Changes to the institutional structure of trade policymaking are important to understanding why Japan remained largely on the sidelines of the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPP) negotiations in 2010-2012. The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) embarked on a series of changes to policymaking institutions, which initially empowered the prime minister and cabinet at the expense of pro-agriculture backbenchers in the ruling party. However, the potential for a breakthrough on farm trade substantially diminished as the institutional reforms were reversed, allowing political supporters of domestic farm interests once more to assert their voice and influence in trade policymaking. Tracing the process of DPJ government decision-making on the TPP reveals that ‘bringing the party back in’ was a major factor in preventing Japan's formally joining the TPP negotiations, despite the strong pro-TPP sentiments of DPJ prime ministers, thus limiting prospects for agricultural trade liberalization.

A fundamental component of liberal democracy – citizen knowledge – has only recently been examined in Japan; rarer still are assessments of the impact of media consumption on political awareness. In this paper, we utilize two recent sources – the Japanese Election Studies III (JESIII) and GLOPE2005 – to address two related questions: (1) what factors influence Japanese political knowledge? and (2) is the changing media environment in Japan having an influence on what citizens know about political affairs? With regard to the first question, we find, in line with previous studies in the US context, that knowledge is explained by education, gender, and politically impinged employment as base factors, with interest, efficacy, and civic duty playing a role as second-stage behavioral factors. Evidence of other traits presumed to distinguish the more informed Japanese – dissatisfaction with politics and community mobilization context (living in urban areas, districts with higher voter turnout, and having larger social networks – remains mixed. Regarding the second question, we find that the effects of media exposure on knowledge vary. Where the GLOPE2005 finds an influence of regular newspaper reading, the JESIII indicates that watching a TV news program ‘often’ also boosts knowledge. The JESIII results reveal further that, ceteris paribus, regular exposure to NHK contributes to higher levels of knowledge at a rate that is comparable to a one unit increase in educational attainment. Conversely, we find that softer news programs (e.g., Fuji TV's Super News) have a depressive effect that appears to decrease knowledge as exposure accumulates. The direction of the causal arrow is not entirely clear. At the same time, our findings lend credence to previous work that raises concerns about the ‘infotainization’ of Japanese (and US) news programming (e.g., Taniguchi, 2007; Prior, 2005). Rather than demystifying or democratizing Japanese politics, softer programs may simply be perpetuating extant gaps between elites and the public.

Employing a two-level game framework, this study examines the decision-making process of the Hatoyama government on the replacement of the US Marine air base in Futenma, Okinawa. Before reaching the final decision to revert to the existing plan of relocating it to Nago City, the cabinet members explored different possible alternatives. Prime Minister Hatoyama simultaneously pursued different international and domestic goals. Misperception and miscommunication between Tokyo and Washington were at play. A two-level game framework provides a clear picture of what Hatoyama tried to pursue and why he failed.

This paper aims to develop a coherent analytical tool to explain the dynamics of Sino-Japanese pluralized leadership. Highlighting the constructivist concept of critical strategic practice, it argues that the nature of pluralized leadership is not fixed by existing social structures, but rather can be dynamically changed by potential leaders through critical reflection and actions to transform identities. It then suggests three possible types of pluralized leadership: collective leadership, competitive coexistence, and a blocking power relationship. These are determined by whether two leadership aspirants succeed in establishing institutionalized social networks and shared norms between them and whether a leadership aspirant gains a majority of followers for its leadership project. The paper shows that China and Japan have engaged in both competitive coexistence and a blocking power relationship through their critical strategic practice.

How do state identities and their accompanying norms affect security behaviour especially when states consider forming alliances or alignments? Are middle powers different from great powers in their security norms and preferences? This article identifies dependency and activism as two ‘identity norms’ that constitute and reproduce medium-sized states as bona fide middle powers. This article argues that, due to the identity norms of a middle power, Japan and South Korea are reluctant to form a bilateral alliance between themselves and their efforts to socialize with China do not necessarily contradict their security relationships with the United States. The first section focuses on the norm of dependency to illustrate whether Japan and South Korea sought to strengthen bilateral alignment in the event of major security crises, provoked by China and North Korea. It argues that a middle power is not disposed to strengthen alignment with another middle power in the event of a national security crisis because of its entrenched norm of dependency on a great power. The second section elaborates the norm of middle power activism. Both Japan and South Korea have engaged in diplomatic efforts to enmesh China in a number of multilateral security mechanisms in order to hedge against the relative decline of US influences in East Asia.

Korean political parties have been organizationally unstable for decades, even after 1987 when a democratic transition from authoritarian military-based politics was achieved. Many studies have argued that the instability has been caused by the Confucian culture of Korean politics. This paper suggests a different view of the political phenomenon: Korean party instability has been due to the ‘cue-chasing behaviors’ of self-interested politicians, rather than Confucian morality. This study examines the proposition with a historical exploration of Korean political parties between 1987 and 2012.

The East Sea (or Sea of Japan) (ESR/SOJ) Rim region, in which five countries – Japan, China, Russia, and North and South Korea – have their own coastal areas, is complex and dynamic, with many emerging regional security concerns. In this paper, the author tries to show that there is the possibility of a maritime regional regime in the ESR/SOJ region by investigating the level of public support, in Japan and South Korea, for the formation of a regional regime. Based on the theoretical assumptions of constructivism, the author analyzes what kinds of individual's social position factors influence the level of support for regional regime formation by conducting a nested regression model of survey datasets. The results of the statistical analysis suggest that people with a high level of national pride in South Korea are more likely to support a regional regime in the ESR/SOJ region. In contrast, for Japanese people, there is no relationship between people's national pride and the level of support for regional regime formation. The economic recession in Japan since the early 1990s has made public concern more about domestic policy than about foreign policy issues. Based on strong support of the bottom, public opinion towards regional regime formation, the South Korean government may play a leading role in developing a regional regime in the ESR/SOJ region (when the process of negotiation begins) as in the case of Japan in nineteenth century.