 were predominantly funded and led by public sector actors, including blood services operators. We aimed to analyze the processes of clinical studies of convalescent plasma to understand alternatives to pharmaceutical industry biopharmaceutical research and development, particularly where public sector actors play a dominant role. We conducted a qualitative, critical case study of purposively sampled prominent and impactful clinical studies of convalescent plasma during 2020-2021.

This article discusses the misalignment of the drug innovation model in the US with broader societal goals. The paper calls for a reconfiguration of this model to prioritize the common good and ensure equitable access to health innovations. The article stresses the importance of adopting a mission-oriented approach to shape the drug market, including reforming intellectual property rights.

Following from sweeping law reforms across the global health landscape, there is a need to prepare the next generation to advance global health law to ensure justice for a healthier world. Educational programs across disciplines have increasingly incorporated the field of global health law, with new courses examining the law and policy frameworks that apply to the new set of public health threats, non-state actors, and regulatory instruments that structure global health. Such interdisciplinary training must be expanded throughout the world to prepare future practitioners to strengthen global health law — ensuring a foundation for global health in legal studies and law and global health studies. Meeting this imperative for global health law teaching — establishing academic courses and textbooks on global legal responses to shared health threats — will be necessary to support students to address the global health challenges of the future.

Current guidelines and regulatory frameworks create a dilemma that threatens the effectiveness of much needed communication between patients and medical providers: How can patients be presented with detailed facts without creating cognitive “overload”? We explain how this is a false dichotomy and illustrate, using three examples, how fuzzy-trace theory offers a third way of informing patients.