I document a new stylized fact: The higher the degree of institutional ownership (IO) in a portfolio, the more time-varying expected returns rather than changes in expected cash flows drive changes in its valuation. Empirical evidence suggests that institutions’ time-varying sensitivity to the risk of holding stocks translates into time-varying expected returns on high-IO stocks. In my model, imperfect risk sharing between different types of investors generates cross-sectional differences in return predictability based on ownership, even among a priori identical stocks. My findings suggest an economic rationale for weak return predictability of small stocks and predictability reversals of stocks and real estate investment trusts.

Pricing is integral to insurance design, directly influencing firm behavior and moral hazard, though its effects are insufficiently understood. I study a quasi-experiment in which deposit insurance premiums were changed for U.S. banks with unequal timing, generating differentials between banks in both levels and risk-based “steepness” of premiums. I find evidence that differentials in premiums resulted in distortions, including regulatory arbitrage, but also provided strong incentives to curb moral hazard. I find that firms that faced stronger pricing incentives to become (or remain) safer were more likely to subsequently do so than similar firms that faced weaker pricing incentives.

We examine a link between bond exchange-traded fund (ETF) creation and redemption processes and the underlying bond market liquidity. Using daily creation and redemption data, we find that including a bond in a creation or redemption basket has a favorable impact on the bond’s liquidity for both high-yield and investment-grade markets. The improvement in liquidity persists during times of market stress with this impact being stronger for redemptions than creations. Our results suggest that ETF mispricing arbitrage explains the improvement in bond liquidity. However, we also find evidence that transaction costs and bond inventory management limit the ETF arbitrage.

We study how the U.S. government’s anti-counterfeiting enforcement actions through Special 301 Reports influence U.S. businesses. We show that anti-counterfeiting enforcement in foreign countries improves U.S. firms’ sales, profitability, and valuations. Firms significantly reduce capital and research and development investments when their brands and products are protected from counterfeiting activities. Anti-counterfeiting enforcement measures also improve brand asset value, brand profitability, brand inventiveness, market penetration, and customer loyalty.

We show theoretically that the usual estimated investment strategies will not achieve the optimal Sharpe ratio when the dimensionality is high relative to sample size, and the $ 1/N $ rule is optimal in a 1-factor model with diversifiable risks as dimensionality increases, which explains why it is difficult to beat the $ 1/N $ rule in practice. We also explore conditions under which it can be beaten, and find that we can outperform it by combining it with the estimated rules when $ N $ is small, and by combining it with anomalies or machine learning portfolios, conditional on the profitability of the latter, when $ N $ is large.

This article examines whether and how stock mispricing can affect the probability of CEO turnover. In a sample of 1,573 US public firms, I find that, after controlling for fundamental performance, a 1-standard-deviation negative uninformative stock price shock increases the likelihood of CEO turnover by 10%. The mispricing-turnover sensitivity is stronger at firms with an independent board, and a difference-in-difference analysis further supports that finding. Ancillary results suggest that independent directors’ career concerns may play a role in the response of independent boards to mispricing.

Information production associated with derivatives markets is not a sideshow; rather, it has significantly positive spillover effects on an array of corporate decisions of underlying firms. Using a regression-discontinuity design based on exogenous variation in options availability as an instrument for changes in the information environment, we show that options introductions have causal effects on corporate policies on both sides of the balance sheet. Through improved information efficiency, options availability reduces the need for debt and payout, increases efficient investment, and yields superior innovation. We conduct two independent experiments demonstrating that our instrument’s impact is not derived from alternative channels.

Professor Melicher has conducted an interesting study of the effects of financial factors on beta coefficients and their variations. He reduced the perennial multicollinearity problem by using a factor analysis to screen the financial variables used in the statistical analysis. This study is another in the growing body of literature concerned with beta coefficients as measures of risk. My comments on this paper will consider separately (1) the research design (i.e., what the study directly covered), and (2) the inferences drawn by the author versus what the beta coefficients and their variation really do measure.

Time series techniques based on autocovariance and spectral analysis methods have often been used for statistical analyses of commodity and stock prices, with the usual conclusion that the prices, zt, are best described by a random walk:

where the errors, ut (alternatively called shocks or residuals), have zero expectation and form a sequence of independent random variables [5 and 8 ].

We empirically study the strategic behavior of levered firms in competitive and noncompetitive environments. We find that regulation induces firms to increase leverage, and this reduces their ability to compete when deregulation occurs. Large and small levered firms adopt different strategies upon deregulation. Whereas more levered small firms charge higher prices to increase margins at the expense of market shares, highly levered large firms prey on their rivals by increasing output and reducing prices to increase their market shares. The difference in their behavior is due to differences in their probability of bankruptcy and their financing constraints.

