How could one translate into any European language a Persian poem as culturally and aesthetically embedded as this hemistich by Hāfez: beh may sajjādeh rangin kon garat pir-e moghān guyad. This is the central question Mohammad-Rezā Shafiʿi-Kadkani addresses in his essay titled “On Poetic Untranslatability.” For Shafiʿi, translation is primarily a function of cultural—and not linguistic—affinity. Therefore, he argues that Hāfez’s poem is all but untranslatable in European languages given their fundamental cultural difference from Persian. This article critically engages Shafiʿi’s essay by outlining and analyzing the set of problematic assumptions embedded in its rubric of untranslatability. It places Shafiʿi’s view on translation in conversation with theorists of untranslatability in comparative literature and translation studies. Ultimately, it outlines why untranslatability is not a useful conceptual framework for the analysis of linguistic and cultural difference.

This article constitutes a preliminary attempt to explore the geographical dimension of premodern Persian lyric poetry from the perspective of the relationship between the historical adherence of a text to external reality and the rhetorics of intertextuality and performativity. The pretext for this exploration is the poem known as “Tork-e Shirazi” or “The Turk from Shiraz,” one of the most celebrated ghazals of Hafez of Shiraz. The analysis focuses in particular on the first two lines of the ghazal, whose rich and ambiguous imagery has challenged the community of readers, interpreters, and scholars for centuries. On the basis of historiographical, formalist, and poststructuralist approaches to the study of lyric poetry, the article outlines a generative paradigm that analyzes a given text from the perspective of its abstract, genre-specific, conventionally negotiated, and referential levels of meaning. The contribution of geocritical studies will be combined with rhetorical analysis to conceive of Hafez’s text as a geopoetic map in which the cities of Shiraz, Samarkand, and Bukhara are put in conversation with the mental and historical representations of Iran and India between the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, during the transition from the Mongol to the Timurid models and ideals of power.

The present study tries to show a wider-than-usual use of ta'ârof, that is the deliberate play with the so-called “ritual courtesy, or politeness” formulas that can alter the readers' opinion about a character, for instance that result in prejudice, sympathy, etc. towards the characters. Politeness, in both everyday conversations and literary texts, is an excellent device for expressing certain individual opinions. Depending on or irrespective of the conversation partner, individual interests or opinions can be expressed or withdrawn. What I try to prove is that their use— quantity, types etc.—can be a form of expressing the author's direct attitude. I have chosen works of the “classics” of modern fiction (Sâdeq Hedâyat, Bozorg ‘Alavi, Sâdeq Čubak and Jalâl Âl Ahmad). Based on the selected examples from the works of the writers I have chosen, I attempt to demonstrate and prove my presumption. The exaggerated insistence on a certain style or just the exaggerated refusal to use a certain style can be a tool for the writer to influence—beforehand—the readers’ impression of a certain character or characters. This effect can be rough, sarcastic, etc.

I concluded my previous paper on this subject with the remark that the people of Boir Ahmad, faced with the depletion of their pastures, the unavailability of new land, the difficulty of obtaining higher education, and the low wages earned from migrant labor, were looking toward the future trusting a merciful God to open, as they say, five doors for each one that was closed. That was in 1971. Since then, doors have indeed been opening up for the people of Boir Ahmad, a process which is filling them with new expectations for the future, but which is also changing basically the structure of their traditional way of life. These changes are most pronounced in the western and eastern parts of Boir Ahmad, i.e., in the nearer and farther environs of the administrative centers of Yasuj and Deh Dasht. In the present paper I shall describe these changes, using as an example a village 36 kilometers to the northwest of Yasuj, the Deh Bozorg Sisakht, commonly called Sisakht, the largest village of Boir Ahmad (pop. in 1976: 2596).

The study of Iranian history in the Safavid period is at a relatively rudimentary stage. Despite the wealth of chronicle, biographical, numismatic, documentary, and journalistic material available, few monographic studies of Safavid institutions have been produced. As Minorsky pointed out four decades ago, “not until all the available sources have been properly scrutinized and more material…discovered, shall we be able to get to the bedrock of social and economic conditions under the Safavids.”

His admonition holds true for political institutions as well. Certain fundamental features of the political life of Safavid Iran are well known to its students. But aside from the state structure itself, as analyzed by Minorsky in his translation of and commentary on the Tadhkirat al-muluk and in articles by Roger Savory and Ann K. S. Lambton, other aspects of political life—for instance the Safaviyya and the persistence of Sufi loyalties in political, life, the character and evolution of the qizilbash as a political party, the political integration of local aristocrats (e.g., the maliks of Farah and Sistan and the divs of Mazandaran), and the organization and functioning of tribal uymaqs—remain largely unstudied.

