Archeologists assure us that organized social life has existed on this earth for about two hundred and fifty thousand years. How millions of people have sought to satisfy their wants over this tremendous span of time is the acknowledged province of economic history. Yet, for lack of records, the gild of economic historians must, for the most part, confine their attention to the last one per cent of this time span; indeed the great bulk of research in economic history is devoted the last one-tenth of one per cent of the archeologists' two hundred and fifty thousand years of social history. Even then the economic historian is utterly overwhelmed with facts. He who essays to write the economic history of the United States, for example, must depict as best can the economic activities of people for more than a hundred and fifty years, farmers, merchants, manufacturers, wage-earners, rentiers; men, women and children in all walks of life, in all variety of occupations. The task is utterly staggering. An army of economic historians would be required to write a complete economic history of the United States; a regiment at least to write a faithful factual account of a single industry.

New spatial patterns, with areas specializing by function rather than industry, reflect twentieth-century developments in industrial organization, the role of the state, and Britain's system of cities. In the short run, World War II and postwar regional policy increased factory-building and employment in formerly depressed areas. Longer-run effects of both helped concentrate research and development within the South near London and dispersed routinized production to other areas. Organizational links within firms and to government departments, intellectual and commercial contacts in London, and locational preferences of professional and technical workers influenced R & D location.

The Old South's economic stake in western land expansion and slave migration is examined in a two-region, general equilibrium model of slave mobility. The model separates the effect on the Old South's assets and slave population of more western land from that of slave sales per se. The authors conclude that the Old South had no economic stake in the New South. The most conservative estimate reveals that a doubling of western lands in 1850 would have increased Old South wealth by less than two percent.

The paper is based upon research over a rather long period into the public activities in railroad construction in the southern states. Table I-A presents a quantitative summary of public contributions in cash, bonds, and other securities; government-endorsed bonds; remission of Federal import duties; and estimated realized values of Federal land grants prior to 1861. It represents an attempt to give a preliminary summary of the public effort. The estimates on public land grants are tentative, and other items are subject to further refinements through additional studies. It does not represent the total of the public effort, since no account is taken in this summary of the investment values of the many important public and quasi-public contributions in services, the uses of public streets and other properties, tax exemptions, and banking privileges. An adequate appraisal of these must await further research. The summary does reflect, however, some of the outstanding features of the public railroad-building effort, which will supply a useful background for the consideration of the main problem of this paper.

The introduction of steam engines in Germany was the work of Prussian state administrators, a body of men who were technically trained, educated in Mercantilist traditions, and guided by the principles of Mercantilist policy. That fact was typical of the German political and economic setup in the late eighteenth century; Prussian administrators also introduced the modern iron industry into Germany. By contrast. English industrial leadership in the same years was already in the hands of co-operating inventors and entrepreneurs, as evidenced by the classical partnership of Watt and Boulton, the prototype of many to come in capitalistic industry.

This article explains the emergence of a plantation economy in the antebellum sugar sector. The hypothesis of increasing returns to scale was tested using a Zellner-Revankar generalized production function model. Economies of scale were found using samples from the manuscript censuses, but these scale economies diminished with size. A second important factor in explaining the size distribution of farms was the dual technology in the manufacturing stage of sugar production. Farms with inferior horse-power mills had poorer survival records and less flexibility in expansion than those using steam power mills.

The economic differences between the Europeans on the eve of industrialization and the currently less developed peoples has assumed a certain degree of importance in the recent literature. It has been argued that West Europeans had significantly higher per capita incomes than do most of the peoples of the world today and that the levels of living of many people fell off during the process of early industrialization. Obviously, the argument is important in that the levels of living found in most of today's less developed peoples could not decline significantly widiout the risk of disaster.

The process of financial integration has been charted in several studies of the late nineteenth-century U.S. economy but lacks comparable documentation in a European case. This gap is filled through an examination of interregional interest rate trends in the pre-World War I Austrian economy. The Austrian data show a marked trend toward rate convergence beginning in the 1870s. These results are significant for the U.S. case and for the long standing debate on the economic viability of the Habsburg Monarchy before World War I and of the successor states in the interwar period.

My archival studies in Egyptian banks reveal that nominal interest rates charged by foreign financial capital in Egypt fell strongly as compared with European rates throughout the period 1882–1914. Interest differentials declined by 2 to 2 ½ percent. This is explained by the increasing confidence of European investors with British occupation and policies. To explain the large inflow of financial capital after 1900 a sharp decline in real interest rates, related to the upsurge of agricultural prices, is posited. The case offers interesting parallels to present-day problems of excessive indebtedness in Third World countries.

