Most new democracies face a challenge of reshaping the political culture to support the new democratic political order. This can often be a long-term process, complicated by the Realpolitik of governing in a new political (and often economic) system. One of the mechanisms of cultural change is generational change. New generations socialized after a democratic transition are presumably educated into the political norms of the new democratic regime. However, one can also imagine that the young lack clear political cues because they grow up under a system in transition, or even reject the new order if it is accompanied by widespread social dislocation. The study of generational change in new democracies thus provides insights into the processes transforming a nation's political culture. We analyze generational change in the new democracies of East Asia using the Second Wave of the East Asian Barometer. We examine support for a democratic/authoritarian regime and the citizenship norms that underlie a democratic process (such as the rule of law and political tolerance). Our results yield evidence of significant generational change in regime norms in these new democracies, which suggests that the political culture is gradually being transformed.

We surveyed 2,221 rural residents in twenty towns across ten provinces in China. Structural equation models (SEM) found the quality of government, impartiality of institutions, and authoritarian values among citizens are the three main sources of citizens’ trust in local government. Among various types of recent institutional innovation and government reform, only a type that involves citizens in a formal electoral process, called ‘open nomination and direct election (ONDE)’, significantly improved trust in township-level government. Our models reveal that the movement of power to select local leaders from the hands of upper-level government to local residents erodes the influence of the so-called ‘traditional authority orientation’ among citizens, and enables them to assess trust level according to the competence of the government. Furthermore, elections reduce the trust-generating effect of institutional impartiality as citizens are enfranchised in the ‘input’ process of government, therefore emphasizing ‘outputs’ less.

This paper presents an explanation for the breakdown of dominant party systems. In contrast to previous works that examine how ruling parties lose their dominant position as a result of interparty competition, this paper focuses on how they are undermined from within by factional conflict. Through an overview of dominant party systems in the postwar world, we show that most of the ruling parties suffered from major splits that significantly reduced their electoral strengths before their final electoral defeat. In order to explain why large groups of politicians decide to leave dominant parties that are likely to remain in power, we develop simple game-theoretic models of intraparty bargaining between party factions over the distribution of benefits from office. Our results suggest two mechanisms through which dominant parties break up. First, factional defections from dominant parties are likely to occur when they are experiencing a significant decline in public support. Second, factional defections are likely to occur when a non-mainstream faction is rapidly losing its bargaining power against the party leadership. Importantly, our results show that under certain conditions, dominant parties will break up even when their electoral prospects are much better than the opposition. We briefly discuss how these mechanisms can be applied to actual cases of dominant party systems.

The aim of this paper is to describe and analyze people's confidence in political institutions in the so-called BRICS countries, that is, Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. I argue that the quality of macroeconomic indicators cannot explain the variation in political confidence between the five most dynamic new emerging economies, and that there is no substantial difference among the young, middle-aged, and senior-aged groups. By combing data from the Asia Barometer Survey and the World Value Survey, I provide two complementary approaches, one sociocultural and the other micropolitical, to reveal the factors that influence people's confidence in four major political institutions. The explanatory effects of these two approaches are mixed. Political identity and values, in most cases, have a significant impact on political confidence. On the other hand, high levels of interpersonal social trust, individual happiness, and satisfaction with living standards also show positive influences.

The political landscape in Malaysia has been changing since the late 1990s with a gradual rise in resistance from civil society and the opposition parties. Domestic politics have become more contentious recently, particularly evidenced by the advent of a strong civil society and a multi-cultural opposition coalition. Thus, the social capital stimulated by ICTs and CSOs has played a vital role in strengthening and empowering the role of the opposition parties in Malaysia. This study seeks to understand how ICT-driven social capital has facilitated the surge in the opposition movement by situating the political use of social capital in a broader socio-political context. Hence the dramatic political change has been intertwined with the dynamics of social capital and creation of a public sphere accelerated by the rapid growth of ICTs in the country. By analyzing recent voting patterns, this study demonstrates that ICT-driven social capital does have a great impact on the changing political landscape in Malaysia, particularly in shaping voting behavior and political participation of Malay and non-Malay citizens in domestic politics.

This paper examines the relation between trade, political openness, and agricultural trade policy in developing countries. It argues that trade openness and democracy contribute to lower taxes and control programs in the agricultural sectors. Examining the politics of agricultural trade policy in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, it was found that trade expansion and democratic regimes lead to fewer taxes and control programs imposed on agriculture. The results indicate that elected governments in industrializing countries are less likely to impose more tax and control programs on agriculture in order to encourage exports and in order to appeal to farmers, who are a major voting bloc in these countries.

The article focuses on how emotions and passions – two related but somewhat different notions – are addressed in the field of international relations. As such it makes three main points. First, the article argues that, although presupposed in mainstream international relations, because of the influence of positivism emotions and passions have tended to be overlooked. Second, it makes the point that in recent years scholars with constructivist leanings have been increasingly interested in taking emotions and passions seriously as an academic area of research. Third, and finally, the article concludes that despite the progress made in the 2000s on the understanding of emotions and passions in international relations, more work remains to be done. As such it outlines future directions of research.