Recent interest in promoting the economic development of the so-called “underdeveloped” areas has stimulated concern with the problem of the effects of social anil cultural institutions on economic growth. A major difficulty in the study of this problem is the scarcity of cases of marked economic development in non-Western cultural milieus, Japan being the major striking exception. Under these circumstances it may be of some interest to examine cases of less striking change on a smaller scale, not only for what can be learned about each case, but also for the assistance they may give in interpreting the more numerous cases of little or no economic growth.

In order to examine the relation between exports and inequality, this article first estimates per-capita income, exports, and other indicators of economic development in Mato Grosso, Brazil. Manuscript data are analyzed to measure and interpret three kinds of inequality: of income, of total wealth, and of landholding. The results suggest that exports and foreign ownership contributed far less to inequality than is imagined in dependency theory.

The Classical Gold Standard period, with high capital mobility and fixed-exchange rates, is usually seen as the extreme case of international constraints on monetary policy. Contrary to this view, we show how central bank balance sheets offset the effects of international shocks on domestic interest rates. In contrast, in the United States, a gold standard country without a central bank, the reaction of money market rates was two to four times stronger than that of interest rates in countries with a central bank. Our study is based on the monthly balance sheets of all central banks in the world (i.e., 21) from 1891–1913.

Drawing on a set of insurance contracts brokered in Antwerp in 1562–1563, we demonstrate that by that time Antwerp hosted a sophisticated, large, and international market for marine insurance in which small and large traders could acquire and sell insurance, backed by the intermediation of a large broker, Juan Henriquez who functioned as an open-access institution. Using information from Henriquez's ledgers which was also available to underwriters, we find that insurance premiums reflected the underlying risk and that agents were able to determine the effect of different contract parameters.

This article assesses how the government of Porfirio Díaz (1876–1910) negotiated sovereign loans. Mexico was a serial defaulter that established a good reputation and issued bonds abroad at progressively better conditions. Based on new archival material, the article demonstrates that borrowing terms improved not only because of sounder fundamentals, but also due to the efforts of high officials to negotiate with debt underwriters. The Mexicans never accepted a patron bank and used the offers from American banks to bargain with European competitors. They acted according to the government's reputation, the underwriters' status, and the ideology of the Porfirian state.

New estimates of the growth in total and per capita consumption are developed for the Soviet Union during the first three Five-Year Plans. These estimates show that consumption per head rose 27 percent from 1928 to 1937. The gains were confined to the urban population and to those moving from the countly to the city. In the standard interpretation, per capita consumption fell in the 1930s. The reasons for the difference in interpretation are examined in detail. The estimates presented here are based on new information and on alternative approaches to valuation and index number problems.

This article shows that there were timing, geographic, and sectoral anomalies in the 1937/38 recession, none of which are easily explained by aggregate shocks. I argue that an auto industry supply shock contributed both to the recession's anomalies and to its severity. Labor-strife-induced wage increases and an increase in raw material costs led auto manufacturers to raise prices in fall 1937. Expectations of these price increases brought auto sales forward. When auto prices finally rose, sales plummeted. This shock likely reduced 1938 auto sales by roughly 600,000 units and 1938 GDP growth by 0.5–1 percentage point.

Today's best-known price indexes for Wholesale Price and Consumer Price Indexesthe Unitedof theStates are the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the Indexes of Prices Received and Paid by Farmers, issued by the Department of Agriculture. These indexes, however, are comparatively new. The “Wholesale Price Index” dates from 1902 with indexes covering the years 1890-1901. The “Consumer Price Index” is of even more recent origin. Retail food price indexes were established on a regular basis in 1901, again with data back to 1890. Other goods and services were not added until after World War I, with estimates back to 1913 based on special studies in shipbuilding cities. The “Index of Prices Received by Farmers” was issued by the Department of Agriculture in 1924 and “Prices Paid by Farmers” in 1928. Botfi of these series were extended back to 1910.

This paper uses independent real wages, earnings, labor force data, and an examination of Kuznet's 1953 data to explore the recent contention that real per capita incomes for most of the American population declined from 1923 through 1929. It concludes that there is little evidence to support this contention.

The seasonality of weddings molded itself to regionally specific patterns of labor in early-modern England. Advantage can thus be taken of the widely available if unlikely source of parish registers of marriages to reveal the timing of regional specialization, defined narrowly as the ability of regions to forgo the production of the staples of local consumption and concentrate on whatever production best suited local resources of land and labor.

There is impressive evidence that wealthy peasants contributed significantly to the success of the Meiji Restoration, the political revolution that launched Japan on her career of modernization. These rural capitalists, for such they were, helped to give the revolution direction as well as power. How otherwise is one to account for a government dominated by samurai, the elite carriers of tradition, following policies that did great violence to Japan's past and destroyed the privileged status of the warrior class? But if the influence of the representatives of rural wealth was so strong, why did they consent to a clique of warriors holding political power almost as a private prerogative for a generation after the Restoration? Despite the demand for a share in power in the eighties, they did consent and weakly accepted the Meiji constitution which sanctified authoritarian government.

This paper will test three models of underdevelopment against the experience of Thailand from 1850 to 1940, when Thailand became a major rice exporter. The models are a dependency model, a staples model, and a supply and demand model of technical and institutional change. The technical and institutional change model provides the best explanation. Divergences between the goals of national security and economic development as well as those between the private interests of the elite decision makers and the social interest explain Thai underinvestment in increasing agricultural productivity and account in large part for the persistence of underdevelopment.

In a review of a recent play by T. S. Eliot, the critic sums up the action as “a tragedy of non-communication between parent and child.” We may be sure the reviewer did not intend to raise a doubt in the reader's mind as to whether the father or son in question had difficulty in getting to a telephone, finding a telegraph office or deciphering one another's handwriting. The level of communication he must have had in mind lies deep in the human dependency on expressive symbols. These primary factors of human experience—primary in the sense that nothing stands between them and the raw sensations and impulses—are made up of words, gestures, and images which are, in turn, invariably organized in systems or complexes. These we call by such names as aims, standards and ideals or, more generally, attitudes.

This multiple regression study of women's and men's wages in New Jersey and Pennsylvania manufacturing finds that the average pay gap has changed in favor of women from 1900–1950 in several industries and in the aggregate. Technological homogenization of jobs is suggested as a possible explanation of gender-based wage convergence. An overall framework of forces and relations of production is outlined, and future work on this newly introduced body of data is suggested.

Flaring westward from the upper valley of the Wabash lies the prairie triangle, embracing most of central and northern Illinois and almost all of Iowa. Much of this region today lies in the heart of the corn belt. Its economic history is a story of practical experimentation, adaptation, and change as its restless settlers endeavored after 1820 to unlock its wealth. To do so, the prairie pioneers had to adapt techniques and crops to the novel environment of an almost treeless grassland at a time when both technology and markets were undergoing revolutionary change. In 1830 the farm-makers had hardly begun their task; by the 1890's the land was tamed, the corn belt a fact, its farmers on the threshold of a golden age.