This article describes implementation of a longitudinal curriculum in public health law, building on doctrinal coursework with skills-based coursework and opportunities for interdisciplinary, community-based engagement and service learning. It specifically describes development of a Policy Practicum, giving an example of how law students can learn policy skills and skills of effective community coalition work through a healthy homes partnership, highlighting areas where the curriculum can incorporate interdisciplinary education. It offers lessons learned during the curriculum-building process, and concludes with a more intensive service-learning strategy through the development of a Policy Lab.

This article compares the landscape of tobacco regulations to the landscape of gun regulations, with a focus on regulations that target youth. This article argues that guns are significantly less regulated compared to tobacco, despite the frequency with which each product causes significant harm to both self and other.

Many of the specific ways tobacco is regulated can be applied analogously to firearms while plausibly surviving potential Second Amendment challenges. This article compares the regulatory landscape of tobacco and firearms across six categories: (a) minimum age for purchase, (b) sale by unlicensed individuals, (c) taxation, (d) advertising, (e) graphic warning labels, and (f) zoning.

At one time, tobacco was as central — or more so — to American culture as guns are today. However, many decades of public health advocacy led to historic tobacco regulations. Tobacco's regulatory history provides a valuable blueprint for gun regulation, despite Constitutional differences.

This contribution reviews the main normative and positive arguments that can used in the assessment of the costs and benefits of food marketing restrictions, focusing specifically on theoretical and empirical developments in the economics of advertising, consumer behaviour and industrial organization since the 70s.

This essay argues that feminist legal theory offers an important, and underutilized, perspective to examine health law and policy. We use several theoretical frameworks developed by feminist legal theorists including relational autonomy, intersectionality, vulnerability theory, and the feminist critique of the public-private divide to demonstrate the utility of these theories to health law analysis. These frameworks provide insights relevant not only to issues that obviously relate to gender, but also to matters of choice, quality, and access that are less obviously gender-related. We map three key areas of existing scholarship and future inquiry at the intersection of health law and feminist legal theory: (I) patient choice and relational autonomy, (II) patriarchy, power and patient safety, and (III) access to health care and healthy living conditions at the public-private divide. Uniting these areas of inquiry is a nagging question central to the relationship between critical legal scholarship (including feminist scholarship) and pragmatic action to combat injustice: Can we use legal rights to achieve our aims even as we recognize them as tainted tools that have propped up oppressive social structures? A feminist agenda for health law and policy must grapple with this dilemma.

In Brazil, the normative landscape around advertising is complex, not the least because of limitations inherent to dispute resolution mechanisms. Focusing on unhealthy food and beverages, this case study identifies some challenges and opportunities around advertising restrictions, including in relation to freedom of speech.

Transgender conversion practices involve attempts to alter, discourage, or suppress a person’s gender identity and/or desired gender presentation, including by delaying or preventing gender transition. Proponents of the practices have argued that they should be allowed until proven to be harmful. Drawing on the notion of expressive equality, I argue that conversion practices are prima facie unethical because they do not fulfill a legitimate clinical purpose and conflict with the self-understanding of trans communities.

In the Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae supporting the Attorney General of Missouri in the Webster case, the Department of Justice invoked a favorable image of European legislative responses to the practice of abortion in order to argue the appropriateness of locating legislative control at the state level, as opposed to the level of federal law. It was further claimed that it was necessary for the Court to set aside its 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade in order for legislation in the U.S. to be consistent with the laws of other countries with which the U.S. “shares a common cultural tradition.”

The foundation on which these arguments were based is fundamentally flawed. The Department's brief omitted reference to the setting of Western European national legislation within the framework of international law , and in particular of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

When the United States Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Missouri Supreme Court that it was not in the best interests of Nancy Cruzan to die of dehydration and malnutrition by withholding from her food and fluids provided by tube the result was deplored by many legal and popular commentators.

