We use a novel database to study the timeliness of hedge fund monthly performance disclosures. Managers engage in strategic timing: poor monthly returns are reported with delay, sometimes clustered with stronger subsequent performance, suggestive of “performance smoothing.” We posit that propensity to delay could reveal operational risk and/or poor managerial quality. Consistent with this, a portfolio strategy that buys (sells) funds with historically timely (untimely) reporting delivers 3% annual-style-adjusted returns. Investor flows are lower following reporting delays, although there are potential benefits to managers from delaying reporting when performance is sufficiently poor. We conclude that timely disclosure is an important consideration for hedge fund managers and investors.

It is commonly believed that deposit rates are determined primarily by supply: Depositors require higher deposit rates from risky banks, thereby creating market discipline. An alternative perspective is that market discipline is limited (e.g., due to deposit insurance and/or enhanced capital regulation) and that internal demand for funding by banks determines rates. Using branch-level deposit rate data, we find little evidence for market discipline as rates are similar across bank capitalization levels. In contrast, banks’ loan growth has a causal effect on deposit rates; for example, branches’ deposit rates are correlated with loan growth in other states in which their bank has some presence, suggesting internal capital markets help reallocate the bank’s funding.

We examine the formation and evolution of corporate risk culture, that is, the preferences toward risk and uncertainty shared by a firm’s leaders, as well as its effect on corporate policies. We document persistent commonality in risk attitudes inside firms, which arises through the selection of leaders with similar preferences and is rooted in the founders’ risk attitudes. Changes in corporate risk culture over time affect corporate investment policies, whereas cross-sectional differences in founders’ risk attitudes, that is, firms’ initial risk culture, contribute to differences across firms in persistent firm policies, such as research and development intensity.

This paper examines management’s motives for rejecting takeover bids and the associated shareholder wealth effects. We develop measures of initial bid quality and find a significant negative correlation between the quality of a bid and rejection. The likelihood of higher follow-on offers decreases with bid quality and is greater when targets have classified boards and chief executive officers (CEOs) with significant personal wealth tied to the transaction. Target CEOs who fail to close high-quality offers experience a significant rate of forced turnover. Overall, the results support a price improvement motive for contested bids.

Can the degree of predictability found in data be explained by existing asset pricing models? We provide two theoretical upper bounds on the R2 of predictive regressions. Using data on the market portfolio and component portfolios, we find that the empirical R2s are significantly greater than the theoretical upper bounds. Our results suggest that the most promising direction for future research should aim to identify new state variables that are highly correlated with stock returns instead of seeking more elaborate stochastic discount factors.

Corporate bond returns exhibit predictability in a manner consistent with efficient pricing. Many equity characteristics, such as accruals, standardized unexpected earnings, and idiosyncratic volatility, do not impact bond returns. Profitability and asset growth are negatively related to corporate bond returns. Because firms that are profitable or have high asset growth (and hence more collateral) should be less risky, with lower required returns, the evidence accords with the risk–reward paradigm. Past equity returns are positively related to bond returns, indicating that equities lead bonds. Cross-sectional bond return predictors generally do not provide materially high Sharpe ratios after accounting for trading costs.

I examine acquisitions of private firms by public acquirers to better understand the effects of financial constraints on the division of economic gains in takeovers. Empirical tests exploit interstate bank branching deregulation, which relaxes financial constraints on private firms and can strengthen their bargaining position in an acquisition. Using a proxy for the degree to which targets depend on acquirers for financing, I find that private targets depend less on acquirers as a result of interstate bank branching deregulation. Relaxing financial constraints on private targets leads to an increase in target valuation multiples and a decrease in acquirer wealth gains.

We investigate whether saving Wall Street through TARP really saved Main Street during the recent financial crisis. Our difference-in-difference analysis suggests that TARP statistically and economically significantly increased net job creation and net hiring establishments and decreased business and personal bankruptcies. The results are robust, including accounting for endogeneity. The main mechanisms driving the results appear to be increases in commercial real estate lending and off-balance-sheet real estate guarantees. These results suggest that saving Wall Street via TARP may have helped save Main Street, complementing the TARP literature and contributing to the cost–benefit debate.

The low (high) abnormal returns of stocks with high (low) beta, which we refer to as the beta anomaly, is one of the most persistent anomalies in empirical asset pricing research. This article demonstrates that investors’ demand for lottery-like stocks is an important driver of the beta anomaly. The beta anomaly is no longer detected when beta-sorted portfolios are neutralized to lottery demand, regression specifications control for lottery demand, or factor models include a lottery demand factor. The beta anomaly is concentrated in stocks with low levels of institutional ownership and it exists only when the price impact of lottery demand is concentrated in high-beta stocks.

We explore the properties of equity mutual funds that experience a loss of assets after poor performance. We document that both inflows and outflows are less sensitive to performance, because performance-sensitive investors leave or decide not to invest after bad performance. Consistent with the idea that attrition measures the sorting of performance-sensitive investors, we find that attrition has less of an impact on the fund’s flow–performance sensitivity for institutional funds where there is less dispersion in investor performance sensitivity. Also, attrition has no effect on the flow–performance sensitivity when attrition arises after good performance or investors invest for nonperformance reasons.

