Extensive amounts of geographic mobility and high rates of labor turnover before World War I gave rise to the notion that the industrial labor force was “casual” and “impermanent.” But data from firms' payrolls and from nineteenth-century surveys conducted by state labor statistics bureaus show that male workers averaged about four years of experience in their current jobs. Data from an 1892 survey of San Francisco workers show that the average non-union male could expect to remain with his current employer almost 13 years.

For almost 25 years between 1797 and 1821, the gold standard in Britain was suspended in order to finance the Napoleonic Wars, creating a paper pound or a fiat currency. Suspension was accompanied by substantial inflation and the accumulation of public debt. By identifying shifts in the spot exchange rate of paper pounds for gold, I document how contemporaries' expectations of how debt would be stabilized in the future shaped the pound's internal value. Thus, it is argued that during the “paper pound” period, fiscal prospects provided a third mechanism, beyond monetary and real factors, affecting the price level.

This article examines the role of capital-deepening technical change in promoting the growth of large firms and concentrated markets in the late nineteenth-century United States. Translog production functions allowing nonconstant returns to scale and biased technical change are estimated in pooled cross-section time series for 16 major industries over the period 1850–1890 based on Census data. It is shown that substantial increases in optimal firm size, dictating natural monopoly or tight oligopoly market structures, occurred in some but not all of the industries experiencing substantial increases in concentration over this period. In a number of markets high concentration levels did not appear to have been compelled by changes in technology.

This article argues that the banking crises and collapse of the international gold standard in the early 1930s contributed to the severity of the Great Depression by increasing interest-rate uncertainty. Two pieces of evidence support this conclusion. First, uncertainty (as measured by the risk premium embedded in the term structure of interest rates) rises during the banking crises and is positively linked to financial-market volatility associated with the breakdown in the gold standard. Second, the risk premium explains a significant proportion of the variation in aggregate investment spending during the Great Depression.

Agricultural improvement, as analysts of economic growth often stress, plays an important role in a developing economy. Recent quantitative research has expanded our knowledge of developments in American agriculture during the period when the economy was becoming industrialized. The purpose of this article is to compute new estimates of average milk yields (output per milk animal) in American dairy agriculture and to analyze the sources of changes in these yields between 1850 and 1910.

Technological changes in the U.S. pulp and paper industry between 1915 and 1940 are chronicled, and three patterns—evolutionary bias, output-increasing innovation in response to technological disequilibria, and differences in the timing of innovations between the 1920s and 1930s—are identified and explained by means of a theoretical framework for induced innovation. The framework conceptualizes technological change as a means for growth-seeking firms to overcome barriers to accumulation and provides a general explanation of induced innovation that is situated in historical time.

The gradual yet cumulative advance of West European capitalism was in large part epitomized by the developments of its textile trades. They were the first to carry the seeds of economic change into the stagnant preserves of guild conservatism, and subsequently they again proved to be the pioneers of the new factory system. In Germany the sequence of economic change was not quite as uniform. Each German textile district emerged as a specific case of economic growth with contours of industrial evolution that manifested unique deviations from the broad pattern of development. The heterogeneity of the German lands, particularly marked before the advent of the railways, was both cause and effect of this diversity.

If we were to reconstruct a blueprint of the Russian government's goals and priorities for industrial development in the late nineteenth century, it would include the following: (1) development of a network of internal transportation, (2) stabilization of the ruble in foreign exchanges through convertibility and the buildingup of an export surplus as a prerequisite for enabling the Russian government to borrow abroad, and (3) stimulation of the development of new industries in Russia and their protection in their “infancy.” Given the relative success of Russia's industrialization during the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries and the important role that the government played in this effort, there is no justification for outright rejection or condemnation of Russian government economic policies. There were, however, serious shortcomings in particular government policies, and the presumed effects that they had upon the industrialization process were not always desirable. This essay is a modest attempt to reexamine Russian government policies on the assumption that the industrialization of Russia was a continuing goal of the state policies beginning with the 1880's and one of relatively high priority. The implication of the analysis is that if some of the defects of the state's policies had been avoided, the process of industrialization in Russia would have proceeded at least at as fast a pace and the economic costs to Russian society would probably have been smaller.

The paper examines in detail revised estimates of unemployment and gross national product for the United States before 1929. It first discusses the nature of the revisions to each series and contrasts the assumptions underlying the new data with those underlying the Kuznets GNP series and the Lebergott unemployment rate series. It then examines the business cycle properties of the new prewar estimates. In analyzes the volatility and serial correlation properities of the new macroeconomic series and investigates the Okun's Law relationship between unemployment and GNP, concluding with an evaluation of the assumptions underlying the old and new data.

