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The Red Cross as transnational movement: conserving and changing the nation-state system

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

David P. Forsythe
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Abstract

The Red Cross, a transnational movement, has taken action in conflict situations that both conserves the authority of states and also circumscribes state behavior in the name of fundamental human rights. On the one hand, the Red Cross, principally through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), is cooperative toward states and acts discreetly in matters regarded by states as sensitive. On the other hand, the Red Cross has promoted the law of armed conflict to limit states and has accepted quasi-supranational authority in international armed conflict in the form of the right of automatic ICRC access to certain detainees. On the basis of this right, or sometimes on the basis of bypassing legal issues, the ICRC is able to transcend the “sovereignty” of states (and non-state parties as well). While the Red Cross movement is highly fragmented and encompasses a number of non-cosmopolitan elements, the historical impact of the movement has been to help liberalize the nation-state system, largely through the actions of the ICRC, while reinforcing fundamental authority within that system.

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Articles
Information
International Organization , Volume 30 , Issue 4 , Autumn 1976 , pp. 607 - 630
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Copyright © The IO Foundation 1976

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References

1 See Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S. Jr, eds., Transnational Relations and World Politics, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Cf.Huntington, Samuel P., “Transnational Organizations in World Politics,” World Politics, Vol. 25, No. 3 (04 1973): 333–68CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See furtherKeohane, and Nye, , “Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations,” World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 1 (10 1974): 39–62CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Like Keohane and Nye, but unlike Huntington, the present essay is based on a conceptualization of transnational relations as all nongovernmental transactions transpiring across a national boundary.

2 In the path-breaking book edited by Keohane and Nye, ibid., there was no chapter on human rights, although there were chapters on social actors like the Ford Foundation and the Catholic Church. Studies of human rights and humanitarian programs have generally been left to lawyers. For exceptions to this generalization seeHaas, Ernst, Human Rights and International Action, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970)Google Scholar, andEmerson, Rupert, “The Fate of Human Rights in the Third World,” World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2 (01 1975): 201–26CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

It is not the purpose of the present essay to define rigorously what are human rights, or what part of these is of interest to the Red Cross. See in generalDyke, Vernon Van, The United States, Human Rights, and World Community, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970)Google Scholar. The Red Cross is generally associated with the most fundamental human rights: freedom from summary execution, torture, mistreatment, inhumane detention conditions, starvation or insufficient nutritional situations, and insufficient medical attention.

3 The Red Cross itself created the independently staffed and funded Joint Committee for the Reappraisal of the Role of the Red Cross. Seven reports were published in 1975. The summary report is Donald D. Tansley, Final Report: An Agenda for Red Cross. Six background papers were also published, from which the final report draws; they are (in numbered sequence): David P. Forsythe, Present Role of the Red Cross in Protection; Ian Reid, The Evolution of the Red Cross; David J. Holdsworth, The Present Role of Red Cross in Assistance; Pierre M. Dorolle, National Red Cross Societies and Health and Welfare; staff, Red Cross at National Level-A Profile; and Richard Magat, As Others See Us: Views on Red Cross.

4 The Red Cross has long emphasized this distinction in its transnational activity. It is a distinction convenient to the present undertaking, for both lack of space and the author's own competence makes such a division useful. The only general and analytic study of the Red Cross and natural disasters is Holdsworth.

5 World politics is considered to be conflict over public policy involving two or more transnational actors or states (and including international organizations made up of states). The nation-state system is defined as that global system of interaction on public policy issues in which ultimate authority is vested in states.

6 Huntington, p. 368.

7 A transnational movement is considered to be a group of individuals that seeks to act nongovernmentally across national boundaries. According toHuber, Max, one of the best known leaders of the Red Cross, “The Red Cross is … a world movement.…“ The Red Cross: Principles and Problems, (Geneva: ICRC), p. 156Google Scholar. Because the nature of the Red Cross is not widely understood, rather extensive description and analysis of the movement seem desirable at the outset of this essay.

8 The formal rules which must be met by a national society to become a member of the Red Cross are found in theInternational Red Cross Handbook, (Geneva, 1971), 11th edGoogle Scholar. The evolution of national societies is briefly traced in Reid. A survey of 23 representative national societies is found in the staff paper, Red Cross at National Level. For background conceptualization, seeKaiser, Karl, “Transnational Politics: Toward a Theory of Multinational Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Autumn 1971): 803 and passimCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

9 See Magat, especially at p. 12 where he quotes a Red Cross official as saying, “Too many Societies… can be described as ‘Nationalized’ … in that they are headed by senior government officials, their wives or dependents and so can tend to become an instrument of national policy.” See also p. 37: “But widely held impressions of the Red Cross at the national level among people outside the movement in the twenty-three countries surveyed was of a governmental or quasi-governmental organization, of an upper-class, aristocratic, élitist, establishment organization, and, accordingly, an organization associated with power and prestige.”

