The Security Council held its 841st meeting on December 8, 1958, in response to an Israeli request that it convene to consider what was termed by this request an act of aggression committed on December 3, 1958, by the armed forces of the United Arab Republic against Israel territory in the Huleh area in northeast Galilee. The Council also had before it a report on the matter by the Chief of Staff of the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). Opening the discussion, Mr. Eban, the Israeli spokesman, stated that on December 3 a Syrian army post in the area had opened fire on Israeli shepherds and on a security patrol which came to their aid. This occurred on Israel territory in the area to which the demilitarization provisions of the 1949 Agreement were not applicable, according to Mr. Eban. Later, according to Mr. Eban, defensive fire was directed by Israeli forces against the Syrian posts. Syrian forces then opened a heavy artillery barrage on seven Israeli villages. These facts were confirmed, said Mr. Eban, in the reports of UNTSO. He informed the Council that Israel had asked UNTSO for an immediate cease-fire which was set by the latter for 1700 hours. The Israelis did not fire after 1700; on the Syrian side small arms fire again broke out after dark at 1940. Mr. Eban described a radio broadcast in Hebrew from Cairo on December 4 which indicated, in his view, that Cairo and Damascus did not repent of the bombardment or promise the cessation of such acts.

In the conclusions of his article on the implications of science and technology for international institutions Eugene B. Skolnikoff advances three provocative propositions: 1) Existing international institutions and governmental attitudes are inadequate to meet the requirements imposed by foreseeable technological developments. 2) These requirements may be better met by creating new international institutions rather than by adding to the functions of those already in existence, especially the United Nations. 3) States with advanced technological development may have to reserve to themselves substantial if not exclusive power in international institutions concerned with technology. With these propositions as guidelines he issues a plea for creative planning for the 1970s and the even more distant future.

The eighteenth session of the Administrative Council of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) was held in Geneva from March 23 to April 26, 1963, under the chairmanship of Mr. Gabriel Tedros (Ethiopia).

Report to the Economic and Social Council: The International Labor Organization submitted to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations on, September 29, 1947 a report on its activities during the year 1947. This report, the first of a regular series which ILO had agreed to submit regularly (Article V paragraph 2(a) of the Agreement between the United Nations and the ILO), included background information and covered the period from the establishment of the United Nations to July 15, 1947. This report dealt with the decisions of five successive sessions of the International Labor Conference, i.e., those held in Philadelphia, May 1947, in Paris, October–November 1945, in Seattle, June 1946, in Montreal, September–October 1946, and in Geneva, June–July 1947. Future reports, it was announced, would cover only one year's work. The report was accompanied by a volume containing a series of appendices which included the text of the Constitution of ILO as amended by the 1946 Instrument of Amendment, the text of the Agreement between the United Nations and ILO, a list of the committees of ILO, a list of meetings convened by ILO as well as meetings of other international organizations at which ILO was represented during the period covered by the report, a list of and the texts of Conventions, Recommendations, and some of the Resolutions adopted by the International Labor Conference, resolutions adopted by the third Conference of American States Members of ILO, held in 1946, and the text of the agreement between ILO and FAO.

At the end of its twentieth year the United Nations is in the midst of a constitutional crisis the outcome of which is still in doubt. During its lifetime it has survived other profound changes, some no less constitution shaking than the present one. Other developments were absorbed chiefly through a process of informal Charter interpretation and institutional adaptation; whereas the current financial crisis was allowed to reach the stage where formal confrontation of conflicting Charter interpretations could be avoided only by adopting a procedural device to evade decision that, unfortunately, also brought the Assembly to a halt.

The relationship between students of international organization and students of international politics has been an erratic one, marked by appreciable shifts in both salience and sympathy. At some points, we may have been close but hostile, at others close and friendly, and more often than not, distant and mildly skeptical of one another's work. As I see it, the extraordinary gap of the 1960s is beginning to close, and I take it as one of my missions here to help accelerate this process, while enhancing the probability that, as our intellectual paths converge again, we will like what we see.

The twenty-third session of the International Wheat Council was held in London at headquarters October 30–31, 1957, under the chairmanship of Mr. F. Sheed Anderson. Present were delegates and advisers from thirty-two countries and an observer from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). The appointment of Mr. W. C. Duggan as Secretary of the Council was reported.

It is now three years since the United Nations General Assembly first convened in London, and over five years since the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China announced at the first Moscow Conference their recognition of “the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization … for the maintenance of international peace and security.”

This research note reports the findings of a mail survey of higher level Guatemalan civil servants, soliciting their views on the United Nations. The survey was administered in the summer of 1979 for comparison with similar surveys of Norwegian and United States officials undertaken five years earlier, to determine whether experience with international organizations produces attitudes more favorable to international cooperation.

The surrender of Japan led to the problem of determining the kind of administration which should be set up for the occupied country. This problem led in turn to a conflict of view and of policy between the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States was willing, and intended, to consult the other Allied states in regard to the policies to be adopted during the occupation, but wished to have the controlling voice in the determination of these policies, and wished the implementation of these policies and the control of Japan to remain solely with General MacArthur who, as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, had already been authorized by the Allied Powers to take such steps as he deemed proper to effectuate the terms of surrender. The Soviet Union, while willing to recognize the leadership of the United States in the occupation of Japan, claimed the right of responsible participation in the control of Japan and in both formulating and implementing the policies for the occupation. During four months the United States and the Soviet Union carried on negotiations in regard to the administration to be established for occupied Japan. Both governments made substantial concessions. They finally reached an agreement, acceptable also to the United Kingdom and China, the two other major Powers chiefly concerned, which was expressed in the Terms of Reference of the Far Eastern Commission and of the Allied Council for Japan.

