Japan created ‘the PKO Law’ in 1992 to provide a legal framework for international peacekeeping activities, following its financial involvement in the Gulf War of 1991. This paper argues that the PKO Law imposed certain restrictions which complicated the missions of the Japanese Self Defence Forces (SDF) and civilian personnel in operational fields. Post 11 September (2001), the Japanese government created a new legal framework for counter-terrorism and dispatched its SDF personnel to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET).

It has been argued that economic development and democracy create new opportunities and resources for women to access political power, which should increase gender equality in politics. However, empirical evidence from previous research that supports this argument is mixed. The contribution of this study is to expand the research on gender equality in politics through an in-depth examination of the effect of development and democracy on gender equality in cabinets. This has been completed through separate analyses that include most of the countries in the world across three levels of development (least-developed, developing, and developed) and across different types of political regimes (democracies, royal dictatorships, military dictatorships, and civilian dictatorships). The results demonstrate that economic development and democracy only affect gender equality in cabinets positively in a few environments. Accordingly, the context is important and there seem to be thresholds before development and democracy have any effect. Development has a positive effect in developed countries and in democracies, but it has a negative effect in dictatorships, and the negative effect is strongest in military dictatorships. The level of democracy has a positive effect mainly in dictatorships, and the strongest effect is in civilian dictatorships. The article demonstrates the importance of dividing samples into subsets to increase understanding of what affects women's representation in cabinets in different environments, and I ask scholars to subset samples and run separate analyses more often in comparative studies.

China's growing assertiveness in strengthening its territorial and sovereignty claims in the South China Sea has arguably intensified friction and deepened tension between the rival claimant States. In sharp contrast to the strong reactions of its fellow ASEAN claimants, such as Vietnam and the Philippines, Malaysia traditionally has been less critical and more inclined to downplay China's perceived emotive actions. This subtle foreign policy orientation is likely to remain unchanged in the immediate future. Malaysian leaders are aware of the need to continue adopting a more cautious but pragmatic approach to counter China's increasingly aggressive actions in the Spratly Islands. Because of the significant economic and political benefits derived from its close relationships with China, Malaysia's policy preference is aimed to avoid jeopardizing such relations. However, the growing presence of Chinese military vessels in Malaysia's waters in recent years has forced the latter to reassess its foreign policy approach, which might include adopting a more assertive stance towards China. Set against this backdrop, this article aims to give an exploratory insight into Malaysia's external behaviour and actions in response to China's recent growing aggressiveness in the South China Sea. To this end, the aim of this article is achieved through a twofold approach. First, it examines Malaysia's overlapping claims to maritime features and waters with China, with the focus on the Spratly Islands group. Lastly, the article provides an explorative insight of Malaysia's rationalist stance, particularly under the current administration of Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak, in response to China's aggressiveness. It also examines the motivations, intentions, and basis of this external posture.

This article identifies how democracy and transparency in Thailand have been subverted since 2001. Specifically, it appraises the sentiments and trends that have been in place since 1993 to prevent a return to authoritarian government. Additionally, it also examines structures and policies that have thwarted democratic consolidation since 2000. The central hypothesis of the article is that there has been a structural weakening of democracy in Thailand under the Thai Rak Thai government since 2001. In other words, Thailand's democratic consolidation has been held in abeyance since the electoral victory of the Thaksin government.

This study utilizes an admixture of the institutionalist and agency approaches to make its case. There is sufficient evidence to discern since 2001 the direction and nature of state–society relations in Thailand and Thaksin has also undertaken a number of policies by way of elite strategic choices. Consequently, bringing these two approaches into strategic convergence obtains better and more comprehensive results of the state of democratic consolidation in Thailand, both from an elite as well as societal perspective for a more balanced approach. The evidence culled thus far suggests that, whereas Thaksin came to power using democratic means and in fact consolidated his democratic credentials after his second victory in 2005, domestic political and social developments reflect a weaker commitment to democratic ideals and its structural and cultural consolidation.

The 11 March 2011 earthquake and tsunami damaged the nuclear reactors in Fukushima. Prime Minister Naoto Kan took this crisis seriously, and made himself personally involved with damage control, especially during the first week. This study examines the responses to the incident by the prime minister's office.