Ever since Minorsky published his introduction and commentary on the Safavid manual of administration Tadhkirat al-Mulūk, which has become a classic in the field, scholars have come to agree on the tribal character of the state that was founded by Shah Esma`il. In fact, it is through the military force of the Turkmen tribes, the Qezelbash, that Shah Esma`il was able to accede to the throne, thus inaugurating a period of relative stability for Iran that lasted more than two centuries. Iran owed its ability to resist the recurring and alternating attacks by the Ottoman Empire and the Uzbegs to Qezelbash power as well.

Initially mobilized by religious fanaticism, the military strength of the Qezelbash became a double-edged sword for the Safavid rulers with the waning of unconditional Qezelbash devotion to the shah. Though they were indispensable to the defense of the empire's frontiers, the Qezelbash amirs, with their unbridled despotism and the resulting turmoil, never ceased to be a prime source of concern for the rulers.

More than Fifty Books, and More than 100 Academic Articles, Have appeared in English alone dealing in significant part with the Iranian revolutionary movement. This impressive output, published in just 15 years, does not reflect a similarly copious wealth of source materials. In fact, the study of the Iranian revolutionary movement is largely, one might argue, sound and fury, a lot of grand theorizing lacking a solid empirical basis. No work on the Iranian revolution has made systematic use of all forms of primary evidence that are currently available, though some are more thorough than others.

This paper discusses Western historiography of the Iranian revolutionary movement of 1977–79, which led to the fall of the Pahlavi regime in February 1979. It does not attempt to cover works on the post-revolutionary period, after the fall of the shah. In addition, it does not deal specifically with individual secondary works on the Iranian revolution.

European leaders are increasingly conscious of their heavy dependence on energy supplies from Russia. In an attempt to articulate a strategy to improve energy security, the European Commission issued an EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan in November 2008. This essay examines Europe's energy vulnerability and the role Iran can play in diversifying the EU energy supplies. I argue that a rapprochement with Iran aimed at greater utilization of its oil and gas reserves would contribute to Europe's (and the world's) energy security.

This article argues that the Avestan text Yasna Haptaŋhāiti (“Yasna of the seven chapters”) was not originally divided into seven chapters. It was divided into three parts that were not considered hāitis (chapters) in the same way as the gathic hāitis. The division of the Yasna Haptaŋhāiti into seven parts and its corresponding title is based on the arrangement of the Old Avestan texts. These texts try to reproduce the structure of the prayer Ahuna Vairiia; three verses with two hemistichs each correspond to three pairs of compositions with 7, 4 four and 1 hāiti each of the Old Avestan texts.

The following ghazals by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini were written between 1365/1986 and 1367/1988. They are taken from his Bada-ye ᶜeshq: Ashᶜar-e ᶜarefana-ye Hazrat-e Emam Khomeini (Wine of Love: Mystical Poems by His Eminence Imam Khomeini). The collection includes twenty-three mystical ghazals, a number of quatrains, and some other material. When one approaches late twentieth-century Persian ghazals, the intellectual climate in which we live today compels one to ask a number of questions. Has the contemporary poet mastered and applied the formal requirements that govern the pre-modern style? Are the poems confined to the traditional topics of wine, spring, and unrequited love in all its aspects or do they explore new areas of broader social relevance? Is the contemporary poet following or reacting to earlier poets? Finally, what is the relationship of the poetry to the life of the poet?

This study pioneers the quantitative research of second generation Iranian graduates in Germany. Second generation immigrants in Germany, immigrants raised in Germany with at least one parent born abroad, are relevant as they are a crucial part of German society. Second generation immigrants in general as well as Iranians in particular are assumed to have high extrinsic aspirations. But a dataset big enough to study the employment situation of second generation Iranian graduates in Germany did not exist. Therefore, the article uses the KOAB dataset from 2011 to 2015, which contains data from 53,429 full-time employed higher education graduates in Germany (among those are 161 second generation Iranians). Their extrinsic job aspirations and career success (income, job satisfaction) are analyzed. Multivariate analyses reveal the higher extrinsic job aspirations of second generation Iranian graduates compared to many other migrant groups and Germans but similar to second generation Turkish graduates. Nevertheless, the extrinsic job aspiration is relevant, though only one factor among others to predict career success.

