Venezuela's entry into the Andean Common Market (ACM) represents a case of systems transformation. Venezuelan membership has led both to major changes in economic provisions of the Common Market, and to significant alterations in political relations among members. Analysis of these changes depends on an understanding of the political debate in Venezuela, which was prolonged, and which led to membership under favorable terms earned through hard negotiations. Any assessment of the ultimate impact of Venezuelan participation in the ACM must remain guarded. As a wealthy and dynamic member, Venezuela could become an important catalyst for integration in the region. But with its superior economic capacity, Venezuela could also come to dominate the integrative effort, accruing most of the benefits to itself and in the process creating disruptions and dissatisfaction among the other members.

The dramatic transformation of the climate surrounding relations between rich and poor nations since the OPEC oil embargo in 1973 has raised new hopes that MNCs may be made to energize development in the Third World. Improved information about the vulnerability of the rich nations and about techniques for dealing with MNCs, some writers argue, will enable underdeveloped countries to ensure that foreign investment serves as an “engine of development.” This view exaggerates the strengths of Third World states. A lack of information about opportunities and techniques is a small part of the burden which underdevelopment imposes on poor countries in their dealings with MNCs. A case study of Japanese MNCs in Southeast Asia raises doubts concerning the likelihood that the poor countries will be able to harness MNCs for their development. Southeast Asia's growing dependence on Japan in the fields of trade, official development aid, and private investment tends to impose constraints on efforts to influence the behavior of MNCs. A more basic problem resides in the “softness” of underdeveloped states, which renders ineffectual regulations intended to control MNCs. Because MNCs in certain important respects inhibit the process of building viable indigenous institutions and even contribute to the perpetuation of soft states, they may do more to impede than to stimulate development, at least in the softer Third World states. It may well be that more serious attention should be paid to studies of how Third World states might develop if the role of MNCs were circumscribed.

Theories of regional integration are becoming obsolescent because three core assumptions on which these theories have been based are becoming less and less relevant to the behavior patterns actually displayed by governments active in regional organizations. These three assumptions are (1) that a definable institutional pattern must mark the outcome of the process of integration, (2) that conflicts of interests involving trade-offs between ties with regional partners and ties with nonmembers should be resolved in favor of regional partners, and (3) that decisions be made on the basis of disjointed incrementalism. The history of the European Communities since 1968 shows that most governments no longer behave in accordance with these assumptions, although they did earlier. The explanation for the new trend is to be found in awareness of the various novel kinds and dimensions of interdependence between countries, issues, and objectives, particularly with reference to policies involving those aspects of highly industrial societies which do not respond readily to the incentives of a customs union. A new decision-making rationality–labelled “fragmented issue linkage”–seems to be competing with incremental habits, suggesting that efforts are being made to cope with “turbulence” in the industrial environment so as to avoid piecemeal solutions. The effort to cope with turbulence, in turn, is unlikely to lead to any “final” set of regional institutions.

Recent writings on problems of the international economy have focused attention primarily on changes in the international system. This paper attempts to show that foreign economic policy can be understood only if domestic factors are systematically included in the analysis. The paper's first part groups the recent literature into three paradigms which distinguish between three international effects. The second part offers a comparison of the differences between a state-centered policy network in France and a society-centered network in the United States. The third part of the paper combines the arguments of the first two and analyzes French and American commercial, financial, and energy policies as the outcome of both international effects and domestic structures. These case studies show that domestic factors must be included in an analysis of foreign economic policies. The paper's main results are analyzed further in its fourth part.

Administration of assistance projects by international lending agencies has come under increasing criticism during the past decade, a period when development projects have become primary instruments of international investment and an important element of public administration in developing nations. As a result international assistance agencies drastically reorganized their lending procedures during the early 1970s, creating complex requirements for project planning, appraisal, and implementation. But the formal procedures have become so complex that they are now beyond the administrative capacity of most developing nations and, perhaps, of the assistance agencies themselves. Evaluation reports reveal serious gaps between prescribed procedures and actual behavior at each stage of the project cycle. International requirements for project planning and implementation not only impose on developing nations a set of “rational” procedures that are often unrelated to political, administrative, and cultural constraints, but the attempts of Third World countries to conform may be adverse to their own interests.

