Board games were played in many parts of the ancient world and so it is very difficult to attribute the origin of any board game to a particular region or culture. Board games have been found in ancient Mesopotamia, the oldest from the city of Ur, but one must also mention the game of Senet in ancient Egypt. Often board games were placed in the tombs of the pharaohs and sometimes the dead are shown playing with the gods, for example one scene shows Rameses III (c. 1270 B.C.) playing with Isis to gain access to the nether world. The importance of this image lies in the depiction of the cosmological and religious significance that ancient peoples attributed to board games—they were not just games played for pleasure. Reference to board games in Persia can be found as early as the Achaemenid period, where, according to Plutarch, Artaxerxes played a board game with dice.

In this paper I shall describe briefly the background and setting of professional storytelling (naqqāli) in present-day Iran. Then I shall examine some aspects of how the craft of storytelling is transmitted, particularly with respect to how a young man becomes a storyteller and what aspects of storytelling are seen as important. Finally, I shall examine how this transmission relates to the way in which storytellers actually construct their performance.

There are two separate, but related, aims in the paper. Through a comparison of the stories told and the literary works used as their source, I shall demonstrate that the Iranian national legend remains creative today. More generally, I shall demonstrate that the abstract values expressed as important to a craft may disregard those very elements which make a craftsman successful and which breathe life into the craft.

It is perhaps no exaggeration to suggest that the crafting and re-crafting of national identity through actions of authorities and/or political mobilization and struggle has been a national preoccupation in modern Iranian history. This is not to imply that Iranians and their political leaders, going through the global process of modernity, have been any more or less creative than others in the world in re-inventing their “national” selves. However, a case can be made that in the past century Iranians have been afforded, or have produced, more opportunities to re-create themselves in a bombastic and dualistic fashion, energetically vacillating between extremes of contentious Islamism and secularism, pre-Islamic and Islamic imagination, and avid anti-imperialism and absorption in global trends.

Eli Teremaxi's Serfa Kurmancî has not yet received the critical attention it deserves. It was dismissed by Auguste Jaba as a text of “minor interest,” but in fact it is of paramount importance both for the study of the Kurdish language and for the history of Kurdish learning. Not only does it contain the oldest extant detailed remarks on Kurdish grammar, in all likelihood preceding even Garzoni's 1787 Grammatica; it is also among the first examples of Kurdish-language prose writing. The rise of prose texts of learning in Kurdish in the eighteenth century is an aspect of so-called “vernacularization,” i.e. the use of a vernacular language for new purposes of written literature and learning. Vernacularization is, this article argues, a crucial prerequisite for the rise of a national language. The article also briefly discusses traces of a similar development in some of Teremaxî's near-contemporaries.

In recent years we have begun to see more of Sadeq Hedayat (1903-1951) as a political writer. An anonymously printed pamphlet of four previously unpublished works, including an excerpt from his political satire, Tup-e Morvari [The Pearl Cannon] (1947), appeared in Berkeley in 1973, giving us a glimpse of the other Hedayat, even at the height of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi's power. In 1978 it became possible after many years to buy Haji Aqa (1945); and briefly in 1979 an edition of The Pearl Cannon was available. As we see more of Hedayat as an engaged political presence, and the Hedayat who spent two months in Uzbekistan in 1945 as a guest of the Soviet Government becomes less of an anomaly for us, Buf-e Kur [The Blind Owl] (1937, 1941) becomes more of a problem. It is patently his greatest work; and yet it is the work in which his referentiality is most in question.

The elections to the fourth session of the Iranian parliament (Majlis) were generally considered as the beginning of the end of factional politics in Iran. The typical journalistic analysis of Iranian politics, emphasizing the existence of two “moderate” and “radical” factions on the Iranian political scene, concluded that the “moderate” forces, led by President Hashemi Rafsanjani, had inflicted a decisive blow on the “radical” faction and neutralized the Majlis (which had been controlled by the radicals in its third session) as an impediment to the president's plan for reconstruction of the economy. Soon after the convening of the Fourth Majlis, however, the legislature challenged the authority of the Rafsanjani government either by initiating legislative bills to limit the authority of the president or by shelving the bills introduced by the government.