10 The American Red Cross, acting in unison with government officials, published an essay in Reader's Digest considered by certain elements in Congress to be both inaccurate and inflammatory. What was at issue was not the right of the national society to a judgment on implementation of the Geneva Conventions, but the nature of the opinion and the way it was rendered. See“American Prisoners of War in Southeast Asia, 1971,” Hearings, Subcommittee of National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, 92nd Cong., 1st sess., 1971: 90–1Google Scholar. Local independence from central direction in a transnational movement is not unknown; see Huntington, p. 342.

11 There is one official history of the ICRC, existing only in French and stopping with events in 1912:Boissier, Pierre, De Solfèrino A Tsoushima: Histoire Du Comité De La Croix-Rouge, (Paris: Plon, 1963)Google Scholar. See alsoFreymond, Jacques, “The International Committee of the Red Cross Within the International System,” International Review of the Red Cross, No. 134 (05 1972): 245–66CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Petitpierre, Max, “A Contemporary Look at the International Committee of the Red Cross, Review, No. 119 (02 1971): 63–81Google Scholar. And see Utter, Glenn, “The International Committee of the Red Cross: A Study in Conflict Management,” unpublished dissertation, State University of New York at Buffalo, 1975Google Scholar.

12 These figures pertain only to the planned budget (permanent and temporary); crisis expenditures are handled through a separate account. Most goods come from governments also, although some come from national societies and from organizations such as the Common Market.

13 During the Nigerian War the Candian government did withdraw a plane on loan to the Red Cross, apparently because of unhappiness over Red Cross actions in that situation. More generally, when the US, for example, increased its annual contribution from $50,000 to $500,000 by act of Congress, the Executive compiled a list of situations in which the ICRC could be said to have furthered American national interests by its actions. It seems to be the case that while governments do not—in general—try to dictate specific policy to the ICRC, the way the ICRC executes its roles has an effect on levels of governmental support.

14 The International Red Cross, not as officially defined but viewed as including governments in the Conference, would seem to have some similarity with the International Labor Organization (ILO). The membership of at least the deliberative body is mixed-governmental and nongovernmental. Both the ILO and the IRC seek, inter alia, to promote implementation of certain multilateral treaties through a system of governmental reporting to the international organization, with some role for a component of the ILO acting as a domestic lobby (labor union, national society).

15 As Keohane, and Nye, suggested, in Transnational Relations, pp. 378–79Google Scholar, the distinction between high politics (relating to war, security, and authority) and low politics (the rest) appears to be of diminishing importance for understanding transnational actors. The Red Cross acts in war as well as in situations of low politics. And high and low politics are intertwined, as public policy on human rights is viewed by governments as inseparable from policies toward security and authority. The meshing of high and low politics would also seem to reduce the utility of the theory of functionalism or neo-functionalism as an aid to understanding the Red Cross. But seeJoyce, James Avery, Red Cross International, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1959)Google Scholar. The utility of neo-functionalism as an aid to understanding the Red Cross is too large a subject for the present essay.

16 For a brief overview of specifics, see Forsythe, entire, and Holdsworth, Part V.

17 Like the Ford Foundation, the Red Cross emphasizes its independence from “politics” while claiming to be aware of the “political consequences” of its “non-political” actions. See Bell, Peter D., “The Ford Foundation as a Transnational Actor,” in Keohane, and Nye, , Transnational Relations, pp. 120–22Google Scholar; and, in that same volume, the final essay by the editors, ”Transnational Relations and World Politics,” p. 377. The present author, like Tansley, has not found Red Cross writing on its principles very analytical. But seePictet, , Red Cross Principles, (Geneva: ICRC, 1956)Google Scholar.

18 See for exampleVernon, Raymond, ed., Big Business and the State, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

19 Pictet, Jean, Le Droit Humanitaire Et La Protection Des Victimes De La Guerre, (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1973), p. 55Google Scholar. Author's translation. An English edition has recently been published.

