International humanitarian law (IHL), also known as the law of armed conflict, seeks to limit the humanitarian impact of war by regulating the conduct of hostilities and protecting those not or no longer participating in combat. IHL does not prevent war, nor is that its role. IHL is only one part of the fabric of international law, other parts of which (jus ad bellum) govern the legality of war itself. However, IHL plays an essential role in mitigating suffering and fostering conditions that may facilitate a return to peace. This article examines the long-standing debate over whether IHL inadvertently legitimizes war or whether it can actually contribute, indirectly, to peace by imposing humanitarian constraints on conflict. It explores how adherence to IHL can preserve human dignity and support post-conflict reconciliation. Ultimately, while IHL does not prevent war, its strict application helps to reduce war's brutality and create pathways for sustainable peace.

recalling previous resolutions on the high human cost of the use and proliferation of certain types of weapons and the response of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (Movement) to these humanitarian consequences, in particular Resolution 7 of the 2013 Council of Delegates “Weapons and international humanitarian law”, Resolution 7 of the 2009 Council of Delegates “Preventing humanitarian consequences arising from the development, use and proliferation of certain types of weapons” and Resolution 2 of the 2005 Council of Delegates “Weapons and international humanitarian law”, as well as numerous other resolutions on landmines, cluster munitions, arms transfers, nuclear weapons and war in cities, and reaffirming the commitments undertaken in these resolutions,

This is the sixth report on international humanitarian law (IHL) and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (International Conference). Similar reports were submitted to the International Conferences held in 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015 and 2019. The aim of all these reports is to provide an overview of some of the challenges posed by contemporary armed conflicts for IHL; generate broader reflection on those challenges; and outline current or prospective ICRC action, positions and areas of interest, and bring them to the attention of members of the International Conference.

Like its predecessors, this report addresses only some of the contemporary challenges to IHL. It outlines a number of issues that are the focus of increased interest among states and other actors, as well as the ICRC: nuclear weapons; protection of people in the hands of parties to armed conflict; conduct of hostilities; new technologies of warfare; impartial humanitarian work; and implementation of IHL. These issues include matters not addressed in previous reports, such as separated family members, missing people and obligations on the handling of the dead, food security, military operations in outer space, and how respect for IHL can contribute, in a modest way, to building steps towards peace. This report also provides an update on some issues of concern that were addressed in previous reports and that remain high on the international agenda, such as the urbanization of warfare, autonomous weapon systems and other new technologies of warfare, and protection of people deprived of their liberty.

Eva Svoboda worked with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) from 1999 to 2011 in Kashmir, Sudan, Myanmar, Iraq, East Timor, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Algeria as Protection Coordinator, Head of Office and Head of Sub-Delegation, as well as Head of Delegation. Prior to joining the ICRC, she worked for the Swiss Development Agency and various non-governmental organizations. From 2012 to 2018 she was a Senior Research Fellow with the Humanitarian Policy Group at the Overseas Development Institute in London. Between 2016 and 2017 she worked as the Senior Expert for Detainees and the Missing at the United Nations (UN) Office of the Special Envoy for Syria.

International law began as a discipline concerned with the goal of peace, seen as the ideal state of relations between States, focusing on the potential for peaceful settlement of disputes, arms control and disarmament, and the prevention of war. International humanitarian law (IHL) emerged as the first significant development in international law addressing issues of peace and security. The subsequent development of international criminal law (ICL) following World War II has enabled the criminal prosecution of war crimes (serious violations of IHL) as well as crimes against the peace, crimes against humanity and genocide. This article argues that IHL, as it was developed to regulate the conduct of war (jus in bello) as a means of preventing unnecessary suffering, should be considered as separate yet integrally linked to the pursuit of international criminal justice as part of transitional justice in the context of jus post bellum, defined as “the set of norms applicable at the end of armed conflict … with a view to establishing a sustainable peace”. The article analyzes existing scholarship and emerging ideas about the relatively old yet underdeveloped concept of jus post bellum, and what this concept means in practice since the rapid increase in international interventions in peacebuilding and transitional justice in non-international armed conflicts. Applying the author's theory of transformative justice along with jus post bellum principles to the case study example of Cambodia, the paper discusses the complexities, uncertainties and apparent contradictions of establishing a “just peace” that builds on, yet goes beyond, the intersecting norms and practices of IHL and ICL. The article concludes by proposing the need for a radical reconceptualization of jus post bellum in order to support a more sustainable, transformative and emancipatory peacebuilding agenda.

