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Switzerland and the United Nations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Michael M. Gunter
Michael M. Gunter
Affiliation:
Michael M. Gunter is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Tennessee Technological University.
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Extract

Despite the approaching universality of the United Nations, Switzerland continues to be a non-member. Her traditional policy of permanent neutrality, which is theoretically incompatible with the United Nations collective security system, and an unsatisfactory experience as a member of the League of Nations largely explain this absence. Ironically enough, however, Switzerland has played in effect as active a role in the United Nations as have many actual members. Switzerland belongs to most of the specialized agencies and many of the Organization's ancillary organs. She has even involved herself in numerous peacekeeping activities. Geneva serves as the Organization's European headquarters. Thus, the Swiss freely participate in what they refer to as the “technical,” as distinguished from the “political” United Nations. The increased prestige of neutrality and neutral Austria's successful membership, approaching universality, the waning of collective security, and a desire to participate fully in international relations are encouraging a gradual reorientation towards the United Nations which may some day lead to formal Swiss membership.

Type
Articles
Information
International Organization , Volume 30 , Issue 1 , Winter 1976 , pp. 129 - 152
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1976

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References

1 The remaining non-members fall into two different categories: (1) divided states: North Korea, South Korea, and Taiwan; and (2) ministates: Liechtenstein, Monaco, Nauru, San Marino, Tonga, the Vatican City, and Western Samoa. The non-membership of what is still legally at least, despite the Communist victory, the two Vietnams is explained, of course, by the first category.

2 See Belin, Jacqueline, La Suisse et les Nations Unies (New York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 1956)Google Scholar; and Ehni, Reinhart, Die Schweiz und die Vereinten Nationen von 1944–1947 (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1967).Google Scholar

3 See, however, the penetrating analysis by Boczek, Boleslaw A., “Permanent Neutrality and Collective Security: The Case of Switzerland and the United Nations Sanctions Against Rhodesia,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 1 (Spring 1969): 75–104Google Scholar, and also Wildhaber, Luzius, “Switzerland, Neutrality, and the United Nations,” Malaya Law Review 12 (07 1970): 140–59Google Scholar. In addition, see Black, Cyril E., Falk, Richard A., Knorr, Klaus and Young, Oran R., Neutralization and World Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 50–6 and 162–6Google Scholar. For a brief discussion of the original Swiss decision not to seek United Nations membership, see Rappard, William E., “The United Nations and Switzerland,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 246 (07 1946): 64–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4 (First) Report of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly Concerning Switzerland's Relations with the United Nations, June 16, 1969, hereinafter cited as First Report; and (Second) Report of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly Concerning Switzerland's Relations with the United Nations, November 17, 1971, hereinafter cited as Second Report. The report of a special consultative commission consisting of fifty eminent Swiss will be submitted to the Federal Council by the end of 1975. It is understood that this new Report basically will maintain the position already achieved in the First and Second Reports.

5 Two eminent Swiss authorities have explained: Neutrality is “the fundamental principle of the Federal Constitution,” and “the axiom of Swiss foreign policy.” Bonjour, Edgar, Swiss Neutrality: Its History and Meaning, trans. by Hottinger, Mary (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1946), p. 7Google Scholar. Thus exists “what might well be called the religion of neutrality in the civic conscience of the Swiss people.” Rappard, William E., Collective Security in Swiss Experience, 1291–1948 (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1948), p. 19Google Scholar. It is beyond the scope of this article to examine the ancient origins and history of Swiss neutrality. Suffice it to state that the permanent neutrality of Switzerland became an integral element of international law in 1815 when it was formally recognized in the Treaty of Vienna It was reaffirmed by Article 435 of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. In 1966, the International Law Commission stated in its comment on Article 34 (rules in a treaty becoming binding through international usage) of the Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties that the agreement for Swiss neutrality, since they have been accepted by so many other states, now constitute a precedent binding upon others by way of custom. See 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 9, U.N. Doc A/6309/Rev. 1 (1966).

6 See the Report adopted by the Political Department of the Swiss government, Jurisprudence des Autorités Administratives de la Cónfedération, No. 24 (1954), pp. 9–13. Also see the discussions in Boczek, , “Permanent Neutrality and Switzerland,” pp. 91–3Google Scholar; and Black, et al. , Neutralization and World Politics, pp. 22–4.Google Scholar

7 Cited in First Report, p. 35.

8 “[I]f we have not joined the Organization, it is merely by reason of our anxiety to maintain our status of neutrality.” Ibid., p. 135.