In an article antitled “Belles-Lettres, Ethics and Didactic Literature: Thoughts on Three Concepts in Iranian Culture,” Ahmad Karimi-Hakkak poses the question whether the large body of andarz literature, “…may be said to form…‘the grammar of ethical thought’ in Persian.” The author briefly reviews the most recent scholarship on the subject, including Charles-Henri de Fouchécour's comprehensive and singular work, and concludes by calling for the necessity of close analyses of works of andarz from rhetorical, cultural, and social perspectives. It is through such close analyses, he maintains, that we can begin to understand “the grammar of ethical thought in Persian.”

Karimi-Hakkak underscores the pragmatic aspect of andarz literature. As de Fouchécour also observes, ‘The point of departure was…not a set of moral precepts, but convenience: Morality was knowing how to live in society (farhang, adab).” The authors of andarz literature provided both general and specific directives as to how one could best live in society.

On 5 May 1850 the Babis of Zanjan rose in arms against the Qajar governor of the town. Led by a charismatic cleric known as Hujjat-i Zanjani, two thousand Babi fighters with their families held part of the town against a much larger government army. Nine months later, when the army captured the last ruined houses held by the Babis, fewer than a hundred Babi fighters survived to face execution.

There is never a neat answer to the question of why a historical event occurred, and the question is that much harder to answer when the information is in fundamental ways incomplete and when the participants themselves differed deeply about the meaning of the event. There were two other major Babi revolts1— Mazandaran in 1848–49 and Nayriz in 1850—and at least four other instances where Babi uprisings might have been expected: Shiraz, Qazvin, and Isfahan in 1846, and Tehran in 1852.

It has long been accepted, almost as a Cold War truism, that the first direct confrontation between Soviet Russia and the United States took place over Iran in February, 1946. According to the traditional picture of Cold War origins, Russia's refusal to evacuate her forces--together with her simultaneous efforts to establish a puppet regime in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan--tipped the West off as to her global intentions. America and Great Britain promptly registered protests within and outside the United Nations, and, in the first effort at containment, prevented direct Soviet penetration of the entire Middle East. After Iran, the West was forewarned. As a leading textbook notes, in pointing to Russia's reluctance to withdraw, “Soviet power was prepared to move into any position that the Western states were not willing to defend.”

Most memoirs of American policy-makers stress that the United States had responded, and responded of necessity, to Russian incentive.

Soviet scholarship on Iran is extensive and highly organized. Just in the year 1980, 119 articles and books pertaining to Iran were published in the Soviet Union. The publications dealt with such topics as history, literature, economics, and geology (and do not include journalistic coverage of current events). The scale of Soviet scholarship on Iran since World War II is so vast that it would be hopelessly cumbersome to try to review or even list all the books and articles. This essay will attempt to provide an overview of the history of Iranian scholarship in the Soviet Union and Imperial Russia, to describe how the study of Islamic Iran in the Soviet Union is organized and oriented, and to look at a few of the most interesting works of recent years.

This essay examines the graphic memoir An Iranian Metamorphosis, by the acclaimed cartoonist Mana Neyestani, in the context of Iranian diaspora literature, particularly the genre of comics. Neyestani’s book is analyzed for its engagement with the politics of exile literature, and its attempt at challenging a two-dimensional view of the political discourse, in which the ethical boundaries of pro- and anti-government are overtly simple. The essay focuses on the book’s narrative techniques that exhibit a complex awareness of what is anticipated from a representative work of Iranian exile memoir, and the way it negotiates its own narrative politics. To clarify the arguments, several comparative examples are drawn from two well-known graphic narratives by Iranian diaspora authors, Marjane Satrapi’s Persepolis, and Amir and Khalil’s Zahra’s Paradise.

This essay addresses itself to the century long history of cinema in Iran, focusing on the history of the senses as they combine with and are extended by film technologies. It argues that Khomeini's aim was to produce a transformed and Shi'ite Iran by purifying the sensorial national body by means of film technologies.

What can the poetry chosen for epitaphs on graves tell us about the political and cultural development of post-revolutionary Iran and the politics of death and dying under the Islamic Republic? This article explores contemporary Persian epitaph poetry as a valuable medium for understanding the socio-political dynamics of Iranian society. By analyzing the epitaphs of the Iran–Iraq war martyrs, who are buried in Zahra’s Paradise public cemetery in Tehran (Behesht-e Zahra), a new nomenclature can be established for the religious, political and socio-cultural ideas underpinning death and the afterlife.