How international law applies to the use of information and communications technology by States is still a matter of discussion. Against this background, cyberspace has become the main area of competition between States, and this competition, to put it simply, is resulting in a constant low-intensity warfare below the threshold for a use of force. Such low-intensity cyber warfare, from a legal point of view, revitalizes the debate over the concept of a “state of intermediacy” that has the potential to overcome the dichotomy between peace and war. In the present author's opinion, this state of intermediacy also supports the idea that the international humanitarian law (IHL) principle of distinction should be applied, even before the eruption of a full-scale war, whenever wartime means and capabilities are employed by States. This paper argues that some opacities in international law have created favourable conditions for such constant low-intensity warfare, and that tackling the identified opacities would therefore be beneficial in order to achieve a more peaceful cyberspace. Thus, the paper goes on to address one of the identified opacities, namely the definition of espionage under international law, because, as international law now stands, it does not allow us to tackle the other identified opacities. Finally, the paper discusses how the proposed narrow interpretation of espionage can cope with the IHL principle of distinction in the cyber domain.

Newly emerging US cyberspace warfighting concepts highlight the need to update US legal doctrine. Concepts adapted to future high-intensity, high-paced armed conflict, including command post dispersal and integration of cyberspace into other targeting domains, present opportunities to refine US understandings of the law of war attack threshold and overlooked rules applicable to destruction and seizure. The advantages of staking out clear and current opinio juris on these and other matters extend beyond providing responsible and consistent operational law advice. Updated and authoritative military cyber legal doctrine will serve the strategic and diplomatic legal interests of the United States and the international legal system as a whole.

International humanitarian law (IHL) provides the normative foundation for efforts to address the issue of missing persons during and after armed conflict. Whilst IHL does not engage with how parties to an armed conflict may go about restoring peace, there has been speculation that resolving the missing issue, by bringing answers to families about the fate and whereabouts of their missing relatives, can potentially play a role in building peace. This article represents an effort to compile existing evidence in academic and practice literature that supports an understanding of how addressing the missing issue relates to peacebuilding. In so doing, the article seeks to lay out a research agenda to understand how addressing the issue of the missing can serve to advance peacebuilding, and proposes avenues for further research.

With the advent of socio-technical systems that gather and process personal data, the capacity to identify and even locate people in an automated fashion has dramatically increased. This article discusses what militaries need to know about data protection and the right to digital privacy/private life when personal data is processed. The focus in this discussion is on sensitive data that makes individuals identifiable. It is here argued that the right to data protection and the right to digital privacy/private life are distinctive and separate rights and should be treated as such, despite some overlaps. Although the law of armed conflict approaches processing of sensitive data in a topical manner, it remains firm on the delimitation between what is permissible and what becomes unlawful when it comes to processing data. This article illustrates that elements of both data protection and protection of the right to privacy/private life can be traced in the law of armed conflict. In fact, both rights remain distinctive also in times of armed conflict and must be separately protected through obligations of result as well as obligations of conduct.

This article outlines and evaluates several unique challenges associated with legal support to special operations. It describes the essential differences between special tactics, techniques and procedures and conventional military operations. It offers a US perspective on how treaty and customary international laws apply to various special operations, including precision attacks against “high-value targets”, hostage rescue missions, and support to partner and proxy forces. It examines the benefits and drawbacks of heavy reliance on special operations during armed conflict, including an assessment of the legal challenges that arise when special operations forces become a primary feature of a military campaign. Finally, it highlights how the assumption of substantial military and political risk impacts the application of international law to special operations at the tactical level.

The context of humanitarian action has changed considerably over the past twenty years. These upheavals have given rise to a need to reflect on humanitarian action, as evidenced by the new focus on scientific research by humanitarian actors since the turn of the century. This new approach has led to the creation of numerous organizations dedicated to research within the sector itself, so that scientific knowledge on humanitarian action is no longer produced solely by university researchers. One such organization is the French Red Cross Foundation, founded in 2013. This organization bears witness to the diversity and depth of the issues affecting the humanitarian sector, and the challenges of responding to them. Its history and its past and present difficulties and successes also illustrate the complexity of implementing such a response.

This article aims to analyze and capitalize on several examples of scientific programmes built in direct relation to the humanitarian sector, in order to draw lessons from them (success factors, difficulties encountered, testimonials of applications of research results). In the article, we provide retrospective information on collaboration between the humanitarian and social action sectors and the academic sector, and look to the future by anticipating the shortcomings and needs that organizations – like researchers – will have to address in order to nurture the solidarity practices of tomorrow.