9 The following discussion is largely based on Ibid., pp. 29–35, 108–10, and 153–5; Brooks, Robert C., “Swiss Referendum on the League of Nations,” American Political Science Review 14 (08 1920): 477–80CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Zahier, Walter R., “Switzerland and the League of Nations: A Chapter in Diplomatic History,” American Political Science Review 30 (08 1936): 753–7Google Scholar; Morgenthau, Hans J., “The End of Switzerland–s ‘Differential’ Neutrality,” American Journal of International Law 32 (07 1938): 558–62Google Scholar; and Bonjour, E., Offler, H.S. and Potter, G.R., A Short History of Switzerland (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), pp. 357–65.Google Scholar

10 Cited in League of Nations, Official Journal, (1920): 57–8.Google Scholar

11 These figures are taken from Bonjour et al., History of Switzerland, p. 359.

12 Message of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly, August 4, 1919, as cited in First Report, p. 110.

13 German-speaking Switzerland voted against the League by a margin of about 292,000 to 244,000. The rest of the country overwhelmingly approved membership. The figures cited here and in the text are taken from Brooks, “Swiss Referendum,” pp. 479–80.

14 Reversing their position of 1920, however, the Social Democrats found themselves to be the League's supporters because they felt that their social ideals could be best furthered by a strong League.

15 Cited in League of Nations, Official Journal, (1938): 386.Google Scholar

16 Ibid., pp. 369–70. The resolution was adopted unanimously, China and the USSR abstaining.

17 Accordingly, Switzerland abstained from the vote by which the Soviet Union was expelled from the League in December 1939 for invading Finland.

18 First Report, p. 48. For a meticulous account of these early years, see Ehni, Die Schweiz unddie Vereinten Nationen.

19 First Report, p. 123.

20 To be eligible to attend the San Francisco Conference, a state had to be at war with one of the Axis powers.

21 This general statement of collective security is given specific application by Chapter VII of the Charter, “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression.”

22 The proposed amendment, which was intended as an addition to Article 2(5) cited above, declared: “Without it being possible for a State to escape such an obligation by relying on a status of neutrality.” United Nations Information Organization and U.S. Library of Congress, Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization (21 vols.; London and New York: United Nations Information Organizations, 1945–1954), VI, 459, 722.Google Scholar

23 Ibid., pp. 459–60, 722. For further discussion of this matter, see Lalive, J.F., “International Organization and Neutrality,” British Yearbook of International Law (1947): 77–8Google Scholar, who explained: “In the minds of many, the concept and the very word neutrality have fallen into discredit…. It has become a target for statesmen and international lawyers, who see in it an obstacle to solidarity, to international organization, and to the formation of a society of states founded on respect for, and enforcement of, law.” p. 73.

24 Cited in First Report, p. 51.

25 Letter dated October 19, 1946, and cited in Ibid., pp. 51–2.

26 Ibid., p. 52.

27 Ibid.

28 Second Report, p. 4.

29 Geneva's role as a host to international organizations, of course, antedates the creation of the League. Today the city serves as the headquarters of some 200 international organizations ranging from the Abolitionist Federation to the World Council of Churches.

30 See United Nations, General Assembly, Negotiations with the Swiss Federal Council: Report by the Secretary-General A/175, November 4, 1946. This lengthy document contains a review of the discussions held between the Secretary-General and the Swiss federal authorities, the text of the “Interim Agreement,” and two letters from the Head of the (Swiss) Political Department concerning his interpretation of it.

31 Ibid., p. 12.

32 Ibid. This “Interim Agreement” remains in effect today. When the Swiss Federal Chambers formally approved it on September 29, 1955, the term “interim” was simply dropped. First Report, p. 56.

33 U.K. Doc. A/175, November 4, 1946, p. 3.

34 Berne serves as the headquarters of the Universal Postal Union (UPU).

35 The figure rose from 1,877 in 1952 to 4,119 in 1967. The number of representatives and experts rose during the same period from 7,000 to 22,500. First Report, p. 57.

36 Mower, Alfred, “Observer Countries: Quasi Members of the United Nations,” International Organization 20 (Spring 1966): 266.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

37 Ibid., pp. 267–8.

38 Switzerland had no observer at San Francisco, but Professor William E. Rappard, who had been one of Switzerland's four representatives in Paris at the conference to set up the League of Nations, did follow the work of the Preparatory Commission from June 1945 on. Ad hoc observers were sent to General Assembly meetings prior to the summer of 1946.

