Since the 1950s, Taiwan and China have utilized foreign aid as an instrument of foreign policy. After Taiwan's forced withdrawal from the United Nations in 1971, diplomatic and aid-giving competition with China became more intense. As a result, Taiwan's and China's struggles to gain supporters have been reflected in foreign aid strategies. Taiwan's bid for the UN and the WHO, and the issue of diplomatic recognition empirically demonstrate the utilization of aid to obtain diplomatic support from recipient countries, and, frequently, any decisions are heavily influenced by the competition it experiences with China. Theoretically, this highlights an important relational framework for analyzing foreign aid decisions – particularly the management of foreign relations of small states or middle powers simultaneously influenced by greater powers and aid recipient states.

Using data from ICDF and related reports, we observe geographically concentrated patterns in the distribution of Taiwan's aid recipients from 1988 to 1997 – mostly in Latin America and Southeast Asia. In contrast to China's foreign aid which emphasizes infrastructural development, the spirit of Taiwan's economic development aid programs often took the form of technical cooperation. However, a high percentage of aid went to countries with diplomatic ties to Taiwan. With civil society development and increased international activities of Taiwanese NGOs in humanitarian relief and development projects after 2000, we find a new emerging set of geographical aid distribution patterns that expand beyond countries that recognize Taiwan. In addition, while the process of incorporating civil society into foreign aid work was initiated by the ICDF the following decade, Taiwanese NGOs have increasingly demonstrated autonomous international agendas, funding, and direction, as well as the formation of civil society alliances that work on common international development issues.

Under conservative Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, Japan has embarked upon a high profile ‘Womenomics’ foreign policy agenda to highlight Japan's official development assistance (ODA) contributions to women's empowerment worldwide. This paper examines the puzzle of why such an avowedly conservative government would pursue a feminist foreign policy agenda. The paper finds that Japan's Womenomics diplomacy cannot be explained simply by materialist or domestic political explanations, but is best understood as a strategic campaign stemming from elite concern about Japan's national identity and esteem about its status in the world. Through Womenomics diplomacy, Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs attempts to construct Japan as a leader on women's rights and gender equality in response to the twin stigmas of Japan's treatment of wartime ‘comfort women’ and perennial low rankings on international indexes of gender equality.

The US and Japan, despite their shared reputation as leading donors for international development, remarkably varied in their foreign aid policy for HIV/AIDS in the 1980s and 1990s. Unlike the US, who initiated and increased global AIDS funding dramatically, Japan was lukewarm in its contributions. I claim that the distinctive pattern depends on how the pandemic was domestically framed and understood. The policy commitment was more likely when the internationally shared idea (international norms) of threats requiring immediate international cooperation was congruent with the domestic perception of the epidemic. The research undertakes a comparative examination of the determinants of the distinctive domestic perceptions of the two cases, including the number of individuals infected with HIV, the attitude and role of the media, and the civil society organizations dealing with HIV/AIDS. They played significant roles as intervening variables that conditioned domestic diffusion or internalization of the international norms for foreign aid policy development. The US had a favorable domestic condition based upon the relatively large number of those infected with HIV, a media that adopted a constructive approach, and active civil society organizations associated with the disease. In contrast, in Japan the number of HIV cases was lower, the media had a distorted view of the epidemic, and civil society organizations were not strong enough to offer much support until the early 1990s.

In March 2011, Japan suffered a massive earthquake. The resultant tsunami hit the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactor and it was later revealed that the reactor was actually in a state of meltdown. While it is still unclear how many people will be affected, both mentally and physically, by the radio-active fallout, the extent to which our lives are subject to the unimaginable risks of scientific technology has become patently clear. This paper strives to clarify the risks of scientific technology in relation to instrumental reason, critical thinking, plurality, and subsequently, the significance of the public realm in contemporary world affairs, with a specific focus on the Fukushima incident. In so doing, I shall introduce arguments regarding scientific technology by such thinkers as Arendt, Heidegger, and Horkheimer as well as the Kyoto School philosophers. This paper also focuses on the issue of morality in order to address the notion of the lack of critical thinking and the disappearance of the public.

With a multilevel governance structure, China and the EU both face the task of preventing lower level political entities from impeding capital mobility. In China, licensing barriers, as the main protectionist measure, are sometimes created by local authorities, leading to restrictions on inter-provincial establishment of companies. Moreover, whether or not to create such barriers depends on various factors. In the EU, a major effort has been undertaken to facilitate cross-border establishment and any remaining barriers mainly arise from national regulatory autonomy in some areas. In terms of further facilitating company mobility, while the strong judicial mechanism in the EU has tackled some of the remaining barriers, China's weak administrative and judicial systems seem unable to prevent the creation of licensing barriers. This paper argues that precise rules defined by the legislative authority offer a better prospect of regulatory effectiveness for China whose administrative capacities are weak and courts are not independent. More specifically, legislative decision making in the setting of inter-provincial establishment should be taken at the central level. Moreover, national legislators should precisely and clearly prescribe which authorities are empowered to control inter-provincial establishment, and under what conditions.