The resumption of serious negotiations looking toward comprehensive disarmament indicates the acute discomfort felt at the top levels of government over continuing to gamble for security through the build-up of modern weapons systems. Responsible leaders of the major powers evidently share the concern voiced by President Eisenhower over “the enormous risks entailed if reasonable steps are not taken to curb the international competition in armaments and to move effectively in the direction of disarmament.” As things now stand, the risks of controlled disarmament may actually be far less than the risks of policies of deterrence which depend on a continuing expansion and ever broader dispersal of cosmic lethal power.

It was generally appreciated when the United Nations was created that changes would occur in the international scene and chat over the years these would affect the functioning of the world organization. The UN was indeed constructed for the purpose of dealing with problems of change and for channeling these along peaceful lines. It was expected chat the relationships between the powers would vary, that the membership would grow, and that the issues of peace and security would not be static.

By the end of the 1950's Western Europe reached an economic position so different from that of a decade before that major new questions arose about the area's place in the world economy. It follows that the assumptions of United States economic policy toward Europe need to be re-examined in the new circumstances. Of central importance are questions about the degree and type of economic regionalism that the countries of Western Europe will pursue in the future. Their experience in the last decade and a half has provided unprecedented evidence of the compatibility of regionalism and globalism in some circumstances. As a result we are past the point at which the two tendencies can be thought of as necessarily sharply antithetical. American policy, which all along has sought to encourage a dual approach, has now to find ways of striking a new balance between regionalism and globalism, since the new circumstances have removed some of the important assumptions of the old policy.

All rhetoric aside, the fundamental long-range task facing the United States in its international strategy is to substitute processes of cooperation, order, and eventually world law for the anarchy and narrow nationalism that continue to endanger world peace and stability.

In December 1959 the European Free Trade Association was set up in Stockholm, and thus the postwar efforts to unite western Europe have led to a significant new division within it: two separate areas of free trade are being set up, at much the same pace, the “Inner Six” centered around France and Germany, the “Outer Seven” around Britain and Scandinavia.

In 1954, just twenty years after first becoming a member, the Soviet Union rejoined the International Labor Organization (ILO). This step was a sharp reversal of the USSR's past policy. The Soviet Union had boycotted ILO since 1937, three years before its initial membership was terminated as a consequence of its expulsion from the League of Nations, and during much of this time it conducted a bitter attack against the agency. The Soviet Union's re-entry may also have marked a turning point for the International Labor Organization. One of the oldest specialized agencies, ILO had developed a tradition of technical work for which it had won wide renown. Some feared that the Soviet Union's re-entry was likely to upset this tradition; others felt that the Organization's wider and more nearly universal membership would provide new strength and vitality. Although the full implications of the USSR's resumed membership in ILO cannot yet be seen, sufficient time has elapsed to warrant a critical examination of Soviet policy in this specialized agency and of the reactions of other states. Perhaps clues can be seen to the motivations for the shift in the USSR's attitude, preliminary estimates made of the success of Soviet policies, and tentative judgments offered about the over-all effects on ILO.

The birthday of the Organization of American States is technically that of the ratification of its Charter by the fourteenth member state on December 13, 1951. But perhaps that date was not so much the birthday of the Organization of American States as the date of its coming of age, the date of its realization that the existing organization that had developed over a period of fifty-eight years was no longer equal to the needs of the times.

In his concluding volume in the Carnegie Endowment's series of National Studies on International Organization, Professor Maclver observes that the International Court of Justice, as set up in 1945, was not so much a new institution as a new promise. It was closely modelled on its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, and Article 92 of the UN Charter expressly recognized the continuity with the past in affirming that the Statute of the new Court was based upon chat of the old one. The promise lay in the fact that the new Court was declared to be “the principal judicial organ of the United Nations” and thus called upon to play a more significant role than the old Court, which had never been an organic part of the League of Nations structure. Professor Maclver concludes, however, that the promise remains in important respects unfulfilled.