20 Huntington, p. 363.

21 These are usually found in the monthly Review, the Annual Report, and the periodic Information Notes, entitled as of 1976 the Bulletin, all published by the ICRC. For an example of Red Cross efforts to draw attention to a situation through publicity, see the Review, August and September, 1970, with regard to the Middle East. Sometimes the ICRC issues ad hoc press releases of some candor. With regard to the use of poison gas in the Yemeni civil war, during 1967 the ICRC made several statements to the press among other uses of publicity, but without naming the user explicitly. In general seeDavis, Morris, “The International Committee of the Red Cross And Its Practice Of Self-Restraint,” Journal of Voluntary Action Research, Vol. 4: 63–68CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

22 Third Geneva Convention of 1949, Article 126; Fourth Convention, Article 143.

23 See furtherForsythe, , “Who Guards the Guardians: Third Parties and the Law of Armed Conflict,” American Journal of International Law, Vol. 70, No. 1 (01 1976): 41–61CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

24 On the ICRC tendency to act independently of the other components in the Red Cross movement, see Tansley, and the staff paper, Red Cross at National Level. This independence has at times been dysfunctional to Red Cross goals, as the ICRC has not sought to mobilize the resources of the movement.

25 ICRC budgetary allotment for relations with National Societies has been increased, and new officials have been named who are prone to think in terms of the movement's potentialities rather than just the ICRC's. For an analysis of the ICRC in the period 1945–1975, see Forsythe, Humanitarian Politics: The International Committee of the Red Cross, forthcoming.

26 New York Times, 22 November 1975, p. 6, quoting Red Cross officials, and interviews, Geneva.

27 See Forsythe, Humanitarian Politics, Chapter 7.

28 See Moreillon, Jacques, Le Comité International de la Croix-Rouge et la protection de détenus politiques, (Lausanne: L'age d'homme, 1973). This book, written by a high official of the ICRC, is the most analytic explanation to date of how the ICRC operates vis-à-vis other parties. There is no English editionGoogle Scholar.

29 Details are found in the Review and Annual Report.

30 A precise analysis of the different types of persuasion or argument used by the ICRC can only be done by one who has full access to private records. Moreillon has done this quantitatively with regard to political prisoners only.

31 See especiallyHentsch, Thierry, Face Au Bloats: la Croix-Rouge Internationale dans le Nigeria en guerre, (Genève: H.E.I., 1973)Google Scholar. Hentsch was an official of the ICRC during the war and has used ICRC documents. There is no English edition. Other literature on the ICRC in that war almost always makes the point that the ICRC contributed to its own difficulties.

32 See further Forsythe, Humanitarian Politics.

33 Naville quotation from the Finnish Helsingin Sanomat, translated and provided to this author by the League of Red Cross Societies.Freymond, quotation from “The International Red Cross and Peace,” Review, No. 638 (02 1972): 2Google Scholar. Cf. the official and more traditional Red Cross view toward “politics” at supra, fn. 17.

34 For a more complex discussion of resources by third parties in conflicts, seeYoung, Oran R., The Intermediaries, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. It has not seemed necessary to go into such detail in this essay. Relevant for present purposes is the stipulation in the Geneva Conventions refering to certain roles for third parties offering “all guarantees of impartiality and efficacy.…” For one such reference see Fourth Convention, Article 11.

35 Criticism of recent efforts by the ICRC to help develop law can be found inForsythe, , “The 1974 Geneva Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law: Some Observations,” American Journal of International Law, Vol. 69, No. 1 (01 1975): 77–91CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For criticism of ethnocentric drafting of law by Westerners, seeMiller, Richard I., The Law of War, (Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1975)Google Scholar. But compare Baxter, R. R., “Humanitarian Law or Humanitarian Politics,” Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1975): 1–26Google Scholar.

36 Le Monde, 5 January 1960, p. 1; 6 January, p. 2; 10 February, pp. 1,2; 12 February, pp. 2,4.

37 The US Executive released ICRC prison reports under court order after the end of the Vietnam war. See The Washington Post, 22 June 1975, p. 1; 23 June, p. 1; 23 July, p. 22. Of course part of the “efficacy of the ICRC” in this case depended on the response of the US to Red Cross overtures.

38 New York Times, June 8, 1974, p. 3, quoting repatriated Israelis.

39 See Sereny, Gitta, Into That Darkness: From Mercy Killing to Mass Murder, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1974), pp. 291, 214–17, 277Google Scholar.

40 In addition to Hentsch on Nigeria, seeSuter, Keith D., “The Work of the ICRC in Vietnam: An Evaluation,” Instant Research on Peace and Violence, Vol. 4, No. 3 (1974): 121–32Google Scholar.