Armed conflict presents a multitude of risks to civilians, prisoners of war and others caught in the middle of hostilities. Harmful information spreading on social media compounds such risks in a variety of tangible ways, from potentially influencing acts that cause physical harm to undermining a person's financial stability, contributing to psychological distress, spurring social ostracization and eroding societal trust in evidentiary standards, among many others. Despite this span of risks, no typology exists that maps the full range of such harms. This article attempts to fill this gap, proposing a typology of harms related to the spread of harmful information on social media platforms experienced by persons affected by armed conflict. Developed using real-world examples, it divides potential harm into five categories: harms to life and physical well-being, harms to economic or financial well-being, harms to psychological well-being, harms to social inclusion or cultural well-being, and society-wide harms. After detailing each component of the typology, the article concludes by laying out several implications, including the need to view harmful information as a protection risk, the importance of a conflict-specific approach to harmful information, the relevance of several provisions under international law, and the possible long-term consequences for societies from harmful information.

The information used for this typology is based entirely on open-source reporting covering acts that occurred during armed conflict and that were seemingly related to identified harmful information on social media platforms or messaging applications. The authors did not verify any reported incidents or information beyond what was included in cited sources. Throughout the article, sources have been redacted from citations where there is a risk of reprinting harmful information or further propagating it, and where redaction was necessary to avoid the impression that the authors were attributing acts to particular groups or actors.

Humanitarian diplomacy emerged as a concept in the 2000s to describe the vital work effected by non-State humanitarian organizations to negotiate access, protect civilians and uphold humanitarian principles. This paper charts the rise of State-led humanitarian diplomacy in the Middle East, arguing for the need to expand the conventional lens that is focused on non-State actors. It does so through a detailed examination of Qatar, a case study that has emerged over the last two decades as a significant State actor engaging in a range of forms of humanitarian diplomacy. Following a brief theoretical examination of the concept of humanitarian diplomacy, the paper describes Qatar's role in humanitarian diplomacy in relation to the changing context of armed conflict and humanitarian response in the Middle East. It then presents a categorization of Qatar's humanitarian diplomacy, employing a framework structured around multiple levels including practice, policy and normative/ideational, carried out by both non-State and State actors. Finally, the paper reflects on the significance of Qatar's experience and the implications it may have on the conduct of humanitarian diplomacy in the region, and in particular what a niche small State can do to contribute to the protection of the humanitarian sphere.

This article explores the potential classification of decentralized armed groups in non-international armed conflicts (NIACs). Unlike centralized armed groups, decentralized groups consist of fluid alliances of small subunits or cells with loose coordination between them. The central question explored by the authors is whether such groups meet the minimum organizational criterion to be considered parties to an armed conflict under international humanitarian law (IHL). The authors argue that, while not possessing the same chain of command as centralized armed groups, decentralized armed groups can, under certain conditions, nevertheless fulfil the criteria for conflict classification. Judicial precedents and IHL interpretation point to this conclusion where the absence of a centralized command structure within the group can be compensated by the existence of other factors attesting to the group's organization, such as the exercise of operational command over armed subunits, with the intensity of violence being an additional element suggesting the overall organization of the group. Ultimately, this interpretation would ensure the applicability of a legal framework that would better reflect the intensity of armed confrontations on the ground, and bind both States and non-State parties to a NIAC alike.

Contemporary armed conflicts have increasingly been accompanied by belligerents’ calls for civilians to support their military efforts. This article investigates the legal consequences of civilians taking up arms provided by or with the tacit support of the State. It first looks at the implications of civilian involvement from the perspective of a State's international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law obligations, focusing on removing civilians from the vicinity of hostilities, informing and training civilians on the implications of directly participating in hostilities, and respecting and ensuring respect for the law. It then demonstrates that the broader fabric of public international law is tested when civilians are encouraged to engage in hostilities, through a close analysis of the challenge of attributing civilian acts to the State. The article closes with practical recommendations for States to ensure that they uphold their humanitarian and human rights obligations, and to render the law of international responsibility effective when civilians commit systemic violations of IHL.

This article aims to highlight the importance of determining the temporal scope of the transition from armed conflict to peace. It will also consider the emergence of a new legal paradigm, jus post bellum, applicable to the post-conflict period, and the associated need for an appropriate regulatory framework. Given the unavoidable impact of armed conflict, the post-conflict period deserves particular attention, especially with regard to the need for a legal framework to facilitate the sustainable reconstruction of communities torn apart by conflict and ensure a lasting peace. After any kind of armed conflict, a solid legal framework is essential to finalize the end of hostilities, begin a sustainable peace process, build a united society and address the rifts caused by armed violence.

