Current histories of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution (1905-1909) frequently begin the story of the revolutionary years with 11 December 1905. On that day the bastinado was inflicted on three Tehrani merchants, Sayyid Hashim Qandfurush, Hajj Ahmad Qaysariyah, and Sayyid Isma'il Charmfurush, on orders from ‘Ala’ al-Dawlah, governor of Tehran. This incident, we are told, led the two leading Tehran clerics, Sayyid Muhammad Tabataba'i and Sayyid ‘Abdallah Bihbihani, to stage a protest sit-in with their supporters in the Shah ‘Abd al-'Azim shrine and demand the dismissal of ‘Ala’ al-Dawlah and premier ‘Ayn al-Dawlah, as well as the institution of a house of justice. A month later, the sit-in ended successfully: though ‘Ayn al-Dawlah remained premier, ‘Ala’ al-Dawlah was dismissed and a royal decree to establish a house of justice was issued. Some months later another incident set off the next round of the contest.

The idea of Zoroastrian mysticism might at first glance seem a contradiction in terms. The Good Religion, after all, is čīmīg, “rational,” above all else: Zoroaster elegantly solved the most intractable mystery of all faiths, theodicy, by the revelation of cosmic dualism. The mere assertion that there are esoteric doctrines within Zoroastrianism has been criticized. This criticism springs in part from a flawed perception of mysticism itself, which, as it will be argued, is not an independent entity, everywhere the same. Rather, each religion has a mysticism of its own, often irreconcilable in some of its features with the mainstream, and, in the case of Zoroastrianism, with some of the religion's plain logic. Also, the existence of mysticism within a religious tradition does not imply its centrality to that tradition. Mysticism exists in Christianity, but could scarcely be called essential to it, considering the claim, elaborated as the Christian church rose to universal prominence, to the radically overt and sufficient truth of the Gospel.

The Iranian revolution presents a unique challenge to social scientists. Marked by massive popular participation (primarily in urban areas), by the rejection of violence by the revolutionaries, and by the rapid fulfillment of its goals, the Iranian experience seems to elude prevailing paradigms for the study of revolution. Although there were several factors that made the country ripe for revolution—widespread feelings of relative deprivation, a state apparatus under pressure from the international system, impeded elite circulation, and conflicts among various social classes—none of these alone can explain why the upheaval occurred. While it is unlikely that a definitive explanation of the revolution can ever be found, virtually all theories of revolution implicitly ask two questions: (1) What social conditions lead to revolution, and (2) What is the nature of participation in such revolutions? It is with the first of these questions that this essay is primarily concerned.

This article revisits the common discourse that Ottoman poetry is a derivative imitation of Persian poetry. I begin by surveying and discussing the discourse of imitation that has pervaded approaches to Ottoman poetry in particular and Ottoman literature in general. Then I turn to explore how Ottoman poets engaged with Persian poetry by focusing on a lyric poem composed by the Ottoman sultan Süleyman the Magnificent (1494‒1566) in imitation of the Persian master poet Hafiz of Shiraz (ca. 1315‒90). In light of intertextual analysis, I illustrate and discuss the intricate ways in which Süleyman models himself on Hafiz in crafting his poem. I conclude with the idea that a closer analytical look at Ottoman poets’ intertextual dialogue with Persian poetry can offer better insights into the Ottoman reception of Persian poetic models as well as into the meaning and workings of imitation in the Ottoman literary context.

The subject of historiography for the Iranian scholar has traditionally been of lesser importance than the actual writing of history. The problems and various techniques of historiography were little discussed and practically unknown until this century. Recently, several articles have appeared in Iranian journals which clearly indicate that Iranian historians intend to rectify this past imbalance. Furthermore, the publication of the journal Bar-rasī'hā-yi Tārīkhī (Historical Studies) suggests a renewed effort to present recent research and historiographical techniques in a more exacting and scientific manner than in the past.

Sufism is One of the Most Dynamic and Interesting Dimensions of Islamic religious and cultural expression. It is an umbrella term for a variety of philosophical, social, and literary phenomena occurring within the Islamic world. In its narrowest sense, the term “Sufism” refers to a number of schools of Islamic mystical philosophy and theology, to the phenomenon of religious orders and guilds (tarīqāt) that have exerted considerable influence over the development of Islamic politics and society, and to the varied expressions of popular piety and devotion to shrines found throughout the Islamic world. In a wider sense, Sufism is often seen as the spiritual muse behind much of pre-modern verse in the Islamic world, the idiom of much of popular Islamic piety, the primary social arena open to women's religious participation, and a major force in the conversion of people to Islam in Africa and Asia. The Sufi orders served as educational institutions that fostered not only the religious sciences but also music and decorative arts. Their leaders sometimes functioned as a challenge to the power of the juridic and theological establishment.

