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Investment Banking and Analyst Objectivity: Evidence from Analysts Affiliated with Mergers and Acquisitions Advisors

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 April 2009

Adam C. Kolasinski  and
S. P. Kothari
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Abstract

We find evidence that conflicts of interest arising from mergers and acquisitions (M&A) relations influence analysts' recommendations, corroborating regulators' and practitioners' suspicions in a setting, i.e., M&A relations, not previously examined in research on analyst conflicts. In addition, the M&A context allows us to disentangle the conflict of interest effect from selection bias. We find that analysts affiliated with acquirer advisors upgrade acquirer stocks around M&A deals, even around all-cash deals, in which selection bias is unlikely. Also consistent with conflict of interest but not selection bias, target-affiliated analysts publish optimistic reports about acquirers after, but not before, the exchange ratio of an all-stock deal is set.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis , Volume 43 , Issue 4 , December 2008 , pp. 817 - 842
Copyright
Copyright © School of Business Administration, University of Washington 2008

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