Reza Attaran is one of the most successful stars of the Iranian popular cinema. This article explores the social circumstances, performative components, and political consequences of Attaran’s popularity and stardom, and the evolution of comedy and satire in the Iranian media after the 1979 Revolution. Analyzing the contextual elements and media texts over the last twenty-five years, the article argues that Attaran actively reflects a complex interaction between the social, political, and artistic demands of each period, best represented through his contribution to the television sketch comedies in the 1990s, and the lowbrow comedies and highbrow absurd films in the 2010s. The trajectory of Attaran’s stardom demonstrates the mechanism by which he serves the maintenance of the status quo.

Folklore at the Turn of the Twentieth Century in a Very Broad sense is understood to encompass the expressive culture of any notable group of people. As implied by the original meaning of the word “lore” when the term “folklore” was coined in 1846, tradition is a vital ingredient of folklore. Yet not all folklore relies on centuries of tradition: Customs may become obsolete, live on submerged for centuries before being revived, or come into being all anew: Duration rather than historical roots makes folklore. The folk, on the other hand, is not necessarily constituted by the uneducated masses, as a conservative point of view would have it: Folklore is not germane to specific social strata but rather to substantial numbers of individuals sharing similar ideas or activities. In this sense folklore encompasses a wide range of cultural expression, ranging from popular beliefs and customs to myths, legends, and other genres of oral literature/verbal art. The obvious overlap of certain aspects in folklore studies and anthropology is inter alia signaled by contemporary Persian terminology, most commonly rendering folklore as farhang-e mardom and anthropology as mardom-shenāsi.

Azerbaijani national identity emerged in post-Persian Russian-ruled East Caucasia at the end of the nineteenth century, and was finally forged during the early Soviet period. After the fiasco of the short-lived independence period of 1918–20, Azerbaijan became Soviet. Soviet power then instrumentalized Azerbaijan for political and ideological penetration into Iran by galvanizing local separatist movements. Azerbaijani Iranology was shaped within Soviet oriental studies and put into service of Azerbaijani nation-building. Exiled Iranian communists found asylum in Baku, joined local research institutions, wrote the first Persian academic and school textbooks, and contributed to the translation of classic Persian poetry into Azerbaijani. Soviet Azerbaijani Iranologists were sent as translators to the Soviet missions to Iran and Afghanistan. After Azerbaijan regained independence in 1991, its Iranological infrastructure was represented by several departments at the National Academy of Sciences and the Iranian Studies Program at Baku State University. While the number of Persian classes at schools during the last three decades diminished, a new generation of post-Soviet Iranologists—those who studied in Iran—emerged. While Soviet Azerbaijani Iranologists never created a solid bilingual dictionary of Persian, several Persian–Azerbaijani and Azerbaijani–Persian dictionaries were published in the 2010s. Post-Soviet Azerbaijani Iranology is still trying to find its place within humanities in the transitional nation.

Shiraz's importance as a Buyid political capitol during the late Buyid period has been mentioned but not thoroughly analyzed. This article attempts to understand Shirazi politics under the late Buyid Abu Kalijar (r. 415/1024 to 440AH/1048CE) by tracing the careers of three prominent figures in his court: the Ismaili propagandist Al-Mu'ayyad fi al-Din al-Shirazi, the Sunni Qadi Abdallah al-Fazari, and Abu Kalijar's Wazir Bahram ibn Mafanna al-‘Adil. Using material from a variety of different narrative sources, it becomes clear that all three individuals used their understanding of court politics and their connections to one or more factions, preferably military factions, to gain sufficient intimacy with King Abu Kalijar to present their own point of view and to exclude other individuals from doing the same. Abu Kalijar was able to maintain sufficient contact with a variety of different factions to prevent the kind of factional warfare that was evident in Baghdad in the same period. By tracing the political strategies of these three men, the article sketches the structure of Shirazi politics and highlights the inclusiveness of Abu Kalijar's court and its relative stability compared to the Baghdad court of the same period.

In contemporary Iran, many shops are under the “shop-lease contract with sar-qofli.” In this contract, sar-qoflisar-qofli, a strong usufructuary right supported by intangible assets such as the shop’s reputation, is given to the tenant. The “shop-lease contract with sar-qofli” originated from a traditional merchants’ custom in Iran’s business quarters. After the 1979 Revolution, the Law of Lessor–Lessee Relationships, which provides a legal framework for the practice of “shop-lease contract with sar-qofli,” was completely revised, since Islamic jurists regarded haqq-e kasb o pisheh o tejārat as problematic. Haqq-e kasb o pisheh o tejārat, the legal designation of sar-qofli, was based on a heterogeneous value concept introduced into the Iranian legal system from abroad during World War II. As a result of this revision, another alternative for asset management was granted to shop owners. Nevertheless, “shop-lease contract with sar-qofli” remains the most widely employed form of lease in Iran’s property lease market.

For the English interested in Persia in the nineteenth century, James Morier's Adventures of Hajji Baba of Isfahan was a crucial text, as it also was for Iranians who read its groundbreaking Persian translation almost half a century later. The text provided a persuasive understanding of Persia that has endured in the western imagination. This paper begins with the framing narrative and shows how the frame story sets the stage for a convincing literary portrait of Persia and Persians. Then it analyzes the image of Persia constructed in this book through the characterization of Hajji Baba as representative of Persians, and the geopolitical portrayal of the country that emerges from the account of his travels.

More than seven years have passed since the intervention of the international community in Afghanistan, yet the country has not only failed to achieve stability; it has actually experienced a downward trend on that account. The worsening situation in Afghanistan has occurred despite the fact that the Afghan government and its international partners have allocated unprecedented amounts of resources, increased their security forces and implemented socio-political and economic programs that they deemed were conducive to stability. Why and how this failure did come about? This article challenges some of the underlying assumptions for stability and the notion of political reconstruction that the international community and the Afghan government have implemented so far as being largely responsible for the gloomy state of affairs in that country.

The paper consists of six parts. The first part discusses the major reasons for the presence of a conventional sociopolitical Baloch culture in Iran. The second part presents a profile of the Iranian Baloch elites, dividing them into four major groups: the Sunni clerics or molavis, tribal chiefs, the educated, and the wealthy. The third discusses the challenging relationship which exists among the Baloch elites. The fourth describes the elites' attitudes towards the Baloch society's norms. The fifth determines the elites' orientation towards state and politics. And finally the paper ends with conclusions.

Since the last world war, there has been an increasing interest in preserving and utilizing archival material in Iran, but, despite several attempts, appropriate institutions have not as yet been established for this purpose. To substantiate their viewpoints, researchers often have to wait long periods before gaining access to the desired archival material. This, of course, does not imply that documents were not preserved in Iran. Throughout the entire Qajar period, the existence of a document chamber at the imperial court, in which documents of unequal value were preserved with reasonable care, indicates that the preservation of archival material is a long-established custom.

There are also private archives of considerable interest, but unfortunately these materials were preserved for long periods only if they had legal or administrative importance. For example, the contracts for real estate transactions, or designations of waqf properties, were carefully preserved by heirs or distantly entitled parties, while documents of only practical interest usually disappeared within two or three generations.