The image of the Iranian woman clad in the traditional chador, pointing her fist in the air or carrying a machine gun, has become one of the hallmarks of the most recent revolution in Iran. But, in spite of the role played by women in toppling the shah's regime, women have lost more from the change of government than has any other group that participated in the revolution. This loss is evident in (1) the abrogation of laws enacted under the previous regime that introduced a measure of equality for women; (2) the dwindling of employment opportunities available to women due to the deteriorating economic situation; (3) the long-term policy of the current government to encourage women to stay at home; and (4) a massive and persistent campaign to convince women that their own welfare and the welfare of society is best preserved if the roles of men and women are kept separate and if contact between the sexes is kept at a minimum.

Despite a succession of scholarly studies over the years, the relationship between Reza Shah’s Iran and National Socialist Germany has not been fully explored. Rather than focusing on the supposed Aryan ideological sympathies that bound the two countries together, this article argues that the real driver of the German–Iranian relationship in the 1930s was economic and based in the mutual interaction of state economic initiatives. It states that Iran’s place in Nazism’s economic system was the outcome of two factors: the “New Plan” of Reich Economics Minister Hjalmar Schacht, and its focus on clearing agreements as a motor for depression-era trade, and the connections of Schacht’s system to Reza Shah’s strategy to modernize Iran. In exploring this issue the article focuses on relations between Germany and Iran during three distinct moments: first, the period from 1918 to 1928 and the working out of a new relationship after the First World War; secondly the period of Schacht’s New Plan in Iran in the mid-1930s; and finally the period from the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939 to the British–Soviet invasion of Iran in 1941. During this last period Iran both belonged to the Nazi–Soviet trade zone created by the Pact and attempted to defend its neutrality.

Many Shi'a Afghan refugees and migrants—most of whom are Hazara—have intentionally settled in Mashhad, Iran, the home of the Shrine of Imam Reza. Hazara also make pilgrimage to the Shrine of Imam Hossein located in Kerbala, Iraq. Hazara comprise nearly half of all documented Afghans in Iran, yet until mid-2005, their returns comprised only one quarter of the total UNHCR-assisted return figures to Afghanistan. Drawing on literature from anthropology and refugee studies on the affect of religious practice in a context of displacement, this article considers whether pilgrimage aspirations and practices of Hazara Afghans in Iran might constitute a factor in their decision making about repatriation to Afghanistan. The study proposes that the decision to return to Afghanistan for certain categories of Hazara is influenced by their pilgrimage practices and attachment to Shrine locations in Iran.

Identity implies the other. As there is no self-definition without a view of the Other, the process whereby the “Self” discovers the “Other” is crucial to the formation of a self-image, for individuals as much as for groups of people claiming a collective identity. Historically, this process has never been more acute and intense than with the explosion of intercultural contact between Europe and the rest of the world following the so-called Age of Discovery. Nothing matches the radical novelty and drama of the first encounter between Europeans and the inhabitants of the New World. Though different inasmuch as it built on previous, intermittent contact and thus lacked the shock element of the utterly outlandish and bizarre, Europe's interaction with most of the major peoples of Asia in early modern times was hardly less transformative in the long run. Unprecedented in frequency and intensity, European-Asian contact as of the sixteenth century began to undermine the exotic notions and fabulous images that had formed and developed since Antiquity and that, over time, had been allowed to harden into convention.

Iran has one of the world's largest refugee populations, comprised primarily of Afghans and Iraqi Kurds.1 As of 2001, there were approximately 2.5 million Afghan refugees living in Iran. About 1.8 million of those were documented and the rest undocumented. With aggressive repatriation efforts under the supervision of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the Afghan population in Iran in 2004 dropped to around one million documented and another 500,000 undocumented migrant workers.2 Based on ethnographic research among Afghans and low-income Iranians in urban and rural Isfahan, this paper examines how Afghans who access Iran's health services interpret health and family planning education in the face of Iran's repatriation efforts and increased social tension. Further, I investigate divergent views toward Afghan repatriation and notions of home, self, and identity. Ultimately, this paper addresses the various borders—physical, national, ethnic, religious, gendered, urban/rural—and how these borders can be redefined through the refugee experience, leaving hope for the future.