41 See Magat for a non-scholarly survey of some opinions from persons in government, the Red Cross, international organizations, and the attentive public. Note, inter alia, that in the eyes of former Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the ICRC “has universal respect” (p. 33). See especially, pp. 42–5. See also Tansley, especially pp. 13, 21–22, 43–4. And see staff paper, especially p. 63.

42 See Tansley, pp. 22–3.

43 The only attitudinal survey extant of more than one National Society is the non-scientific effort reflected in the staff paper, Red Cross At National Level.

44 Some of the most informed criticism has been written by Freymond, a former acting president of the ICRC. Much of this is inaccessible to the non-Swiss reader, since his views have appeared frequently in Swiss newspapers. But see supra (fn. 11), and his“Confronting Total War,” American Journal of International Law, Vol. 62, No. 4 (10 1973); especially 672–75Google Scholar.

45 See Scoble, Harry M. and Wiseberg, Laurie S., “Human Rights NGOs: Notes Towards Comparative Analysis,” paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Meeting, Toronto, 02 1976, p. 15Google Scholar: “Since the ICRC is reluctant to resort to public exposure except when it is really pressed, the ICRC is often charged with engaging in whitewash or providing legitimacy for repressive regimes.”

46 When ICRC visits to places of detention in Chile were suspended in the mid-1970s, congressional elements expressed concern at this action by the junta. Spokesmen for the Executive Branch in the US hastened to assure Congress that the suspension was temporary, and they may have taken steps to promote a resumption of ICRC activity. See “Human Rights in Chile,” Hearings, Subcommittees on Inter-American Affairs and on International Organizations and Movements, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 7 Dec. 1973; 7 and 23 May; and 11, 12, and 18 June, 1974, especially pp. 110–21.

47 On this new development see Forsythe, Humanitarian Politics.

48 Keohane, and Nye, , Transgovernmental Relations, p. 372Google Scholar.

49 Hence the ICRC continued to visit allied prisoners of war in Nazi Germany even though that government refused systematic and unhindered access to the ICRC for visits to concentration camps. The ICRC made the judgment that it was preferable to do some good rather than denounce German policy toward Jews, which would most probably have led to termination of ICRC access to those being visited. For an accurate understanding of the ICRC position, see Gottlieb, Gidon, “International Assistance to Civil Populations in Civil Wars,” Israeli Yearbook on Human Rights, 1971, Tel-Aviv: Israel Press, 1971, 354 and passimGoogle Scholar.

50 In general see Keohane and Nye, Transgovernmental Relations, passim.

51 See Dyke, Jon M. Van, “Nixon and the Prisoners of War,” New York Review of Books, 01 7, 1971Google Scholar, for a concise overview of how the American government sought to mobilize domestic support and direct criticism against Hanoi on the “humanitarian” issue of implementation of the Third Geneva Convention. See also supra (fn. 10).

52 A detailed case study of the Red Cross and the Vietnam war will appear in Forsythe, Humanitarian Politics, based in part on extensive interviewing in Washington and on other non-published sources.

53 ICRC, Information Notes, No. 219b (31 03 1975), p. 1Google Scholar. To some extent, the price paid for non-cooperation with the Red Cross is linked to international law. It is only in international, but not internal, armed conflict that a fighting party has the legal obligation to grant the ICRC access to certain detainees.

54 During one stage of the war in Korea, the American military barred ICRC delegates from certain detention installations because of differences of opinion. In situations like the wars in Korea, Indochina, and Algeria, lack of reciprocal acceptance of ICRC supervision of detention has not led to ICRC favoritism toward the accepting party. The ICRC has not “whitewashed” humanitarian problems in South Korea and South Vietnam, and on the French side in the Algerian war.

55 The British government sought to create the image of cooperation with the ICRC in order to offset domestic criticism directed at British policies in Nigeria. See, inter alia, Hentsch, p. 99, 192–95.

56 It would appear at first glance that Socialist regimes permit Red Cross activity in low politics but not high. But then there is the Soviet acceptance of a role for the ICRC during the Cuban missile crisis. This role could be viewed as a part of low politics if the Soviets never intended to send ships to Cuba immediately after the crisis. In that event, there would be no role to actually play—as was factually the case. Adding further complexity to analysis of Socialist views is the fact that at least two Socialist regimes, East Germany and Yugoslavia, have permitted occasional ICRC visits to political prisoners, a subject usually regarded by Socialist regimes as part of high politics. See supra (fn. 15) on the lack of clear utility from differentiating high and low politics.

