Both political and economic institutions matter for economic growth and development, and are indissolubly connected: sustained economic growth requires far-reaching opening up of the economy and polity to wide participation. This review essay draws on three books which share this view of institutions, to develop an argument on which institutions matter most, and how and why they change. Like them, it uses history as laboratory. North et al. (2009) in Violence and Social Orders focus on Britain, France and the United States, in which change was generally progressive, to study such change from the medieval to the modern period. Jan van Zanden in The Long Road to the Industrial Revolution looks at Europe, 1000–1800, in particular the Netherlands and England, finding regressive as well as progressive change. Acemoglu and Robinson also examine both directions of change, in Why Nations Fail: they range widely in space, but little before the 16th century. All three offer powerful tools of analysis. All have implications for policy-makers in advanced societies who wish to promote the development of ‘inclusive’ institutions elsewhere. Two striking surprises emerge, and one prime mover – an institution with particular power to change others – the medieval Catholic church.

We use the Stansel (2013) metropolitan area economic freedom index and 25 conditioning variables to analyze the spatial relationships between institutional quality and economic outcomes across 381 U.S. metropolitan areas. Specifically, we allow for spatial dependence in both the dependent and independent variables and estimate how economic freedom impacts both per capita income growth and per capita income levels. We find that economic freedom and per capita income growth and income levels are directly and positively related. Furthermore, we find that the total (direct plus indirect) effects on all metropolitan areas are positive and larger in magnitude than the direct effects alone, indicating that freedom-enhancing reforms in one metropolitan area lead to positive-sum games with neighboring metropolitan areas.

Tit-for-tat (TFT) in trade policies is a common practice. It is even enshrined in Article 22.4 of the WTO's dispute settlement process within multilateral trade integration. As such, it is a well-recognized means for promoting cooperation and for enforcing compliance with a common set of rules or institutions. However, there is equally widespread concern that a strategy of TFT degenerates into a prisoner's dilemma, in particular because of special interests ill-using it as a springboard for advancing protectionist measures and beggar-thy-neighbor policies. This paper provides a novel evolutionary perspective on TFT in trade policy regimes in that it tracks the role of special interests by parameterizing their leverage on strategies. Doing so, it provides new insights on the political economy of TFT in international institutions. Accordingly, the set of parameters for which a prisoner's dilemma emerges shrinks rather than widens, even with powerful domestic interest groups sharing a stake in protection.

I investigate the consistency of agent-based computational models with the institutionalist research program as outlined by Myrdal, Wilber and Harrison, Hodgson and others. In particular, I discuss whether such models can be a useful heuristic for ‘pattern modelling’: Can they provide a holistic, systemic and evolutionary perspective on the economy? How can agency be conceptualised within ABMs? Building on these issues, I discuss potentials and challenges of the application of ABM in institutionalist research. This discussion also relates to recent methodological advances in neo-Schumpeterian economics. I explain how institutionalists can benefit from these and suggest areas for joint research under the methodological umbrella of ABM.