The growth rate of industrial electricity usage predicts future stock returns up to 1 year with an R2 of 9%. High industrial electricity usage today predicts low stock returns in the future, consistent with a countercyclical risk premium. Industrial electricity usage tracks the output of the most cyclical sectors. Our findings bridge a gap between the asset pricing literature and the business cycle literature, which uses industrial electricity usage to gauge production and output in real time. Industrial electricity growth compares favorably with traditional financial variables, and it outperforms Cooper and Priestley’s output gap measure in real time.

Cost-of-capital assessments with factor models require quantitative forward-looking estimates. We recommend estimating Vasicek-shrunk betas with 1–4 years of daily stock returns and then shrinking betas a second time (and more for smaller stocks and longer-term projects), because the underlying betas are themselves time-varying. Such estimators also work well in other developed countries and for small-minus-big (SMB) and high-minus-low (HML) exposures. If own historical stock returns are not available, peer betas based on market cap should be used. Historical industry averages have almost no predictive power and should never be used.

We test the hypothesis that investment constraints in delegated portfolio management may distort demand for stocks, leading to price underreaction to news and stock return predictability. We find that institutions tend not to buy more of a stock with good news that they already overweight; they are reluctant to sell a stock with bad news that they already underweight. Stocks with good news overweighted by institutions subsequently significantly outperform stocks with bad news underweighted by institutions. The impact of institutional investment constraints sheds new light on asset pricing anomalies such as stock price momentum and post–earnings announcement drift.

We analyze the flow of money between mutual fund categories, finding strong evidence of seasonality in investor risk aversion. Aggregate investor flow data reveal an investor preference for safe mutual funds in autumn and risky funds in spring. During September alone, outflows from equity funds average $13 billion, controlling for previously documented flow determinants (e.g., capital-gains overhang). This movement of large amounts of money between fund categories is correlated with seasonality in investor risk aversion, consistent with investors preferring safer (riskier) investments in autumn (spring). We find consistent evidence in Canada and also in Australia, where seasons are offset by 6 months.

We examine the impact of trading on markets partially exempt from National Market System requirements (“dark venues”) on equity-market quality. We find evidence consistent with the notion that dark venues rely on their special features to segregate order flow based on asymmetric information risk, which results in their transactions being less informed and contributing less to price discovery on the consolidated market. Except for the execution of large transactions and trading in small stocks, the effects of dark-venue order segmentation are damaging to overall market quality. Our results have important implications for the regulation of international equity markets.

Using unique transactions data for individual high-frequency trading (HFT) firms in the U.K. equity market, we examine the extent to which the trading activity of individual HFT firms is correlated with each other and the impact on price efficiency. We find that HFT order flow, net positions, and total volume exhibit significantly higher commonality than those of a comparison group of investment banks. However, intraday HFT order flow commonality is associated with a permanent price impact, suggesting that commonality in HFT activity is information based and so does not generally contribute to undue price pressure and price dislocations.

Motivated by a theoretical model, we examine for 43 countries whether it is policy or policy uncertainty that affects technological innovation more. Innovation activities, measured by patent-based proxies, are not, on average, affected by which policy is in place. Innovation activities, however, drop significantly during times of policy uncertainty measured by national elections. The drop is greater for more influential innovations (citations in the right tail, exploratory rather than exploitative innovations) and for innovation-intensive industries. We use close presidential elections and ethnic fractionalization to address endogeneity concerns. We uncover the mechanism underlying the main result by showing that the number of patenting inventors decreases with policy uncertainty. Political compromise, we conclude, encourages innovation.

We investigate whether incentives to join the Fortune 500 affect corporate decisions. Firms closer to the cutoff appear to take actions to join the list by engaging in more mergers and acquisitions activity, bidding for larger targets, and paying higher takeover premia. Further, the relation is stronger for firms with more-entrenched chief executive officers, and the stock market reaction to bids is worse when bidders are close to the Fortune 500’s cutoff. A 1994 methodological change by Fortune acts as an exogenous shock for identification. Our results suggest that firms try to increase revenues to join the Fortune 500 but that such actions adversely affect shareholders.

Using a database of daily institutional trades, we document that a majority of short-term institutional trades lose money. In aggregate, over 23% of round-trip trades are held for less than 3 months, and the returns on these trades average -3.91% (nonannualized). These losses are pervasive across all types of stocks, with the lowest returns occurring in small stocks, value stocks, and low-momentum stocks. Short-term trades lose more in more volatile markets. Across funds, the worst short-term returns accrue to funds that do the most trading, and there is no evidence of persistent skill or disposition effect in short-term institutional trades.

We show that a simple, intuitive variable, Goliath versus David (GVD), reflects time variation in discount rates related to changes in aggregate business conditions. GVD is the annual change in the weight of the largest 250 firms in the aggregate stock market and is motivated by research that shows that small firms are more severely impacted than large firms by economic shocks due to differences in access to external finance. We find that GVD is the best single predictor of out-of-sample market returns among traditional predictors, predicting quarterly market returns with an out-of-sample R2 of 6.3% in the 1976–2011 evaluation period.