In 1942 more than 110,000 persons of Japanese origin living on the U.S. West Coast were forcibly sent away to ten internment camps for one to three years. This paper studies how internees’ careers were affected in the long run. Combining Census data, camp records, and survey data, I develop a predictor of a person’s internment status based on Census observables. Using a difference-in-differences framework, I find that internment had long-run positive effects on earnings. The evidence is consistent with mechanisms related to increased mobility due to re-optimization of occupation and location choices, possibly facilitated by camps’ high economic diversity.

During the late 1930s, the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) developed a series of area descriptions with color-coded maps of cities that summarized mortgage lending risk. We analyze the maps to explain the oft-noted fact that black neighborhoods overwhelmingly received the lowest rating. Our results suggest that racial bias in the construction of the HOLC maps can explain at most 4 to 20 percent of the observed concentration of black households in the lowest-rated zones. We also provide evidence that the Federal Housing Administration had its own mapping strategies when evaluating mortgages and relied relatively little on the HOLC maps.

By a nation's economic growth we understand a sustained increase in its magnitude as an economic unit. Conversely, stagnation and decline can be defined as a sustained failure of the nation's economic magnitude to increase, or as its persistent decline.

Inconsistent measurement of ship tonnage, the denominator in the usual measures of crowded conditions on slave vessels, may confound estimated associations between crowding and slave mortality on the Middle Passage. The tonnages reported in Lloyd's Registers are shown to be consistent over time and are used to demonstrate that both the unstandardized and standardized tonnages in the Transatlantic Slave Trade Database are deeply flawed. Using corrected tonnages, we find that crowding increased mortality only on British slave ships and only before the passage of Dolben's Act in 1788.

This paper provides the first evidence of the effect of tax policy on violent attacks against Black politicians. I find a positive effect of local tax revenue on subsequent violence against Black politicians. A dollar increase in per capita county taxes in 1870 increased the likelihood of a violent attack by more than 25 percent. The result is robust to controls for numerous economic, historical, and political factors. I also find counties where Black officeholders were attacked have the largest tax reversions. This provides the first quantitative evidence that Reconstruction political violence was specifically related to Black political efficacy.

This article contributes to the debate on the causes of unemployment in interwar Germany. It applies the Layard-Nickell model of the labor market to interwar data. The results indicate that demand shocks, combined with nominal inertia in the labor market, were important in explaining unemployment. Real wage pressures due to procedures for wage determination were a major influence on unemployment, but were partly offset by movements in other supply-side variables, such as the replacement ratio and the pricing policy of cartels. Demand- and supply-side variables were mutually reinforcing in the Great Depression and in the recovery under the Nazis.

When one compares ancient and modern economic institutions, the differences are many and deep. One of the most obvious is the appearance of slavery virtually everywhere among those societies that rose from simple village life to civilization. Social and economic specialization, the resulting necessity for interchange of goods, and a higher political organization in a firm, consciously organized state—these are aspects of the appearance of civilization, and with them one usually finds a spectrum of social classes from aristrocrats to slaves.

These brief quotes can serve as an excellent introduction to the volume under review. Solow was able, in a single phrase, to capture the main theme of this International Economic Association conference. And Gerschenkron adds a justified plea for tolerance on the part of critics. My own impression can also be stated at the outset: the boys may have had a fine bull session at Konstanz back in 1960, but as a book it doesn't add-up to much.

There have recently been a number of studies concerned with the equality of wealth distribution in the nineteenth-century U.S. Collectively, these studies have arrived at the following conclusions: 1) the distribution of wealth was much more unequal in the South than in the North; 2) both the North and South were characterized by a high degree of inequality. Gavin Wright analyzed the degree of concentration in several measures of agricultural wealth (improved acreage, farm value, slaves, and cotton output) in the “cotton South” in 1850 and 1860; he found no evidence to reject the traditional view that antebellum southern agriculture was characterized by a highly unequal wealth distribution. Wright was careful to point out, however, that his conclusions only held for the “cotton South” and might not hold for the rest of the slave region. In this paper, I have calculated the degree of inequality in the distribution of slave wealth in five major agricultural regions (cotton, grain, tobacco, sugar, and rice) in the South in 1860, and I have found no evidence that the wealth distribution in the cotton region was substantially different from that in other southern agricultural regions.

Ferguson and Temin criticize my article for only paying lip service to the notion of a twin crisis while providing a story of a pure banking crisis. In fact, I have never claimed that the crisis was a pure banking crisis. The question is whether and to what extent banks contributed to the crisis. Ferguson and Temin take the position that the crisis was a pure currency crisis. I argue that weaknesses in the banking sector existed, which interacted with the currency problems in numerous ways. The focus of my article on banks reflects the nature of the question, rather than any view that currency problems were unimportant.