We find evidence that conflicts of interest arising from mergers and acquisitions (M&A) relations influence analysts' recommendations, corroborating regulators' and practitioners' suspicions in a setting, i.e., M&A relations, not previously examined in research on analyst conflicts. In addition, the M&A context allows us to disentangle the conflict of interest effect from selection bias. We find that analysts affiliated with acquirer advisors upgrade acquirer stocks around M&A deals, even around all-cash deals, in which selection bias is unlikely. Also consistent with conflict of interest but not selection bias, target-affiliated analysts publish optimistic reports about acquirers after, but not before, the exchange ratio of an all-stock deal is set.

This article incorporates well-documented managerial traits into a tradeoff model of capital structure to study their impact on corporate financial policy and firm value. Optimistic and/or overconfident managers choose higher debt levels and issue new debt more often but need not follow a pecking order. The model also surprisingly uncovers that these managerial traits can play a positive role. Biased managers' higher debt levels restrain them from diverting funds, which increases firm value by reducing this manager-shareholder conflict. Although higher debt levels delay investment, mildly biased managers' investment decisions can increase firm value by reducing this bondholder-shareholder conflict.

This Paper explores the importance and price implications of style investing by institutional investors in the stock market. To analyze styles, we assign stocks to deciles or segments across three style dimensions: size, value/growth, and sector. we find strong evidence that institutional investors reallocate and sector. We find strong evidence that institutional investors reallocate across style groupings more intensively than across random stock groupings. In addition, we show that own segment style inflows and refurns positively forecast future stock returns, which distant segament style inflows and returns forecast negatively. We argue that behavioral theories play a role in explaining these results.

We apply an event-study methodology on over 10,000 Morningstar star rating changes and find that Morningstar has subsantial independent influence on the investment allocation decisions of retail mutual fund investors. It is the discrete change in the star rating itself and not the change in the underlying performance measures that drives frow. We document econnomically and statistically significant positive abnormal flow following rating upgrades, and negative abnormal flow following rating downgrades. In contrast to the cross-sectional flow performance literature, we find evidence of investor punishment of performance declines, some of which is evident immediately in the month of the rating change.

Agency problems in firms are prevalent because of a scarcity of wealthy principals with corporate governance ability, whom we call “restructuring specialists.” We investigate how this scarce resource, “agency cost-free capital,” is allocated. We show that the restructuring specialists may acquire blocks only in those states of the worls in which they can increase firm value the most, which corresponds to a takeover. Firms with dispersed ownership and firms with a financial intermediary as a blockholder can coexist, although they are otherwise identical. The moderl can explain differences in corporate ownership structures and restructuring mechanisms across economies.

This paper examines the effect of commercial bank entry on underwriting spreads for IPOs, SEOs, and debt issues using a long time series that spans 30 years, from 1975 to 2004. We find that, on average, commercial banks charge lower spreads of approximately 72 basis points for IPOs, 43 basis points for SEOs, and 14 basis points for debt over the entire sample period. The economic impact of commercial banks on lowering underwriting spreads is most significant when commercial banks were allowed to enter via Section 20 subsidiaries but persists beyond. Commercial bank entry into underwriting appears to have a procompetitive effect that lasts many years after their initial entry.

This paper provides the first theoretical explanation and the first empirical analysis of contingent value rights (CVRs), which have been used as a means of payment in acquisitions, exchange offers, debt restructurings, Chapter 11 reorganizations, and lawsuit settlements. A CVR is a put option committing to pay additional cash or securities to CVR holders, contingent on the issuer's share price falling below a prespecified reference level. In this paper, we develop a model to show that CVRs can help a higher-intrinsic-value firm to reveal its firm type when the firm faces an asymmetric information problem. Our model predicts that i) when CVRs are offered along with cash or stock, the announcement period abnormal stock return is greater than that in stock offers, ii) firms facing more severe asymmetric information problems are more likely to offer CVRs to signal their firm type, and iii) firms that are relatively more cash-constrained are more likely to offer CVRs rather than cash. We test all three predictions using a sample of mergers and acquisitions. Our empirical results are consistent with the predictions of the model.

In this paper we present a new method of approximating the risk neutral density (RND) from option prices based on the C-type Gram-Charlier series expansion (GCSE) of a probability density function. The exponential form of this type of GCSE guarantees that it will always give positive values of the risk neutral probabilities, and it can allow for stronger deviations from normality, which are two drawbacks of the A-type GCSE used in practice. To evaluate the performance of the suggested expansion of the RND, the paper presents simulation and empirical evidence.

Tests for the existence and the sign of the volatility risk premium are often based on expected option hedging errors. When the hedge is performed under the ideal conditions of continuous trading and correct model specification, the sign of the premium is the same as the sign of the mean hedging error for a large class of models. We show that discrete trading and model misspecification may cause the standard test to yield unreliable results. In particular, ignoring jump risk premia can lead to incorrect conclusions. We also show that delta-gamma hedges do not increase the reliability of the test.