Universal wisdom is that crises are better handled at the level closest to which they occur. Shifting the decision making to the higher authority is needed when a crisis spills over the local boundary or when the local authority fails to deal with the situation. This is called ‘upscaling’.

Frustrated by the lack of communication coming from the bureaucracy and Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), Kan upscaled the decision making and began micromanaging damage control. The upscaling, however, did not contribute to improvement in the accident situation in most cases. Even in one case, it exacerbated it.

On the other hand, upscaling made a significant difference when the TEPCO officials considered withdrawing from the accident. By upscaling to the higher authority, Kan stopped their withdrawal. After the establishment of a joint headquarters with TEPCO, the political leaders, instead of upscaling, moved down to a closer level to the accident and successfully coordinated the recovery work.

This study addresses why small parties nominate candidates to run in the district elections and how nomination of district candidates could influence small parties’ share of party votes in Taiwan. Previous studies on party's strategic entry in the mixed electoral system demonstrate the existence of ‘contamination effect’ in various Western democracies. While ‘contamination effect’ suggests that party would gain more proportional representation (PR) seats by increasing its number of candidate nomination in the single-member-district (SMD) races, we contend that small parties should also take the strength of nominated candidates into consideration. Nominating strong candidates in SMD competitions could generate positive ‘spillover effect’ to party's PR tier. By focusing on the 2016 Taiwan legislative election, our findings suggest that first, small parties need to fulfill the institutional requirements in order to qualify for running in the party-list election; second, the ‘contamination effect’ exists in Taiwan, but it is conditional; and finally, candidates’ strength creates positive ‘spillover effect’ on party's proportional seats.

Latin American fiscal policy presents a stark challenge to standard analytical models of political economy. Most importantly, since about 1990 the combination of drastic inequality, electoral democracy, and weak redistributive efforts appears to contradict the economists’ workhorse, the median-voter model, which predicts significant fiscal redistribution under these conditions (Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Profeta and Scabrosetti, 2008: 70–71; Huber and Stephens, 2012). However, recent innovations – a “basic universalism” in social welfare and a couple of progressive tax reforms – might be thought to bring the region more in line with the model's predictions, or perhaps those of other approaches. In short, this field could benefit from theoretical clarification. This paper evaluates the performance of median-voter and several other models in an attempt to explain longstanding differences in fiscal policy. It compares Latin America with other world regions, first and mainly, before examining variation across the region. It then turns its attention to the new developments in policy.

Developments in both China and Russia are a challenge to political science, and more particularly to theories of political culture. Both countries are engaged in profound processes of transition involving the abandonment of totalitarianism and the adoption of market-based economies. It is, however, far from clear what form their political systems will eventually take. They are currently following strikingly different paths. Are the differences a reflection of their distinctive cultures? Or, are the differences more structural, a manifestation of their respective stages of economic and social development? Or, are they merely the consequences of the idiosyncratic choices and policy decisions of the two leaderships?

Little is known about health of the growing subpopulation of the working poor in Japan. We aimed to evaluate health status and healthcare utilization in relation to income among Japanese working adults. We conducted a one-month prospective cohort study using a health diary in working adults from a nationally representative random sample in Japan. Based on the government criterion, the working poor group was defined as earning an equivalent annual income of less than 1.48 million Japanese-yen. For health status, we measured symptomatic episodes and health-related quality of life (HRQOL). For healthcare utilization, we measured frequencies of visits to a physician or pharmacy, and use of complementary and alternative medicine (CAM). We constructed multiple linear regression models for these measures adjusted for age, gender, and co-morbidity, using annual equivalent income as a 4-level categorical variable.

Of 3,568 participants originally enrolled in the study panel, 3,477 completed the survey (response rate 97%). For the purpose of the study, of the 3,568 participants, we analyzed 1,406 working adults who were 20–65 years old (mean age, 40.8 yr: 58.4% men). There were 106 (7.5%) working poor: 56 men (6.8% of working men) and 50 women (8.5% of working women). Compared to the highest income group, the working poor reported the greater number of symptomatic episodes and a slightly lower score of physical component of HRQOL (PCS8). The numbers of symptomatic episodes among the working poor and the highest income group during the 1-month study period were 9.79 (SD, 8.77) and 7.01 (SD, 7.34), respectively (p < 0.01). The PCS8 among the working poor was 48.71 (SD, 7.05) and it was 50.34 (SD, 6.55) among the highest income group (p < 0.01). There was no difference of healthcare utilization by the different levels of income.