57 Forsythe, Who Guards the Guardians.

58 This essay obviously does not seek to assess the precise extent of cooperation with the Red Cross, but it is clear that Third World parties have given access to the Red Cross and cooperated significantly on many occasions-witness India and the treatment of combatant detainees.

59 Forsythe, The 1974 Geneva Diplomatic Conference. The ICRC was not in favor of the Third World position, but what is unofficially a Red Cross meeting led to a diplomatic triumph for the Third World. (The ICRC hosts meetings preparatory to, and presents the basic working documents to, the Diplomatic Conference, officially hosted by the Swiss government.)

60 On the conservative-liberal dichotomy in general, see Huntington, pp. 355–58 and passim.

61 See Forsythe, “Who Guards the Guardians.” The ICRC did not want to become an automatic substitute for a Protecting Power under the Geneva Conventions, once the belligerents had labeled a situation an international armed conflict. The belligerents maintained the authority to activate the law and seek agreement on a Protecting Power or on a state-appointed substitute. Thus what was at issue was quasi-supranational authority for the possibly automatic introduction of a substitute for the Protecting Power not appointed by the belligerents. The ICRC retained the right to visit detainees automatically, as a grant of authority separate from the issue of substitutes for Protecting Powers. (A Protecting Power is a neutral state charged with helping belligerents fulfill their legal oblications.)

62 There has also been some fragmentation because of disputes over functional jurisdictions. In situations like the war for Bangladesh and the Algerian war, there has been some disagreement as to what the ICRC and League were to do precisely.

63 What the ICRC opposed at the Diplomatic Conference in 1975 it proposed itself in 1929. See Forsythe, “Who Guards the Guardians.”

64 For change in the law of armed conflict, seeSchindler, Dietrich and Toman, Jiri, eds., The Laws of Armed Conflicts, (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1973)Google Scholar. For increasing attention to internal war and humanitarian law, seeVeuthey, Michel, “Les Conflits Armés De Caractère Non International Et Le Droit Humanitaire,” Current Problems of International Law, 1975Google Scholar; and Bond, James E., The Rules of Riot, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974)Google Scholar. On the ICRC and political prisoners see Moreillon. On the increasing interest in human rights in general seeHumphrey, John P., “The Revolution in the International Law of Human Rights,” Human Rights, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1975): 205–16Google Scholar.

65 See Tansley, and staff paper, both fn. 3 supra. On the subject generally of the development of “cosmopolitan” attitudes from participation in transnational events and movements, see Puchala, Donald J. and Fagan, Stuart I., “International Politics in the 1970s,” International Organization, Vol. 28, No. 2 (1974): 247–66CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

66 The point is developed in Tansley, p. 34. For a discussion of the importance to transnational actors of dual loyalties, seeKeohane, and Nye, , Transgovernmental relations, 377–78Google Scholar.

67 It should be emphasized that it is impossible to say exactly what the ICRC has achieved rather than the UN, Amnesty International, or even the Russian Tzar with regard to certain subjects. The UN played a role in efforts to supplement the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Amnesty has played a role in fostering interest in political prisoners, the Tzar played a role in promoting humanitarian law around the turn of the century.

68 See, for example,de Onis, Juan, “Juntas Move Right and The Church Is Now the Left, New York Times, 11 30, 1975, Review, p. 3. On the Church as transnational actor, presenting some similarity with the Red Cross, seeGoogle ScholarMurphy, Francis X., “Vatican Politics: Structure and Function,” World Politics, Vol. 26, No. 4 (07 1974): 542–59CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Ivan Vallier, ”The Roman Catholic Church: A Transnational Actor,” in Keohane and Nye, Transgovernmental Relations. Just as the action of the Vatican is sometimes controversial among Catholics, so the action of the ICRC is sometimes controversial among Red Cross members. Just as the Holy See is competitive with other churches, so is the ICRC competitive with other human rights groups, or even other Red Cross groups. Both the Church and the ICRC claim to be ideological and pragmatic at the same time; both seek improved relations with Socialists and Third World regimes; both seek to promote human dignity and improved interstate relations; both have had problems in dealing with two Chinas; both struggle against governmental control.

69 See Huntington, p. 362; and supra (fn. 25).

70 On this important difference seeInkeles, Alex, “The Emerging Social Structure of the World,” World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 4 (07 1975): 467–95CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

71 On growth in the use of ombudsmen, not only in Europe but also in places like Tanzania, Atlanta, and Detroit, seeFawcett, J. E. S., “The Spread of the Ombudsman System in Europe,” The World Today, Vol. 31, No. 11 (11 1975): 469–74Google Scholar.

72 See Huntington, p. 368.