Eighty interviews with bureaucratic and political actors in five national capitals illustrate the Keohane/Nye theoretical argument concerning the importance of transnational and, specifically, transgovernmental factors in world politics. Focusing upon the development and application of integrative techniques between countries which have no formal supemational integrative institutions, the paper reports on the practice of transgovernmental politics within the dyad of Canada and the United States, and the triad of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. Dealing both with middlelevel bureaucratic practitioners concerned with horizontal coordination of policy and administration between countries, and with bureaucratic and political actors responsible for the cohesiveness of national policies, the paper explores situations in which the demands of external and domestic harmonization are inconsistent, and sometimes mutually contradictory. The problem of maintaining “dual coherence” in domestic and external policy and administration is identified, and procedures for attempting such coordination are discussed. Of importance are modifications within the traditional institutions of inter-state communication: foreign offices and embassies. Recommendations are made on the basis of the intra-North American and intra Scandinavian experiences. It is suggested that considerable insight into managing policy and administrative areas which are neither purely domestic nor purely external may be gained by the study of bureaucratic experience only infrequently considered by students or governmental managers. Insights which may be gained from such study, it is argued, may be of great relevance in dealing with the challenge which transgovernmental horizontal harmonization now poses for national administrations.

Many agencies of the United States Government with nominally “domestic” mandates play important roles in international affairs, and collaborate extensively with other governments and international organizations in the performance of their tasks. In some areas, these agencies rather than intergovernmental organizations play key management roles. Data gathered from a variety of sources indicate the extensiveness of this involvement, and suggest that it continues to expand, although not in linear fashion. Certain trends in governmental reorganization, such as those in the Agriculture Department, suggest similar patterns to those observed in business firms as they become more heavily involved abroad. More attention needs to be paid to international networks involving “domestic” governmental bureaucracies and governmental agencies traditionally oriented toward international affairs. From a conceptual point of view, we should think of “international organization” as including not only formally intergovernmental organizations, but all officials who participate significantly in these networks.

Increasing attention is being paid to the development of international codes of behavior and rules of law to regulate the behavior of transnational enterprise. Notable steps in this direction have been taken by the United Nations, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the European Community, the Andean Common Market and various other organizations. The approaches represented by these efforts can be categorized by the use of four models: the Free Market model; the European Community model; the Multinational Consortium approach; and the Development Community approach. These approaches to the problem of regulation differ in the degree to which they impose prior regulation on multinational firms and in whether they permit the firms to operate as integrated systems or impose arms-length standards on parent-subsidiary relations. Each approach has merits, depending on context and the values of the governments involved.

The article is an empirical study of the political processes leading to the agreement on the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) that was reached in October 1970 at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Section I of the article sets out the triangular interests that had to reach agreement among developed countries, among developing countries, and between developed and developing countries. Section II poses the problem of the article: How did the UNCTAD secretariat contribute to the political process that resolved the three-dimensional disagreements, if only on a partial basis? The argument of the article is that sustained institutionalized pressure exerted through the UNCTAD secretariat did make a difference in influencing the policy outcomes on GSP. Certain results were achieved through UNCTAD organizational processes–secretariat ideology, Prebisch's leadership, and pragmatic group bargaining–that could not have been achieved through other means.

The Red Cross, a transnational movement, has taken action in conflict situations that both conserves the authority of states and also circumscribes state behavior in the name of fundamental human rights. On the one hand, the Red Cross, principally through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), is cooperative toward states and acts discreetly in matters regarded by states as sensitive. On the other hand, the Red Cross has promoted the law of armed conflict to limit states and has accepted quasi-supranational authority in international armed conflict in the form of the right of automatic ICRC access to certain detainees. On the basis of this right, or sometimes on the basis of bypassing legal issues, the ICRC is able to transcend the “sovereignty” of states (and non-state parties as well). While the Red Cross movement is highly fragmented and encompasses a number of non-cosmopolitan elements, the historical impact of the movement has been to help liberalize the nation-state system, largely through the actions of the ICRC, while reinforcing fundamental authority within that system.