This article explores the development of market integration within the Baltic Sea region and with England, from the 1840s to the late 1880s. It exploits two new datasets on grain prices. The degree of market integration is estimated using a wavelet variant of dynamic factor analysis that takes account of both time and distance. Additionally, we use the London corn market as the benchmark for the degree of market integration. Our results show that the role of distance disappeared in the wheat and rye, but not in the oats and barley trade, as the Baltic Sea Region became integrated into the Atlantic economy.

This article creates a new database that covers all U.S. banks in the census years between 1870 and 1900 to test the interaction between inequality and financial development when the banking system was starting over from scratch. A fixed-effects panel regression shows that the number of banks per thousand people in the South has a strong positive relationship with the size of farm operations. This suggests that large southern farm operators welcomed new banks after the Civil War. When the analysis is extended into the 1900s, the relationship becomes more negative, as bankers may have tried to block entrants.

This article describes a newly constructed data set of all U.S. state banks from 1782 to 1861. It contains the names and locations of all banks and branches that went into business and an estimate of when each operated. The compilation is based on reported balance sheets, listings in banknote reporters, and secondary sources. Based on these data, the article presents a count of the number of banks and branches in business by state. I argue that my series are superior to previously existing ones for reasons of consistency, accuracy, and timing. The article contains examples to support this argument.

This article surveys the co-evolution of monetary policy and financial stability for a number of countries from 1880 to the present. Historical evidence on the incidence, costs, and determinants of financial crises (the most extreme form of financial instability), combined with narratives on some famous financial crises, suggests that financial crises have many causes, including credit-driven asset price booms, which have become more prevalent in recent decades, but in general financial crises are very heterogeneous and hard to categorize. Moreover, evidence shows that the association across the country sample between credit booms, asset price booms, and serious financial crises is quite weak.

Was eighteenth-century London's financial market linked to domestic real capital markets? When did English capital markets cease to be regionally segmented? We compare London interest rates with annual registered property transactions in Middlesex and in West Yorkshire. This evidence, though tentative, suggests that London financial markets were weakly linked to local real capital markets in the mid-eighteenth century. By the late eighteenth century those links were strong. Regional markets were still segmented in the mid-eighteenth century but were integrated by the time of the Napoleonic War.

Analysis of census data reveals that the size of the average factory in the United States grew more rapidly during the 1870s and 1880s than during any subsequent decade through the 1920s. While the average factory doubled in size between 1869 and 1889, it increased by only about a quarter between 1899 and 1929. These results support the view that the reaping of economies of scale was not an important motive for the great merger wave.

An economic downturn coincided with the start of the epidemic but the recession was short and moderate, compared with that of 1920/21. Cross-sectional high-frequency data indicate that the epidemic affected the labor supply sharply but briefly with no ensuing spill-overs; most of the recession, brief as it was, was due to the end of the war. I analyze weekly city-level mortality data and economic indicators with time series methods and structural estimation of an economic-epidemiological model: interventions to hinder the contagion reduced mortality at little economic cost, probably because reduced infections mitigated the impact on the labor force.

Monetary innovation, the development of new forms of money, has not received much systematic study from economic historians. This essay presents a framework for analyzing the determinants of monetary innovation and illustrates the argument by means of a sketch of monetary innovation in America from colonial times to the present.

This paper documents a secular increase during the antebellum period in the fraction of New York's population that received public poor relief. The increase was concentrated among able-bodied adults who required only short-term assistance during periods of sickness or unemployment. Cross-sectional patterns suggest that the rise of market production and the spread of wage labor in both urban-industrial and rural-agricultural sectors, rather than urbanization or industrialization, may have been responsible for the upward trend in short-term, ablebodied pauperism.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, U.S. tobacco manufacturers were not forging ahead of their leading European counterparts in technology, productivity, or managerial techniques. On some indicators, including per capita cigarette consumption, the United States strikingly lagged. Fiscal discrimination against cigarettes, amplified by the monopoly pricing, strategic choices, and organizational overload of the American Tobacco trust, were among the retarding factors.

“Of all things American, nothing is more so than the cigarette.”Written by an enthusiastic booster of the addiction (with the assistance of the American Tobacco Company) in 1916. See Young, Story, p. 4.