Published in 1933, Walther Hinz's detailed study on the short and turbulent reign of Safavid Shah Ismacil II (984-85/1576-77), which he likens to that of Ivan the Terrible, has yet to be surpassed. Although Hinz consulted many Safavid chronicles then in manuscript, including a number which have yet to be published, his discussion of a major facet of the period's history, Shah Ismacil II’s religious policies, is based primarily on the account of Iskandar Beg Munshi in Tārīkh-i cālam-ārā-yi cAbbasī, which he essentially paraphrases. Hinz concludes that Shah Ismacil II’s pro-Sunni policies, including primarily his prohibitions against cursing the Companions of the Prophet and his attempt to remove the Shicite credal statement cAlīyun walī Allāh “cAli is the ally of God” from the coinage, resulted not from political expediency but rather from personal conviction. In the end, these policies failed. Realizing that he could not win over the Qizilbash and that he himself was in grave danger, Shah Ismacil rescinded his decrees, had his pro-Sunni ṣadr and advisor, Mirza Makhdum Sharifi, placed under house arrest, and reconfirmed his commitment to Shicism before the end of his short reign.

From 1928 to 1932 the Pahlavi regime of Iran negotiated with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) to revise the D’Arcy Concession. These negotiations, conducted by ‘Abd al-Hosayn Teymurtāsh and the chairman of APOC Sir John Cadman, ended in failure when Rezā Shah unilaterally cancelled the D’Arcy Concession in November 1932. This article argues that “equitability” was the goal of the negotiations. An agreement was ultimately impossible to reach, due to differing ideas on either side regarding what was equitable, changes in the international oil economy and instability within Iran itself, leading to an unequal agreement in April 1933 that confirmed APOC’s long-term security but served only the short-term needs of Iran.

This article presents a detailed criticism of Darioush Bayandor's book Iran and the CIA. Bayandor argues that certain Shi'a clerics, rather than the US Central Intelligence Agency, were the main actors responsible for overthrowing Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq in August 1953. Bayandor presents no major new evidence to support this claim. He gives too much weight to certain statements, draws unwarranted inferences from others, and discounts or disregards a wealth of evidence that conflicts with his account. He overemphasizes the role of civilian crowds in the overthrow of Mosaddeq and underemphasizes the role of Iranian military units organized by the CIA. And he fails to acknowledge the importance of US and especially British efforts to foment opposition to Mosaddeq before the coup.

The triumph of the Khomeini forces and of the Iranian revolution in February 1979, sweeping away the old imperial regime and the transitional Bakhtiyar government, marked the beginning of a highly critical period in American-Iranian relations. The conflict culminated in the seizure of the American embassy in Tehran and in the holding of U.S. diplomats as hostages for well over a year. The hostage issue was the most controversial question for U.S. foreign policy in 1980 and marked a historic low point in relations between the two countries.

From the viewpoint of most Iranian leaders, this battle was an inevitable one. Based on their perceptions of bilateral relations over the previous three decades, Ayatollah Khomeini and his supporters expected a deterministically hostile United States. In their eyes, Washington had provided the main foreign support for the shah, a regime for which their passionate hatred can scarcely be overstated, and had tried to prevent the revolution's triumph.

This study investigates university coaches' knowledge about their legal duties toward their athletes, as well as the connection between the level of their legal knowledge and their educational, social and economic background. The results are presented according to three major dimensions: deficiencies in the coaches' training system, in their knowledge concerning their legal responsibility and the coaches' social recognition regarding their profession. The findings indicate that the coaches' training in Iran has a lot of weaknesses, including the neglect of legal issues, the consequence of which is that the Iranian university coaches do not have sufficient knowledge about the legal issues in general and they are not aware of their duty toward their athletes in particular. In Iran coaching is not considered as a prestigious occupation; in terms of social status coaches belong to the lower middle class.

Alongside the burgeoning secular ideas on people and state during the Constitutional Revolution, a movement seeking a modern Islamic state, governed according to the shari'a, also emerged. This article studies the evolution of that movement in Isfahan, first by contrasting the experience of two brothers of very different ages, Aqa Najafi Isfahani and Haj Aqa Nurullah Isfahani, and examining the way the younger became receptive to the Pan-Islamic ideas then current in the Middle East. Second, the article considers in particular the political theory of Aqa Nurullah, which was influenced by his practical experience of institutional innovation in Isfahan. He argued that constitutionalism was implicit to Islam and saw it as generating wealth for Muslims. He also advocated many of the features of later Islamism, including the desire for a strong army.

The nomadic tribes of Iran have long attracted interest, yet despite many descriptive accounts there have been few critical studies of them. Major obstacles to analysis have been a romanticization of nomadism, a dichotomization that emphasizes the differences between nomadism and agriculture, and a disregard for the historical setting and change. Discussions have tended to obscure important economic and social relationships between nomadic and sedentary society, and within the tribal structure itself; moreover, it has often been assumed that an organic or deterministic, link between pastoralism and tribal political structures exists.

The Bakhtiyārī are commonly associated with the central Zagros mountains. It is assumed that this rugged area in turn necessitates transhumant movement of the Bakhtiyārī with their flocks of sheep and goats and a tribal organization to accomplish this end. Furthermore, this environment isolates and gives the tribe autonomy vis-a-vis the state.

