Political studies of military institutions in Latin America have tended to lay heavy stress on their external linkages, with a good deal of emphasis being placed upon the ‘differential degrees of dependence upon other countries for supplies, parts, training and equipment by the various service branches’. This particularly the case when scholars attempt to explain why two military institutions differ in their political behaviour and ideological orientation. Thus, we find Lieuwen asserting that

[t]he aristocratic tendencies of [Latin American] naval officers… often were moderated by the democratic views of the British and United States officers who were their professional advisers. Conversely, before World War II, authoritarian attitudes of some Latin American armies were reinforced by the influence of German, Spanish, and Italian military missions.

A reviewer confronted with fourteen new books on the Latin-American economy inevitably seeks a common theme on which to hang his remarks, in the hope that this will make sense of his labours. Let it be confessed immediately that diligent search has failed to reveal any such unity in these volumes. Indeed, on the safe assumption that they represent a random selection from the rapidly growing literature on the subject, they might almost be taken as evidence of a diversity of approach. An alternative strategy, therefore, is to argue the existence of central doctrines in the literature on Latin- American development in the last twenty-five years, and to relate to them the literature under review.

While the seventies will see a continuing debate over the merits of alternative development strategies, histories of Latin America's industrial progress over the past two or three decades can now be filed under ‘import substitution’. Bruton explains, ‘In the narrowest terms, import substitution refers simply to the take-over of an existing domestic market from the foreign producer by prohibiting his imports in one way or another’.

The success of the Radical Party in Argentina under Hipólito Yrigoyen has frequently been attributed to the creation of an effective political machine. While the machine did exist, it cannot explain Yrigoyen's overwhelming popularity with many sectors. Such political organisations and client–patron relations flourished in many cities throughout the world. This article examines employment with the municipality of Buenos Aires, and concludes not only did governments both before and after Yrigoyen have similar policies but all major political parties shared in the spoils. However, they failed to reap similar political benefits. The roots of Yrigoyen's popularity lie elsewhere.