We concluded that the working poor (7.5% of all working adults) more frequently report symptomatic episodes and show slightly poorer physical health status, compared to the highest income group. Healthcare utilization is not affected by income.

It is both academically and practically valuable to construct a multi-dimensional scale to assess the effectiveness of the Communist Party of China's (CPC) policy toward Taiwan. The author constructed a One China identity scale based on national identity theory and the CPC's political advocacy and actions toward Taiwan. Using panel data from 271 members of Taiwanese student delegations to Mainland China from 2016 to 2017, this study explored the changes in their sense of a One China identity. The results showed a significant increase (0.11, 5.19%) in the average ratings of the investigated students' One China identity. The regression equation constructed by the current study was able to explain 10.94% of the total variance of the One China identity scale, and all three hypotheses were supported. Following the exchange program, Taiwanese students appeared to have a greater sense of a One China identity. Their impression of Mainland China had improved, their acceptance of the CPC's regime had increased, and their preference for authoritarianism had increased.

As Indonesia democratises, a key feature of the country's political life has been a mixture of turmoil, hope and uncertainty. When Suharto's authoritarian regime collapsed in May 1998, Indonesia was experiencing the worst political and economic crises in more than three decades. On the political front, Suharto's collapse was preceded by communal violence, political turmoil, and state terrorism. Economically, the financial crisis, which came to Indonesia in December 1997, brought down the foundations of growth and pushed the country on to the brink of economic collapse. All these problems, which found their roots in the absence of democracy and good governance, worsened after the fall of Suharto. As the country moved towards democratic transition, however, society was imbued with a sense of hope for a better future, and that hope continues to exist until today. In that context, resolving current uncertainty constitutes the biggest challenge facing Indonesia in fulfilling the people's hope for a democratic future.

In Japan, electoral campaigning in plurality districts often appears strangely ineffective to observers. In their explanations, political scientists have so far fallen back on the proximate cause, namely the strict Public Office Election Law (Kōshoku senkyo-hō), claiming that it is this law that prohibits different and more effective campaigning. This study, however, is based on the assumption that such an explanation could be insufficient since even those campaign tactics legally allowed are often executed and/or selected in an apparently ineffective way in terms of their appeal to voters. Especially when looked at from the perspective of structural learning theory, which assumes that actors adapt their behavior within stable structures by learning what works well and what does not, these observations invite further investigation.

As a first step, participant observation was used to identify types of apparently ineffective campaigning. In the second step, these types were discussed in qualitative interviews with candidates and other practitioners. The results show that next to appealing to voters there are other campaign goals that can determine the choice of electoral instruments: motivating campaign staffers, maintaining good working relationships with external helpers, presenting political convictions and personal determination. This explains part of the assumed ineffectiveness, but not all of it. When seen through the lens of structural learning theory research findings suggest that the lack of clear feedback regarding the impact of campaign activities on voters inhibits the learning processes of candidates. In combination with constraints regarding time, place and/or resources, these factors shape election campaigning to a considerable degree. Consequently, this study suggests that explanations need to take more factors into account than just the Public Office Election Law in order to solve the puzzle of ineffective campaigning in Japan.

This introductory essay outlines the core themes of the special issue on the rise and fall of Hong Kong's Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement. In the essay, we highlight several theoretical and empirical contributions the featured papers make to our understanding of the protest–repression nexus from the onset of the movement to the imposition of the National Security Law. First, we describe the political and social contexts of the movement. Second, we present our empirical findings on Hong Kongers' political preferences. Finally, we highlight new research avenues arising from this special issue.

In the fall 2007 Diet session, the largest opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) showed strong opposition against the government's proposal to continue the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) refueling operations to support maritime inspections in the Indian Ocean. In order to evaluate this parliamentary confrontation, the article compares the handling of this issue with the six past major post-Cold War national security policies. The DPJ constantly presented its own legislative proposals in order to participate in Diet deliberation. DPJ's counter proposals, however, were not always cooperative with the government. This different attitude by the DPJ could not be explained by the public and media opinions or the position of the supporting organization but by DPJ's political calculation.