This article analyzes the ways in which Iran and Iranians are represented in Western news media sources. Through detailed textual analysis of articles in Time and Newsweek between 1998 and 2009, it demonstrates that journalistic representations of Iran and Iranians are not simply efforts aimed at describing the real Iran, but rather form the basis of what Said refers to as a powerful “community of interpretation” that often reflects and reproduces certain xenophobic stereotypes of non-Western foreign subjects. While some shifts in Western media representations of Iranians have occurred in the thirty years since the revolution, the underlying ontological assumptions of these representations have remained remarkably durable. That is to say, the dominant representational discourse found in these newsmagazines depicts the political behavior of Iranians on the basis of essentialized notions of Persian and/or Islamic civilization, while very often emphasizing the taken for granted superiority of the West. Earlier Orientalist discourses focus on the difference of non-Western foreign subjects by denigrating them as fundamentally anti-modern and incapable of political, cultural and economic development without Western intervention. This article presents an unmistakable discursive pattern in American journalism whereby certain Iranians are incorporated into Western civilization by virtue of their embrace of a Western modernity.

Transsexuality in Iran has gained much attention and media coverage in the past few years, particularly in its questionable depiction as a permitted loophole for homosexuality, which is prohibited under Iran's Islamic-inspired legal system. Of course, attention in the West is also encouraged by the “shock” that sex change is available in Iran, a country that Western media and society delights in portraying as monolithically repressive. As a result, Iranian filmmakers inevitably have their own agendas, which are unsurprisingly brought into the film making process—from a desire to sell a product that will appeal to the Western market, to films that endorse specific socio-political agendas. This paper is an attempt to situate sex change and representations of sex change in Iran within a wider theoretical framework than the frequently reiterated conflation with homosexuality, and to open and engage with a wider debate concerning transsexuality in Iran, as well as to specifically analyze the representation of transexuality, in view of its current prominent presence in media.

The Qajar uymāq provided Iran with a central dynasty from 1795 until 1924. A great deal of attention has been paid to the dynastic aspect of the Qajar uymāq, with emphasis being placed on the founders of the dynasty (Āghā Muḥammad Khān and Fatḥ cAlī Shāh and their successors. The almost total preoccupation with the family that established the dynasty has underestimated the amazing complexity of the organism out of which it developed and the origins of that organism in the even more complex Safavid uymāq system. In order to understand the specific characteristics of the social system(s) of Qajar Iran, it is necessary to study first the development of the uymāq system in Iran and the origins of the Qajar within that newly developing social context.

The objective of this paper is to describe cultural improvisations on the theme of temporary marriage, mut'a (sigheh in colloquial Persian) in Iran; I wish to bring to light the relationship between the law of the institution of temporary marriage, and certain common motifs of behavior of the Iranian people. I do not presume that the following is an exhaustive compilation of such improvisations; rather, it consists of those that I have been able to identify. While the terminology used is partly mine and partly indigenous, the descriptions of sigheh variations is entirely indingenous.

Since 1979, Iran has witnessed important socio-economic and institutional changes and has been affected by significant economic and political upheavals. These years have witnessed a succession of oil booms and busts, external war, trade sanctions and of course, more recently, heightened internal strife within the state. After 25 years, however, Iran's political outlook seems opaque to most observers and the economic record is equally lacklustre with many Iranians experiencing a considerable retrogression in their living standards by regional and international standards.

Turkic languages and dialects played a much more important role in Safavid Iran than is generally thought, while Azerbaijani Turkish in particular was widely spoken and written in Safavid Iran. It was not only the language of the court and the army, but it was also used in poetry, even by renowned poets who usually wrote in Persian. The Safavid shahs, many of whom wrote poetry in Turkish themselves, promoted its literary use. Also, Turkish was used in the court's official correspondence, for both internal and external affairs.

The Haydariyyah and Niᶜmatiyyah were Widespread, Mutually Hostile urban factions of Safavid and post-Safavid Iran, sparsely documented and virtually unstudied. From at least the middle of the tenth/sixteenth century up until recent decades, a number of cities and towns of Iran were perceived as being divided into two groupings of adjacent wards (maḥallah), one grouping known as the Ḥaydarī-khānah and the other as the Niᶜmatī-khānah, the respective (male) inhabitants of which would profess mutual contempt and antagonism, and would periodically clash in massive public fights. The origin of the terms and the cause of the antagonism were not generally known to the participants; the topography and composition of the Ḥaydarī-khānah and the Niᶜmatī-khānah (which in some places extended into the adjacent countryside) was apparently irrelevant; and membership in either of these factions corresponded to no other social, political, or sectarian affiliation.