Recent schemes for international currency reform are unrealistic to the extent that they are derived as optimum solutions to economic problems alone. International currency arrangements are instances of international organization generally, and consequently fall within the scope of political sociology as much as—if not more than—of pure economics. Political complications must therefore not only be acknowledged, as they usually are, but analyzed as well, as they often are not. This essay represents an inquiry in that direction.

The United Nations Special Fund was the result of a compromise between two proposals which were debated at nineteen meetings of the Second (Economic and Financial) Committee during the twelfth session of the General Assembly. The first of these proposals was an eleven-power draft resolution, based on the recommendations of the Scheyven Committee, to establish a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED). The second was a United States proposal to ncrease the financial resources of the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance (EPTA) and to establish within it a Speical projects Fund Which would be used to widen the scope of EPTA7's activities.

Article 21 of the Charter of the United Nations provides that the General Assembly shall adopt its own rules of procedure and shall elect its President for each session. No other mention of the President of the General Assembly is to be found in the Charter and, as in the British fashion, his role is more a reflection of evolution than definition in the rules of procedure. It is perhaps for this reason that the highest office of the General Assembly has not been described at any length in the literature about the United Nations.

The seventeenth session of the South Pacific Commission was held under the chairmanship of Mr. C. G. R. McKay, Senior Commissioner for New Zealand, at its headquarters in Noumea from October 19 to November 6, 1957. The Commission decided to concentrate on a limited number of activities, work on projects in active partnership with island administrations, and seek increasing aid from other international organizations and bodies interested in Pacific progress, thus giving effect to the conclusions of the review conference held by its members in Canberra in May 1957 to study its first ten years of progress and to suggest broad lines for its future work. The Commission selected the following specific subjects for concentrated effort in its three main fields of activity: in economic development, fisheries, pests and diseases of plants and animals (especially the rhinoceros beetle), and plant introduction; in health, health education, nutrition and diet, and mosquito-borne diseases; and in social development, literature promotion, education, and aided self-help.

In “Rewarding Impatience: A Bargaining and Enforcement Model of OPEC” (International Organization, Spring 2004) I presented a theoretical model that suggested that in strategic situations where a bargaining phase is followed by an enforcement phase that resembles a prisoners' dilemma, impatient actors earned better outcomes than their more patient rivals. I also modeled the division of cartel profits in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), particularly with regard to the relationship between bargaining strength and disparate time horizons, and found that there is some threshold level for which states that discount the future more heavily tend to receive better production offers than those that do not. The critique presented in Goodrich deals with the final section of the article, which presents the results of statistical analysis testing the implications of these theoretical models.I am grateful to Jeff Lewis, Drew Linzer, and Ken Schultz for suggestions and advice. Many thanks to Thomas Plümper for sharing the computer code for his procedure to analyze fixed effects with time-invariant covariates in Stata. The usual disclaimers apply.

In his Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 16 June 1966–15 June 1967 Secretary-General U Thant observed that during the period under review the international political situation had deteriorated considerably. The war in Vietnam had progressively intensified, there had been renewed warfare in the Middle East in June 1967, and the situation in Cyprus had not improved. Only limited progress had been made in such areas as disarmament, outer space, economic and social development, decolonization, and human rights. Frustrations in respect of South Africa, South West Africa, and Rhodesia continued, although in the cases of South West Africa and Rhodesia the General Assembly and the Security Council, respectively, had taken certain steps which might help in time to improve the situation

Alliance for Progress: On June 15, 1963, recommendations for revitalizing the Alliance for Progress were presented to the Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) by the ex-Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek and the ex-Colombian President Alberto Lieras Camargo. The studies had been requested in October 1962 by the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (IA-ECOSOC). Although the two reports differed somewhat in their interpretation of the causes for the deficiencies noted to date in the Alliance for Progress, they coincided in recommending the establishment of a new coordinating agency with in the OAS framework. The new body, which would be called the Inter-American Development Committee, would coordinate the implementation of the Alliance. It would be composed of five Latin American representatives (one from each of five geographical areas) and one representative from the United States.

The Council of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) held its twentieth session on October 14–18, 1963, under the chairmanship of Mr. D. Ramon Huidobro, permanent Chilean representative to the European Office of the UN. ICEM Director B. W. Haveman keynoted a discussion of ICEM's proper role with his request that fuller use be made of ICEM's migration machinery which, he pointed out, had aided in the resettlement of some one and one-quarter million people during the past eleven years. Mr. Haveman's proposals for future action included: 1) making the good offices and machinery of ICEM available in areas in which ICEM did not at present operate; 2) establishing improved reception and placement services, especially in Latin America; 3) exploring the possibilities of making the fullest use of ICEM in carrying out governmental migration policies and programs; and 4) encouraging the settlement of European farmers in Latin America.

At Managua, Nicaragua, on December 13, 1960, the governments of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua signed the General Treaty, the basic treaty of the Central American Program of Economic Integration (CAPEI), often referred to as the Central American Common Market (CACM). Also signed at the same time were the Agreement establishing the Central American Bank for Economic Integration and the Protocol to the Central American Agreement on the Equalization of Import Duties and Charges. Sixteen months later the government of Costa Rica acceded to the three agreements.