In view of recent proposals to grant the International Monetary Fund new instruments to press countries to adjust balance of payments disequilibria, the question arises of the efficacy of such means of pressure. An analysis of the Fund's power shows, inter alia, that conditions attached to currency purchases by deficit countries can only influence the techniques of adjustment but not the length of the adjustment period, that it is normally not possible for the Fund to expose individual surplus countries to inflationary or expansionary pressures, that the scarce currency clause is unworkable in present monetary conditions, and that the Fund's system of charges and remunerations cannot be used to exert financial pressure on countries in imbalance. The general avoidance of sanctions by the Fund's Executive Directors suggests that it would only be useful to make additional pressures available to the Fund, as contemplated by the Committee of Twenty, if the authority to take decisions on sanctions were transferred to a separate judicial or quasi-judicial body.

The European Common Market and forty odd African, Caribbean, and Pacific States (ACP) signed a trade and aid Convention in February 1975. The negotiations leading to the Lome Convention and the provisions of the Lomé Convention constitute an instructive vehicle for an examination of North-South bargaining. The organization, tenacity, and skill of the ACP states, as well as some re-thinking regarding their own situation on the part of European states produced some innovative and groundbreaking moves toward more equitable trade and aid relations. But even the most innovative components of the Lome Convention, STAB EX, sugar indexing and focus on industrial development, are perhaps less significant for their short-term economic effects than they are for a general understanding regarding the structure of North-South relations.

Discussions of international commodity organizations often compare the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the Intergovernmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries (CIPEC), yet few researchers have examined CIPEC. A comparison of environmental characteristics of copper and petroleum suggests that although copper producers' collusion is possible, it is problematical and depends on political as well as economic factors. Since its formation in 1967, CIPEC members have been engaged in a gradual process of institution-building, although a lack of institutional leadership has hampered collective policy making. Substantively, CIPEC has dealt primarily with three issues: nationalization, technical pricing arrangements, and market regulatory policies. Until 1974, CIPEC members proved incapable of adopting a regulatory policy; they fostered the illusion of impending action and cooperation. Faced with deteriorating market conditions and stimulated by OPEC's success, CIPEC members have initiated a joint policy. The future of CIPEC will depend on its institutional flexibility as well as on decisions of nonmember producers and developed consumer countries.

The research reported in this article seeks to understand how and why individuals are appointed to serve as executive heads of international organizations. A simple statement of the behavioral rule used in selection of executive heads is developed in the form of an executive head appointment function. The type of data available for the analysis of the appointment of executive heads in international organizations is identified, and an empirical examination of changes in emphasis in the selection of executive heads is reported. The executive head appointment function utilized in the study views appointment as an executive head as a function of six factors (three organizational, one national, and two personal). Discriminant function analysis is used to determine if the function would distinguish between individuals appointed during the period 1945–57 and those appointed from 1958–70 as executive heads in UN treaty-based organizations. It is possible to distinguish, on the basis of the specified executive head appointment function, between executive heads appointed during the two halves of the time period under study. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the emphasis involved in the selection of executive heads has changed over time in UN treaty-based organizations.

Cultural expansion has been a major component of postwar French foreign policy. The creation and operation of UNESCO afforded opportunities for pursuit of French cultural relations. French authorities determined to secure the location of UNESCO in Paris, the privileged use of the French language, and to direct the organization towards activities with appeal to an international intellectual clientele. France also endeavored to divert UNESCO from paths detrimental to French cultural policy. These dangers included the creation of international norms and mandatory reports on bilateral cultural relations, adherence by UNESCO to a philosophy inimical to French cultural policy, and penetration by multilateral organs into areas of French cultural predominance. At the same time, France availed itself of UNESCO to supplement its independent actions, to infiltrate a French presence into new areas, to facilitate the operational conduct of cultural relations, and to diversify the conventional instruments of cultural action. Additionally, the French National Commission for UNESCO emerged as an agent for the conduct of French cultural diplomacy.