When do non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) end? Determining the existence of a NIAC requires a detailed, fact-intensive inquiry. Since the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia's seminal decision in the Tadić case, international courts and tribunals have evaluated the existence of NIACs under the Tadić test's two-pronged inquiry into intensity and organization. Although that decision also pronounced that international humanitarian law (IHL) continues to apply until a “peaceful settlement is achieved,” neither international tribunals nor scholars have articulated a comparably widely accepted and well-developed test for determining the end of NIACs.

At the same time – and especially since 9/11 – States have increasingly relied on IHL to meet the threat posed by non-State actors, broadening the scope of conflict-related liabilities in armed conflict without conferring the privileges or immunities otherwise inherent in IHL. This one-sided approach twists the purpose of IHL and places members of organized armed groups into legal black holes without temporal limitations, as States resist the termination of “armed conflict” irrespective of the continuing intensity of violence or the level of organization of non-State actors. Ultimately, the current approach gives States broad discretion without appropriate safeguards, which undermines the proper application of human rights and humanitarian principles within conflict and prevents the establishment of a sustainable peace.

This paper argues that the most appropriate test for ascertaining the end of a NIAC is one that combines objective consideration of the diminution of organized and intense hostilities below the Tadić threshold with the likelihood that hostilities will not again rise above that threshold. It thus draws from but does not fully endorse the preferred approach of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which focuses on the lasting termination of hostilities,1 while abjuring a general temporal limitation. Although commendable for its effort to avoid the legal uncertainty that attends the revolving conflict classification problem, the ICRC's approach unfortunately tends to encode existing uncertainty surrounding the termination of NIACs and to indistinctly prolong the application of IHL to erstwhile conflict situations. In contrast, the authors suggest that a test for the end of NIAC based on a specific period (five months following the diminution of organized and intense hostilities below the Tadić threshold), subject to an evaluation of the risk that those hostilities may resume, better balances certainty of legal application with the promotion of a return to peace. The authors will employ the facts of diverse case studies, including the FARC in Colombia, the LTTE in Sri Lanka, numerous armed groups in Mali, and the United States with Al-Qaeda, to build a legal standard that courts can use to determine IHL's continuing applicability to an erstwhile armed conflict.

Neutral States must abstain from supporting a party to a conflict with military equipment and assistance. This core aspect of the law of neutrality has not changed with the adoption of the UN Charter in 1945, or with the brutal Russian aggression against Ukraine. That said, by reviewing the changes to neutrality law over time, this article finds plausible reasons to believe that neutrality has – for better or worse – become optional for the vast majority of States, which can today opt to be non-belligerent States – i.e., States that are neither neutral nor parties to the armed conflict. All States have to cooperate to bring to an end serious violations of international law, including humanitarian law, and this duty of cooperation has abolished “sitting-still neutrality”, but it does not render neutrality law moot. This reading of “optional but not qualified” neutrality maintains the core neutrality idea of abstaining in military matters. In this article, I argue that views of “obsolete” or “qualified” neutrality are not new at all but depart from well-accepted rules of legal interpretation and raise concerns about double standards. Viewing neutrality as optional but unqualifiable offers greater conceptual clarity, is more honest than alternative views, and comes with advantages for humanitarian action.

Three decades after the United Nations Security Council invoked its Chapter VII powers to create the ad hoc criminal tribunals, there can be little doubt that the prosecution of individuals responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) contributes to restoring and maintaining peace. While there is little doubt that the reparatory function of justice is just as crucial as retribution, under international law today, reparations for IHL violations remain harrowingly insufficient or borderline non-existent. In scholarship and strategic litigation, various attempts have been made to distil an individual right to reparations from black-letter IHL. This article argues that such approaches are doomed to fail, as procedural aspects of international obligations rarely, if ever, emerge through the evolution of an existing customary international obligation, let alone via the crystallization of a new customary international norm. They are usually triggered by a political shift that makes States adopt novel regulations setting forth the jurisdictional ramifications of enforcing a pre-existing right or obligation. This article thus advances a two-fold argument. First, it asserts that States’ increased compliance with the obligation to provide compensation for violations of IHL attributable to them would contribute to “the restoration and maintenance of peace” just as much as the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations thereof. Second, it argues that the individual right to claim reparations for IHL violations can only be established through a political decision of States, and that the establishment of an international mechanism for Ukraine might be an important precedent for the evolution of the current international system.