Japanese security policy has undergone a significant degree of evolution since the early 1990s. As a result, the range of responses Japan can make in international crisis has significantly expanded. The gradual evolution and expansion of the Japanese security policy culminated in the legislation of security-related bills under the second Abe administration in September 2015. The security-related bills dramatically transformed Japanese security policy as it allowed Japan to exercise the right of collective defense when certain conditions are met. The gradual change of Japanese security policy has so far gathered much academic attention. There is a strong claim in the existing literature on Japanese security policy that changes in security policies became possible because of reforms in domestic institutions, which had expanded the Japanese prime minister's power. It is the contention of this article that the Japanese prime minister is still faced with severe constraints from the Diet, in particular from the House of Councilors even after a series of institutional reforms has empowered Japanese prime ministers to significantly alter Japanese security policy. It demonstrates that as the House of Councilors has significant power in the Japanese political system, some Japanese prime ministers had to have the implementation of some security policies delayed or was driven to revise some policies they had originally envisioned through several case studies.

The failure to reconcile views of the past and to address historical injustice has damaged inter-state relations in Northeast Asia. Joint committees, dialogues, and the participation of civil society have been used to address historical issues, but scholars in the disciplines of international relations and area studies have largely ignored these dialogues and deliberative forums. At the same time, there is an emergent theoretical literature on how deliberative democracy can address ethnic conflicts and historical injustice. There is a serious disconnect or distance between the theoretical literature on the resolution of conflicts via deliberation on the one hand, and empirical studies of deliberative approach in East Asia on the other. This article aims to address this shortcoming in the study of the politics of historical dispute in Northeast Asia by proposing a deliberative approach to history disputes and highlighting the achievements, limits, and dynamics of deliberation. Through mapping and comparative testing, we confirm that deliberation offers some potential for a departure from nationalist mentalities and a shift towards a consciousness of regional history in Northeast Asia. Our empirical test of the utility of the deliberative approach suggests that a new model for addressing regional disputes may be emerging.

The timing of the Japanese Government's acceptance of the United Nations multilateral treaties governing several environmental concerns indicates Japan's priorities: biodiversity, global warming, and depletion of the ozone layer. Banning transboundary movement of hazardous wastes is the least prioritized, as indicated by Japan's failure to accept the Ban Amendment to the Basel Convention. The Japanese Environment Agency's policy statements and budget allocations between 1985 and 2000, as well as other official statements and programs, likewise indicate the same priorities. Moreover, of the three priorities, global warming is the top.

Japan, which has been looking for a niche in world leadership, has found it in global warming concerns. However, it would be hard for it to maintain a leadership role in global environmental concerns if it would not be able to play a proactive role in the more technologically, economically and politically difficult task of banning transboundary movement of hazardous wastes.

This article conducts a decision theoretic analysis of the effect of dual candidacy on voting decisions in the Japanese variant of the mixed electoral system, where each candidate can run in both a single-member district (SMD) and a proportional representation (PR) block, and dual candidates can be ranked either individually or equally in parties' PR lists: their post-election ranking is determined by their SMD votes. The model shows that dual candidacy differentiates the mixed system from merely the simultaneous use of the SMD and PR systems. That is, if an SMD candidate also runs in the PR block, it lowers voters' utility increment obtained by casting their SMD votes for him. If he is ranked equally in the PR list, however, SMD votes for him may help him win a PR seat against other equally ranked dual candidates, which enables dual candidacy accompanied by equal ranking to attract more SMD votes.

This study examines the effects of personality traits on voter turnout in South Korea. While it has been demonstrated that no direct relationships exist between personality traits and voter participation in South Korea, we argue that personality traits have indirect effects on turnout through such attitudinal factors as political interest, political efficacy, partisanship, and ideology. Using data from Korean General Social Survey (KGSS) 2012, we find that political interest and political efficacy play an important role in mediating the relationships between personality traits and voter turnout in South Korea. However, contrary to our expectations, there is either weak or no evidence on the mediating role of partisanship and ideology in the relationships between personality traits and voter turnout. To sum up, our findings provide some support to the indirect relationships between personality traits and voter turnout in South Korea and imply that the impacts of personality traits on voter participation vary by country or geographic region.