Mashhad, the site in northeastern Iran of the shrine of the eighth Shiʻi imam, is arguably one of the largest and wealthiest sacred shrines in the world. The gilded dome over the imam's mausoleum stands amidst an expansive complex of courts, monumental gateways, libraries, museums, guesthouses, and administrative offices that cater to thousands of pilgrims each year. This paper examines the period, under the aegis of the early Safavid shahs, when Mashhad was established as the preeminent Shiʻi pilgrimage center in Iran. Appropriating the Timurid ecumenical vision for the shrine, the Safavid shahs refashioned the holy city into a site that celebrated the triumph of Twelver Shiʻism in the Safavid realm and reinforced Safavid claims of legitimacy. While highlighting Shah Tahmasb's personal devotion to Mashhad, and his privileging of the shrine within Safavid sacred topography, the paper focuses on Shah ʻAbbas's urban reshaping of Mashhad and the architectural and institutional expansion of the shrine during his reign, thereby enhancing its status as the leading spiritual center in the Safavid empire.

From December 1930, when the first Iranian feature film was made to the 1980s, the connections between Persian literature and the Iranian cinema have been intimate, varied, and significant. In fact, an examination of the Iranian cinema in terms of the roles literature plays in it demonstrates that the cinema constitutes an important aspect of the sociology of the Iranian writer, especially from the mid-1960s to the late 1970s.

This essay surveys the role of literature and Iranian writers in the Iranian cinema and then focuses on a prominent example of the relationship between literature and movies, the popular 1971 film called Dash Akol, for the purpose of indicating differences in the aims and effects of the two art forms.

The Turkmen inhabit a portion of the Central Asian steppe extending cast from the Caspian Sea to the Amu Darya, a region divided among three countries--Iran, Afghanistan, and the Soviet Union. The central part of this area is the Kara Kum, or “black sand,” a vast, largely uninhabited desert. The majority of the Turkmen are concentrated in two somewhat more fertile regions bordering the Kara Kum. One area consists of the banks of the Amu Darya; the other is a long strip of plains and low mountains, lying south of the Kara Kum and separating it from the Iranian Plateau (see Map below). The Turkmen number about a million and a half, with approximately a million living in the Soviet Union, and roughly a quarter of a million each in Iran and Afghanistan.

Research in Iranian social and economic history is still relatively unknown. This situation is puzzling in view of the social and economic research in Arab and Turkish history, particularly from 1955 onwards. in the past ten years, social and economic research in these two areas of Middle East history have produced some excellent results. But similar research in Iranian history has not developed. This state of affairs is disappointing when we recall the words of Vladimir Minorsky in his "Foreword" to the Tadhkirat al-mulūk in 1943:

Azerbaijani national history theory poses a challenge to the conventional history writing of Iran. Since 1937, Azerbaijani Soviet historians in Baku have constructed an Azerbaijani national history and identity based on the territorial definition of the nation. This approach was supported by Joseph Stalin. By the 1940s, this narrative incorporated various components hitherto exclusively known as “Iranian,” such as the Medes. Meanwhile, Soviet Iranologists and Orientalists, followers of the conventional Iranian narrative, tried to avoid controversy with the Azerbaijani claims, which secured political support at the highest level. When Stalin died in 1953, the Iranologists raised their voices, which caused controversy with political connotations. Using primary source materials, this article sheds light on the first round of discussions between Azerbaijani historians, constructors of their national history, and the Soviet Iranologists, the proponents of conventional Iranian history. The article also shows the limits of the Communist Party's control over history writing and the hardships of accommodating contradictory interpretations of history within a multinational communist state.

Contemporary Iranian cinema has enjoyed wide success on the international scene—winning awards at film festivals, receiving praise by critics, and being screened in many countries around the world. But this success has another side to it: at home in Iran, the movie theater attendance is in decline and a range of players, including individuals, policymakers and government entities continue to meddle in shaping its future. Throughout the twentieth century and during the two decades of post-revolutionary successes abroad, Iranian cinema developed its own unique style and aesthetic. A cinema which was sometimes nurtured and financially encouraged by the government, yet at other times censored or banned by it. This paper provides a brief survey of the history of Iranian cinema since the 1900s in order to reveal the paradoxical issues both propelling and bedeviling its development and the role of principal actors involved in fashioning an Iranian national cinema.

In less than twenty years, Nadir Shah built an empire across Iran, India, and Central Asia. When he took the throne on the Mughan steppe in 1148/1736, Nadir confronted the problem of how to legitimize his reign after two centuries of Shi'i Safavid rule. He attempted to solve this problem, in part, by challenging Iran's Twelver Shi'i identity.

Nadir proposed to the Ottomans that Twelver Shi'ism be considered a fifth school of Sunni Islam, to be called the Ja'fari madhhab after the sixth Imam, Ja'far al-Sadiq. In exchange for Shi'i renunciation of such practices as sabb (the ritual cursing of the first three caliphs), Nadir proposed that the Ottomans give this Ja'fari madhhab all the privileges enjoyed by the four Sunni schools, and that a fifth pillar be erected in the Ka'bah in Mecca to commemorate it. He asked that the Ottomans allow him to appoint the leader of the annual ḥajj caravan from Iran.