As if such creatures were cheaper by the dozen, the family of UN specialized agencies celebrated the nativity of its twelfth and most recent member on March 17, 1958, when the Convention of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) entered into force after ten long years of anxious gestation. The organization has from the first been a child of suspicion, its fortunes subject to the various styles of amour propre indulged in by its parents. The government of Greece, for example, having disavowed paternity by withdrawing its original instrument of ratification when IMCO was yet unborn, underwent still another change of heart and reinstated its ratification in time to attend the baptismal ceremonies of the opening session at the organization's headquarters in London. To make public its doubts, however, that instrument bore an undisguised caveat that, in the event “the Organization extends its activities to matters of commercial and economic nature, the Greek Government may find itself bound to reconsider its acceptance” and have recourse to the withdrawal procedures in Article 59 of the Convention.

Australia is a nation small and vulnerable enough to need great power guarantees of territorial integrity, yet at the same time strong and stable enough to constitute an asset in any joint undertaking. The quality of being a small power dependent on the support of the great powers Australia shares with the countries of Southeast Asia, and in particular with the Southeast Asian states linked up with the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO). But it is less exposed to immediate dangers, is more modern and industrialized than its near-northern neighbors, and hence is also capable of serving as an independent source of strength and of assuming a role somewhat akin to that of the great powers in SEATO. Australia's membership role in SEATO is, in effect, defined by these two basic conditions.

Western European Union (WEU) is unique in the family of European organizations. Its membership comprises Great Britain in addition to the inner circle of the six nations of Little Europe. As such it was hailed as a big step forward from the continental limitations of European integration. Its special task, besides residuary powers in the cultural, social, and economic field, has been defense and the control of armaments. Western European Union was erected on the ruins of the European Defense Community (EDC) by the Paris Agreements of October 1954. Its legal basis was the Brussels Treaty Organization of 1948, a defensive alliance against future German aggression which over the years had left its military functions to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and had concentrated on its cultural and social role.

For almost a decade commentators on international organization have nurtured the myth that the UN Charter was originally ‘oversold’ to the American public by enthusiastic supporters, who represented the organization as a panacea for the ills of twentieth-century world politics. So unrealistic were the expectations created by this publicity barrage, so the story runs, that subsequent disillusionment with die UN was inevitable. Although propagated with many variations, the myth finds a classic formulation in the words of Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., uttered before the House Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, July 8, 1953: ‘The United Nations,’ said Ambassador Lodge, ‘was oversold. It was advertised entirely as an automatic peace producer. All we had to do was sign on die dotted line—so it was said—and all our troubles would be over’. A recent volume on international relations, currently in use as a college text, restated the myth in a some what less extreme form: ‘Considered a towering edifice of strength in 1945, the United Nations was often shrugged off in the early 1950's with the damning phrase, ‘debating society.’ Because expectations had been so extravagant, the achievements of the United Nations seemed ridiculously trivial to many who had expected a Utopian revolution in international relations that the United Nations could not hope to provide.” Other variations on the theme are no doubt familiar to students of international organization. Use of the expression ‘myth’ implies no denial that ‘a veritable wave of propaganda and influence was generated on behalf of American membership’ in the UN. The country was flooded with information, from bodi government and private sources, designed to win over the public to the desirability of postwar international organization. It is also true that those engaged in selling the UN to the public tried to give their arguments an optimistic, hopeful tone. Recalling the League's fate, they emphasized the differences between the League and the proposed new organization rather than their patent similarities. Often they were guilty of oversimplifying the facts of world politics upon which the future of the UN would necessarily depend. The growing split between Russia and the Western allies, so ominous for the new organization, was not usually highlighted in speeches urging the establishment of the UN. A vigorous selling campaign was unquestionably conducted.

No governmental functions are traditionally more suspect than those relating to public information. National legislators always demur at the public relations work of civil servants. They inevitably assume (at times, with good reason) that appropriating funds to inform people about the performance of government agencies only helps to preserve the bureaucracy and to create and nurture a public which ultimately will bring pressure to bear upon the legislature itself.

Among the many differences between the League of Nations and the UN systems is that characterized by the increasing expansion in the latter's structure of field operations along with the development of the administrative structure of field offices. This essay deals with the key field post, that of the UN Technical Assistance Board (TAB) Resident Representative, in the most far-flung of the new UN field networks.

