This paper relates firm size and opportunism by showing that, given certain behavioural dispositions of humans, the size of a profit-maximizing firm can be determined by cognitive aspects underlying firm-internal cultural transmission processes. We argue that what firms do better than markets – besides economizing on transaction costs – is to establish a cooperative regime among its employees that keeps in check opportunism. A model depicts the outstanding role of the entrepreneur or business leader in firm-internal socialization processes and the evolution of corporate cultures. We show that high opportunism-related costs are a reason for keeping firms’ size small.

This paper proposes an information perspective on path dependence. From this perspective, historical paths are important insofar as knowledge about them shapes current decisions, for better or worse. A key consideration is the extent to which relevant information is fully inscribed in the existing configuration of state variables, including organizational structures and institutional norms. Using a chess analogy, path dependency arises whenever a decision maker's ‘move’ depends not only upon existing state variables, but also knowledge of the path by which this configuration came about. This chess analogy is then extended to various institutional contexts such as legal expungement of criminal records, patient privacy rights, and corporate executive succession strategies. A formal notation is introduced to specify this definition more precisely, and to compare it with other perspectives on path dependency, such as lock-in effects, increasing returns to scale, ergodic equilibria, and generalized notions that ‘history matters’.

Previous research, notably Baumol (1990), has highlighted the role of institutions in channeling entrepreneurial supply into productive, unproductive, or destructive activities. However, entrepreneurship is not only influenced by institutions – entrepreneurs often help shape institutions themselves. The bilateral causal relation between entrepreneurs and institutions is examined in this paper. Entrepreneurs affect institutions in at least three ways. Entrepreneurship abiding by existing institutions is occasionally disruptive enough to challenge the foundations of prevailing institutions. Entrepreneurs sometimes have the opportunity to evade institutions, which tends to undermine the effectiveness of the institutions, or cause institutions to change for the better. Lastly, entrepreneurs can directly alter institutions through innovative political entrepreneurship. Like business entrepreneurship, innovative political activity may be productive or unproductive, depending on the incentives facing entrepreneurs.

This paper proposes a composite measure of ethnic fragmentation, the Social Diversity Index (SDI) to capture inherent multidimensionality not captured in the prevalent Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization Index (ELF). The SDI more accurately demonstrates the direct effects of hidden diversity values and the extent and corresponding costs of ethnic diversity on economic growth. A comparative empirical analysis of the results from 132 countries employing the SDI and the ELF Index, suggests that the SDI is more robustly correlated with growth, and does a moderately better job of explaining the effect of exogenous static ethnic diversity. However, the empirical effects of ethnic diversity on growth tend to diminish with the inclusion of additional macroeconomic variables.

Johan Åkerman and Erik Dahmén's institutional theory of economic fluctuations is a constructive alternative to traditional macroeconomic approaches and also to modern business-cycle analysis based on microeconomic optimization models. By its integration of a business-cycle and growth perspective, Åkerman and Dahmén's analysis was similar to that of Schumpeter in Business Cycles. But their notions of malinvestment, structural tensions, and development blocks provided an original explanation of the turning points in the business cycle. The Åkerman–Dahmén approach is more valid for innovation-driven cycles such as the ICT boom in the late 1990s and the subsequent crisis than for cycles with an independent role of financial-market conditions.

Constitutional theorizing typically employs a bi-level analytical framework wherein the choice of rules precedes the actions that people pursue within those rules. Constitutions are thus products of planning and are prior to the spontaneous ordering that characterizes market processes. This paper explores an alternative conceptual framework wherein rules and actions are coeval and not sequential. Hence, constitutions are subject to spontaneous ordering just as are ordinary market processes. All societies necessarily possess constitutional frameworks that frame the actions of participants; however, those frameworks are not fully settled prior to action but rather evolve through action, which means, in turn, that constitutions, like societies, are living entities and not background precepts against which societal life evolves.