If in the First Conference, which was held in New Delhi in January 1985, the main theme of the papers was focussed on social development in the first half of the twentieth century, while that of the Second Conference held in Leiden in September 1985 shifted to the nineteenth century, particularly on various aspects such as bureaucratic tradition, population changes, and cottage industries, the central theme of the Third Conference concentrated on historical dynamics in pre- and early colonial India and Indonesia. State formation, socio-political aspects of Islam, and early-colonial policies were the major topics discussed at the Conference.

The demarcation of phases of empire has a perennial fascination for historians of European expansion. One of the most elusive processes of change both to date and to define is what most scholars would recognise to be the shift from the colonial systems of ancien regime Europe to the empires of the nineteenth century. In outline, it seems that systems based on the close regulation of commercial capitalism through privileges devolved on more or less autonomous colonies and trading companies gave way to national empires under direct state authority and increasingly geared to the needs of industrial metropolitan economies. In the mid-eighteenth century the old order was generally intact; by the mid-nineteenth century it had largely been replaced. Greater precision about the timing and speed of change remains very difficult to attain, but within this wide parameter it seems reasonable to suppose that different empires moved at different speeds: the economically and politically sophisticated British are likely to have remodelled their system ahead of their competitors, probably forcing them towards modernity in the process.

On August 31, 1803, a group of seven men, comprising the Commission for East Indies Affairs (Commissie tot de Oost-Indische Zaken), submitted the final report of its deliberations to the Government of the State of the Batavian Republic (Staatsbewind der Bataafsche Republiek) in The Hague. This Commission had been called into existence in November 1802 to make recommendations on how best to administer and conduct trade with the nation's possessions in the East Indies in a fashion that would render the greatest advantage to the nation's finances and profit to its commerce. Only a couple of years earlier Holland's monopolistic United East Indies Company (VOC) had been terminated by the Republic, and its assets and liabilities assumed by the State. The liabilities were immediately identifiable, for they consisted of debts which had to be paid in hard cash. The assets, on the other hand, consisted of territories – most of which had fallen under English control – and factories that somehow had to be made profitable, but seemed, given the then-existing conditions in the world, to be almost out of reach. The Commission was supposed to make recommendations as to how the remaining, territories of the VOC should be managed and how the trade with the East Indies and Asia in general was to be made profitable. This was no small task, so it may appear somewhat wondrous that the Commission was able to complete its work in less than ten months. The dispatch with which the Commission's work was completed, however, is more understandable if it is realised that the financial collapse of the VOC had been openly recognised since 1786, and various proposals for either reform or total change of the Company's system had been presented and discussed. These alternative proposals were well known to the members of the Commission. Their work, therefore, involved striking a balance among these proposals rather than creating a system de novo.

In the aftermath of the Islamic conquests of the seventh and early eighth centuries the territory which came under effective domination of the caliphate extended from the Iberian peninsula and North Africa to Central Asia and into the Persian-Indian borderland of Sind which for three centuries remained its easternmost frontier. Beyond Sind a vast area was left unconquered which the Arabs called al-Hind and which, in their conception, embraced both India and the Indianised states of the Indonesian archipelago and Southeast Asia. In the countless kingdoms of al-Hind the Muslims penetrated, up to the eleventh century, only as traders. By the time that Islamic power was established in North India the political unity of the Abbasid caliphate was already lost. Neither India nor Indonesia were provinces of the classical Islamic state. But in the Middle East three decisive developments had occurred and these created patterns which were to survive the political fragmentation of the empire. Most important was that a thoroughly commercialized and monetised economy with a bureaucracy and a fiscal polity had been established which continued to expand. Secondly, from the ninth century onwards, the Islamic military-bureaucratic apparatus had begun to be staffed with imported slaves on an extended scale. And thirdly, from its Arab roots the Islamic conquest state had shifted to a Persianised foundation, adopting Persian culture and the Sassanid tradition of monarchy and statecraft.

The dominant theme in the historical literature on agricultural production for export is the fast-expanding demand by Europe in the course of the industrialisation during the nineteenth century of agricultural goods originating in Asia, Africa as well as the Regions of Recent Settlement. In a large number of cases, the growing supplies of agricultural export were put together through recourse to the plantation system. The colonial governments often played an important, and sometimes a decisive, role in the rise and the smooth functioning of this system. This could be in the form of liberal land grants, the delegation of coercive authority to the management over the labour supply and so on. The direct, including entrepreneurial, role of the government was often evident also in arrangements which were not of the usual plantation variety, but which operated on the basis of accommodation, and indeed integration, with the existing organisation of traditional peasant agriculture. An outstanding example of this is the well-known Cultivation System introduced by Governor-General Johannes van den Bosch in Dutch Indonesia in the 1830s. The common theme that cuts across the bulk of the great diversity of arrangements of the use of coercive power by the colonial state in a variety of ways and often in fairly liberal doses.

Orthodox viewpoints on the formation and transformation of states in early modern (or late pre-colonial) South and Southeast Asia fall broadly into two strands. On the one hand, there are those who see the state as ephemeral, and essentially divorced from society in general.

The overland communications between Asia and Europe were of crucial importance to the economic and military survival of the East India companies. This applies equally to the English, French and Dutch East India companies - and even to the Portuguese empire.

At some of the most crucial moments of its history, the very survival of the Dutch East India Company (Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie or VOC) depended on the thin thread connecting it overland to Europe. One of these crises occurred in the mid-seventeenth century when during the first Anglo-Dutch war, English fleets challenged Dutch naval supremacy in the Indian Ocean. Reflecting on the defeat of the British fleets and the near eradication of the English East India Company or EIC's naval presence there in 1654, the Dutch director of Surat commented: ‘We would never have gained such an easy victory if the English had reacted more promptly or had we not received warnings so promptly [tijdig].’ Similarly, the catastrophic defeat suffered at a later date by the French admiral De la Haye is normally attributed to De la Haye's hesitations. Yet is is doubtful whether the VOC would have been able ot assemble a fleet quickly enough to destroy De la Haye's fleet had the VOC not received messages overland.