In analyzing the future of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), it is useful to assess both the centrifugal and centripetal forces affecting regional economic integration. Centrifugal forces include the existing structure of production in Eastern Europe; problems of coordination; and inefficient price systems, among others. Centripetal forces include the worldwide energy crisis; Western inflation and recession; the growing importance of trade blocs; and numerous other factors contributing to the increasing hard-currency indebtedness of the Eastern European countries. Many of these external events have increased the attractiveness for CMEA countries of intrabloc economic relations and provided a momentum for CMEA integration. Analysis of the various forces leads to the conclusion that Soviet economic policy vis-à-vis Eastern Europe will remain crucial in determining the direction and speed of economic integration. Soviet economic involvement with Eastern Europe seems to have been costly for the USSR during the past decade and so it is not obvious that the USSR will attempt to push integration much further than it now stands.

There are three main approaches to the observation and measurement of power: 1) control over resources, 2) control over actors, and 3) control over events and outcomes. The control over events and outcomes approach emerges as the best approach to the measurement of power in contemporary international politics because: 1) it is the only approach which takes into account the possibility of interdependence and collective action, 2) it is more general than the other two approaches, and 3) it produces a type of analysis which has both descriptive and normative advantages. I will discuss each of these approaches at length and criticize them. I will argue that the third approach is superior to the other two for the measurement of power in contemporary international politics because it is better suited to situations in which interdependence and collective action can be derived from the third.

Because of France's traditional use of culture and language as an instrument of foreign policy, it would be easy to dismiss any movement involving French as serving her national interests. Francophonie, whose purpose is to strengthen the French language and serve the interests of those who use it, depends on nongovernmental organizations and subunits of government in about 26 countries. Its leaders claim it serves the purposes of all French-speaking peoples and that it is transnational or outside the control of governments. In fact, however, some French elites do try to control directly and indirectly the formal organizations of Francophonie, and, thus, it may fail to become a transnational force in world politics. On the other hand, the work done by professionals and language specialists to strengthen French, to extend it to the masses and to build a closed circuit for the communication of vital information responds to needs for protection against so-called “Americanization” and for access to modernization. Therefore, despite its intangible nature, a new cultural force might emerge, and it then could affect the way states interact with each other.

This article examines the voting behavior of the exceptionally small states (population less than one million) in the UN General Assembly. It uses modified Rice-Beyle techniques (Index of Cohesion and Index of Agreement) to measure the cohesiveness of 23 ministates in four issue-areas: political, colonial, economic, and social, humanitarian and cultural. Ministate voting patterns are compared with those of the US, the USSR, the former colonial powers, and the African-Asian caucusing group. The study's major findings are that: 1) there is greatest ministate cohesion on colonial and economic issues and less cohesion on social, humanitarian, and cultural questions. Political issues divide the ministates; 2) the ministates and the USSR vote similarly on colonial and economic questions, whereas the ministates' voting is more similar to that of the US and the colonial powers on social, humanitarian, and cultural issues. On political issues the ministates are neither a bloc nor the subservient clients of the superpowers; 3) with few exceptions ministate voting patterns are similar to those of the African-Asian group in the UN. These findings extend the generalizations of Kay, et al., with reference to the concerns of the newer nations. In addition, the findings indicate that size alone does not appear to be a significant differentiating variable. The existence of shifting alignments and majorities in different issue-areas underscores the political sophistication and relative independence from large power pressure of ministate voting in the UN.

Analysis of the United States’ shift to support of trade preferences for developing countries in 1967 provides evidence for the value of a “bureaucratic politics” model that pays attention to the importance of transgovernmental relations in influencing national policy making. Between 1964 and 1967, international organizations affected, United States policy making on trade preferences, and officials within the US government who favored preferences used such organizations-particularly the OECD-to help change American policy. Intergovernmental, transgovernmental, and national levels of policy making were closely linked to one another. This case study suggests the need for a broadened conception of “bureaucratic politics”; but it also supports the view that the “bureaucratic politics” and “rational actor” approaches are fundamentally complementary rather than antithetical.