The recent experience of increased volatility of exchange rates among major currencies coupled with highly unstable price levels necessitates a more fundamental understanding of exchange risk. This necessity is further enhanced by the increased internationalization of consumption, investment, and other aspects of economic activity.

In their comment on a paper by Porter, Wart, and Ferguson [7], Professors Frankfurter and Phillips [2] have raised two serious objections to “any attempt to compare and contrast SD and EV efficiency criteria on empirical grounds.” Essentially, they have argued that empirical comparisons of SD and EV selection rules are invalid because:

a. The EV portfolio building algorithms are not allowed to operate in such tests, and

b. While the estimators of true E and V are derived from and supported by elementary sampling theory, there exists no comparable sampling theory for the estimation of total probability functions.

The capital asset pricing model of Sharpe [39], Lintner [28], and Mossin [33] has been the basis for many theoretical and empirical studies in capital markets. One criticism of the model hasbeen directed at the assumption that investors optimize in a one-period framework. Fama [7] and Merton [30] have shown that the results of this one-period optimization model are consistent with the results for an intertemporal optimization model if the investment opportunity set is constant over time. Specifically, the relevant parameters for the distributions of risky securities (i.e., conditional means and variances) must be constant over time. Merton has argued that this is a restrictive assumption, but there has been very little empirical evidence to suggest that changes in the investment opportunity set are significant.

In recent years, large commercial banks in the United States have turned to so-called “liability management” as a way to acquire additional funds. The use of Certificates of Deposit (CD's), Eurodollar balances, debentures, and recently the issuing of commercial paper through their holding companies represent an extension of the more traditional secondary reserve asset management approach to bank liquidity and reserve adjustment.

The arithmetic formulas appearing in the mathematics of finance are practically useless unless one has available either excellent tables and infinite patience, or working computer programs, a machine, and a budget. The present article shows how a number of useful topics in this area can be dealt with effectively by the more tractable mathematics of continuous processes. The methods yield approximate answers of high quality, and in some cases exact answers as well, with small effort, and have obvious applications in “truth in lending” investigations.

It has been suggested that information has the three following uses:

1. Information can be employed to earn trading profits.

2. Information can improve the operating decisions of a firm or group of firms and thereby increase the stock price.

3. Information can reduce the risk of a firm or group of firms and thereby increase the stock price.

A number of studies have recently attempted to explain cross sectional variations in selected characteristics of commercial bank operations through least squares regression analysis.1 Generally, whether the particular study objective was to explain inter bank differences in costs, revenues, profits, or loan rates, several explanatory variables were isolated which varied systematically among banks, and which at least partially explained differences in the dependent variable. The explanatory variables which were shown to be theoretically relevant, and statistically significant, were then interpreted literally and designated as having causal characteristics.

We study when CEOs with legal expertise are valuable for firms. In general, lawyer CEOs are negatively associated with frequency and severity in employment civil rights, contract, labor, personal injury, and securities litigation. This effect is partly induced by the CEO’s management of litigation risk and reduction in other risky policies. Lawyer CEOs are further associated with an increase in gatekeepers providing additional legal oversight and a decrease in innovative activities with high litigation risk. Lawyer CEOs are more valuable during periods of enhanced compliance requirements and regulatory pressure and in industries with high litigation risk or better growth opportunities.

We demonstrate that investment income taxes incentivize capital allocation to the ecofriendly green sector away from the non-ecofriendly brown sector in a stylized economy. This tax reduces the arrival intensity of climate disasters, delivers the socially optimal allocation, and can be jointly implemented with a carbon tax, expanding policymakers’ toolkit to reduce climate disasters. Extending the model with heterogeneous investors, we show that investment income taxes can obtain support from a political majority and thereby relax political constraints faced by a carbon tax alone.

In [1, p. 999] I wrongly stated that “the solution locus generated by the chance-constrained problem is efficient (for the class of utility function implied by the expected wealth-probability of ruin criterion) if the assets follow a multinomial distribution with means above the survival level.” In support of this statement footnote 6 of [1] attempted to establish the quasiconcavity of the expected utility function

in the (μ, σ) plane, where F is the normal distribution, z = (s-μ)/σ < 0, s is the survival level, μ is the mean of the portfolio, σ is the standard deviation, and c is a positive constant. The condition

was claimed to hold for any two assets (μ1., σ1) and (μ2., σ2) on any given indifference curve of (1), where zi. = (s-μi.)/σi., i = 1,2, and zγ = (s−μγ)/σγ corresponds to the convex combination μγ = γμ1 + (1−γ) μ2, σγ = γσ1+ (1−γ) σ2, in the (μ, σ) plane. (Note that this is not the same as asserting that F(z) is a convex function of μ and σ, which it is not as an examination of its Hessian determinant would readily show.)