The criticism suggested a wide range of values and reasoning that were reflected in the various briefs filed in the U.S. Supreme Court in support of reversing the Missouri court decision. The objections might be placed in three categories: the medical, the legal, and the ethical.

The medical rationale for reversal of the Missouri Supreme Court categorized provision of food and fluids by tube as a “medical treatment” and, hence, subject to practices that pertain to forgoing other, more obvious forms of medical treatment, such as use of respirators or chemotherapy.

Prospects for the introduction of RU 486 into the United States in the foreseeable future are not good. Despite the drug's proven value in inducing abortion safely and effectively in early pregnancy without the need of surgery or anesthesia and its potential value in the treatment of many other diseases, it has been held hostage by the controversy over abortion. Because of opposition to abortion from the current administration and the threat of boycotts by antiabortion groups, Roussel-Uclaf, the drug's manufacturer, has expressed its resolve not to become embroiled in the abortion debate and has postponed indefinitely plans to market RU 486 in the United States.

The contrast between this situation and that accompanying the introduction of RU 486 into France and England, the two countries where it has so far been approved, is striking. Rather than blocking access to RU 486, the governments of these countries moved forward expeditiously with testing and approval of the drug.

I welcome the long-overdue recognition of medical futility represented by the contributions of Koch, et al., Miles, and Dew, although I would be more comfortable with using the more global (and optimistic) term of “beneficence.” However labeled, the notion that medical treatment decisions are primarily that—medical decisions—is a far more appropriate starting point in both law and ethics than the customary departure point of patient autonomy. This is particularly true in cases in which the patient is not competent, and prior expressions of intent are remote, vague, or otherwise unreliable. Despite such flaws, prior statements have been invested with a talismanic quality, permitting avoidance of the genuine moral issues of duty and benefit that are presented by every severely ill and incompetent patient.

The rise of patient autonomy may actually have had less to do with genuine concern for the liberty of the patient than with the moral vacuum created by an excessively pluralistic view of medical ethics. Courts in particular have fallen out of the habit of a priori moral reasoning, replacing this discipline with balancing tests of asserred personal and governmental power.

This paper explains why informed consent for randomized comparative effectiveness research (CER) must include risks of standard care. Disclosures of such risks are both legally and ethically required and, for reasons discussed in the paper, should remain so.

Despite successful transplantation outcomes in Europe, uncontrolled organ donation after circulatory determination of death (uDCDD) has essentially been a non-starter in North America. In this paper, I identify and explore a set of interesting, ethics-related considerations that are of relevance to this organ donation-transplantation practice. The analysis provides a theoretical platform for my development of a proposal for the creation of a particular ethical practice and policy space for kidney uDCDD in the U.S. and Canada that recognizes and aims to effectively address the various, identified challenges and constraints.

This narrative provides insight into medical education for Black physicians in South Carolina in the 1960s, during the civil rights movement. It also discusses the many rewards and challenges of being a physician of color, describes what has been done to develop programs that benefit minority communities, and argues that more such programs are needed.

Kara Swanson has painted a textured portrait of Alan Guttmacher, showing the tension between his embrace of medical paternalism and simultaneous rejection of the legal paternalism that regulated women’s access to abortion before Roe v. Wade. Swanson explains Guttmacher’s route, navigating the troubled waters between “what was medically indicated and what was legally permissible” in the realm of reproductive medicine, the path that Guttmacher identified as the “doctor’s dilemma.” She takes us from his 1930s practice, creatively assisting in his patient’s use of reproductive technologies such as artificial insemination, to the era post Roe v. Wade, after which he seems to have come to terms with a fuller commitment to autonomous reproductive choices. We learn that Guttmacher’s early career provided opportunities to exercise some of his prerogatives as a doctor in the absence of clear legal constraints. By the end of his life, the Supreme Court came close to having endorsed his preference, as Swanson notes, “privileging the doctor/patient relationship and medical expertise.”