This paper examines the profitability and risk of a naive strategy of forward exchange speculation during pegged and flexible exchange rate systems. It suggests a new method of calculating these speculative returns and shows that the average return was much less than previously supposed and that the distribution of returns differed between systems and countries.

Define Rt as the ratio of the value of an asset at the end of the tthperiod to its value at the end of the previous period. Rt is then a one-period relative equal to unity plus the interest rate. Assume that Rt is an independent, normally distributed random variable with mean μ and nonzero variance σ2. Rt is then observed as

where the disturbance term ∈t t is independently and normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2. To assess the long-term expected rate of return of the asset, it is desirable to estimate its expected increment in value of the one-period relative raised to the Nth power, i.e., μN.

In his recent paper in this Journal, Miller [3] proposed, following Adler's results [1], that “the investor exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion with respect to expected wealth if, as increased holding σ constant, the slope of the indifference loci decreases” [3, p. 301]. He further attempted to have shown that in general the sign of () is the same as the sign of r'(W) (the derivative of the absolute risk aversion measure), but this is not proved.

Some basic ideas of a model of the international term structure of interest rates are outlined. Based on Roll's (1970) theory of equilibrium interest rates in an efficient bond market of a closed economy, we show that the term structure of interest rates in countries whose residents engage in international financial transactions is a function of domestic and foreign traders' expectations of future domestic and foreign spot interest rates, or their degree of risk aversion, and of differences in time preferences.

A student of financial theory must always assume that managers will follow a course of action that will lead to a higher value of the firm rather than a lower value, given a choice between two courses of action. Yet, Lewellen and Racette (hereafter LR) in a recent paper [1] comparing the sale of convertible debentures with the sale of straight debt assumed that managers will behave in a way that will lead to submaximal firm value. The purpose of this paper is to correct the LR error.

In this paper, we develop a Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) using a mean-lower partial moment framework. We explicitly derive the valuation formulas for the equilibrium value of risky assets and provide a distribution-free testable hypothesis for empirical validation of the new CAPM. We show the invariance of our results to the problem of estimation risk. We also show that when the probability distribution of security rer turns is the normal distribution, the stable Paretian distribution (with the same characteristic exponent between 1 and 2 and the same skewness parameter (not necessarily zero)), or the multivariate t-distribution, our CAPM reduces to the traditional two-parameter CAPM.

This paper utilizes a two-parameter model of segmented securities markets to develop equilibrium implications concerning the impact of statutory investment restrictions upon the market prices and allocation of risky securities. The distinguishing feature of the model is the existence of a subset of securities common to the opportunities of all investors and therefore said to “span” the investor population. These common opportunities are shown to permit intersubset security transactions which integrate the various market segments and lead to the following theorem and tendency concerning equilibrium prices and portfolios:

Theorem: In the absence of active barriers against short positions, the equilibrium expected return for any security spanning the investor population is an exact linear function of its contribution to total market risk, irrespective of the number of distinct investor segments that may exist.

Tendency: The economic characteristics of the equilibrium risky portfolio for any investor, irrespective of the market segment to which he or she may belong, will approximate the characteristics of the market portfolio of all risky assets in the economy in all relevant risk dimensions.

Professor Schwartz's [6] attempt to provide an economic model of trade credit is to be applauded. I am in complete accord with his statement [6, p. 656] that “the aggregate importance of trade credit and the economic effects generated by changes in trade credit flows suggest that greater attention should be given to this source of funds.” For too long, thorough qualitative and quantitative analyses applied to the phenomenon of trade credit have been somewhat neglected. In his attempt to remedy this situation, Schwartz is to be complimented.

The theory on the relationship between real and nominal interest rates is based on the well-known Fisher equation:

where: i = nominal interest rate;

r = real interest rate;

λ = percentage change in price level: P /P0 - 1 where P and P0 denote end-of-period and current levels of some aggregate price index, respectively.

This paper examines the problem of the selection of first-, second-, and thirddegree undominated portfolios by using the properties of the Laplace transform (L-T) of the distributions of portfolio returns. It is assumed that the joint distribution of n interdependent prospects, as well as its Laplace transform, is known or may be estimated from past data. Next, it is shown that the L-T of the portfolio returns may be expressed very simply in terms of the L-T of the joint distribution. A theorem is then proved, which uses results from L-T theory and shows that stochastic dominance between two portfolios of first-, second- or third-degree may be expressed by inequalities between the L-T's of the portfolios and their derivatives. It is also shown through an example how this theorem may be used in finding undominated portfolios.

The author argues, in this paper, that there are at least three reasons why a simultaneous equation bias may exist and be significant in single equation estimates of executive compensation when one of the independent variables is a measure of firm performance. First, there is simultaneity between the determination of the MRP of the executive input and profit maximizing output in the classical microeconomic sense. Second, where firm performance is used as a measure of executive quality, then a simultaneous bias may develop. Third, the presence of expense preference behavior could result in simultaneous but inverse effects on executive compensation and firm performance.