The second UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, convened in accordance with a resolution1 of the General Assembly, was opened in Geneva on March 16, 1960, under the presidency of Prince Wan Waitha yakon (Thailand), and closed on April 27. Representatives of 88 countries attended. Two questions only were before the Conference: 1) the breadth of the territorial sea; and 2) the breadth of fishery limits. These had been left unsolved by the first Conference, held early in 1958.

Much popular and scholarly writing abounds with references to blocs in the UN General Assembly, but there has been little systematic study of the actual patterns of group alignment in that body. This state of affairs may have resulted from the difficulties inherent in applying to international organization the methods used to analyze domestic legislative behavior. However, social scientists have recently developed some new techniques which may help to simplify this task and allow us to use quantitative procedures to study voting behavior in the General Assembly. This article will attempt to point out the difficulties encountered in analyzing bloc voting, and to indicate possible solutions, based on the use of quantitative techniques.

The fourth emergency special session of the General Assembly, summoned by the Secretary-General in accordance with a resolution adopted by the Security Council at its 906th meeting on September 16, 1960, was held from September 17 through 19, 1960. During consideration of the provisional agenda, Mr. Wadsworth (United States) suggested that the admission of new members, scheduled for the regular fifteenth session of the General Assembly, be added to the agenda of the emergency session as item No. 1. After objections to this addition were voiced by the Soviet Union, several African states, and others, on the ground that the necessary documents were not yet in the hands of the Assembly, a proposal by the representative of Guinea for postponement of the matter was adopted by 43 votes to none, with 26 abstentions.

On March 30, 1960, the 851st meeting of the Security Council convened to consider a 29-nation request1 that the Council discuss the situation arising out of the largescale killing of unarmedand peaceful demonstrators against racial segregation in the Union of South Africa as a threatto the maintenance of international peace and security. The representative of the Union of South Africa, as well as those of India, Ethiopia, Ghana, Pakistan, Guinea, and Liberia were invited to participate without vote in the proceedings. After the adoption of the agenda, reservations regarding the jurisdiction of the Council with respect to the question before it were expressed by the representatives of the United Kingdom and France, who maintained that nothing in the Charter authorized the UN to intervene in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state.

Report to the General Assembly: The third report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the UN General Assembly covered the period from July 1, 1958, to June 30, I959. The report noted that the period under consideration had been characterized by the fact that member states had begun to make substantial requests to the Agency for assistance, which the Agency had in fact been able to furnish. Furthermore, the Agency had begun to carry out its regulatory tasks, organize its first meetings, conferences, and symposia, enter upon its own research, and greatly expand the collection and publication of technical information. Whereas on June 30, 1958, membership of IAEA had stood at 66, one year later it stood at 70, Iran, Iraq, the Philippines, and the Sudan having in the meantime deposited instruments of ratification of the Statute. In the broadest terms, according to the report, the production of radioisotopes and their use in industry, agriculture, medicine, and research, and the eventual production of economic nuclear power, under safe and secure conditions, continued to be the main objectives of most of the Agency's work. For the attainment of these aims IAEA had been employing a variety of means, including technical assistance, the diffusion of information, the formulation of regulations and recommendations, the supply of nuclear fuels, the promotion of research reactor development, the elaboration of safeguards, the organization of training courses, and the award of fellowships and research contracts. A notable development was cited as being the completion of the Agency's first supply operation, three tons of natural uranium in metallic form having been supplied to Japan.

“You know,” Khrushchev characteristically proclaimed in a message to the African People's Conference meeting in Accra in December 1958, “that on the national question the Soviet Union is invariably guided by the principle of the right of nations to self-determination, and that it has always supported and still supports the struggle of peoples to obtain or strengthen their national independence and freedom.” The idea of national self-determination, fathered by political theorists like Mazzini and Wilson, is, of course, Western in origin. But in an age of nation-building in the Afro-Asian world, skillful Soviet use of this concept presents Western diplomacy with a formidable and continuing challenge in the East. The purpose of the present inquiry is to examine briefly how Soviet spokesmen have attempted to manipulate this Western idea, particularly in the great assembly halls of the UN where representatives of East and West constantly intermingle.