39 Swiss Permanent Observers have been Ministers Wagnière (1948–1953), Lindt (1953–1956), Soldati (1956–1957), Schnyder (1957–1961), and since then Ambassadors Thalmann (1961–1966), Turrettini (1966–1974), and Marcuard (1974–).

40 These states were North Korea, South Korea, South Vietnam, the Holy See, Monaco, and Switzerland.

41 On the other hand, the pro-Western image of the status of Observer appears to be changing, as witness the recent assumption by the North Koreans of the position.

42 See the Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 16 June 1966–15 June 1967, General Assembly, Official Records: Twenty-Second Session, Supplement No. 1A, p. 20.

43 First Report, p.115.

44 The post has been held by Ambassadors Keller (1966–1968) and Humbert (1968–).

45 This reasoning is employed in First Report, p. 82. Also see Hudson, Manley O., “Switzerland and the International Court of Justice,” American Journal of International Law 41 (10 1947): 866–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

46 The Swiss National Bank does not possess the machinery necessary to overcome the inflationary consequences that might result from the issuing of Swiss francs under IMF drawing rights. In addition, IMF rules are viewed as being too rigid in regards to the acceptable limits for fluctuations in exchange rates. Finally, IMF membership would entail too heavy a financial burden. First Report, pp. 87–8. Swiss membership in the IBRD, IFC, and IDA is precluded by the necessity of possessing prior membership in IMF.

47 The other Specialized Agencies Switzerland belongs to are: The International Labor Organization (ILO), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the Universal Postal Union (UPU), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), and the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO). Membership is also held in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which technically is not a Specialized Agency.

48 Cited in First Report, p.95.

49 Ibid., p. 38.

50 Ibid.

51 Second Report, p. 16.

52 Ibid.

53 Cited in First Report, p. 67.

54 Second Report, p. 16. In addition, the Swiss government made a subscription of 8.2 million Swiss francs to the United Nations bond issue in 1961.

55 Reply of Federal Councillor Petitpierre, cited in First Report, p. 69.

56 Ibid., p. 70.

57 Second Report, p. 16.

58 First Report, p. 72.

59 Second Report, p. 16.

60 First Report, p. 71.

61 For an excellent and especially thorough discussion of Switzerland and the Rhodesian sanctions, see Boczek, , “Permanent Neutrality and Switzerland,” pp. 75–104.Google Scholar

62 The maxim of international law “pacta tertiis nee nocent nee prosunt” (treaties do not affect non-signatories) would certainly entitle the Swiss to object to the application of Article 2(6) to their situation. On the other hand, it cannot be supposed that the United Nations would willingly allow its decisions to be vitiated because one relatively small state chose not to join it. Article 2(6) exists precisely to correct such possibilities. In addition, it should be noted that Article 2(6) might become binding upon non-signatories such as Switzerland through custom.

63 United Nations, Security Council Resolution 217, November 20, 1965.

64 First Report, p. 77.

65 On this terminology, see Boczek, , “Permanent Neutrality and Switzerland,” p. 96n.Google Scholar

66 First Report, p. 77.

67 United Nations, Security Council Resolution 232, December 16, 1966.

68 Boczek states that the Swiss reply to the first request was delayed “to emphasize that Switzerland was not legally bound by the Resolution….” “Permanent Neutrality and Switzerland,” p. 84.

69 They declined from $5,678,000 in 1965 to $3,925,000 in 1967. Exports to that territory, however, increased very slightly from $1,641,000 in 1965 to $1,939,000 in 1967. See “Issues Before the 23rd General Assembly,” International Conciliation, No. 569 (09 1968), Table 1 on p. 74.Google Scholar

70 Cited in First Report, p. 77. When the Security Council imposed comprehensive economic sanctions against Rhodesia in 1968, the Swiss position remained unaltered.

71 Ibid., p. 78.

72 Ibid., p. 3.

73 See, for a small example, the articles by Bretscher, Wahlen, Schwarz, Guggenheim, Hofer, Frei, Kreibaum, Reck, Streuli, Schindler, and Luchsinger, written for Neue Zurcher Zeitung in January and February 1966, and published in a separate pamphlet, Kann und Soil die Schweiz den Vereinigten Nationen Beitreten? (The present author is indebted to Professor Boleslaw A. Boczek of Kent State University for calling these sources to his attention.)

74 This term basically refers to those states which are not aligned on the side of either bloc in the Cold War. It lacks any legal definition and must in no way be confused with the status of neutrality. Interestingly enough, however, the fact that the term “neutralism” carries such a favorable connotation for so many of the new Third World states has undoubtedly helped, through a kind of osmosis process, to give the term “neutrality” a more palatable flavor than it initially possessed when the United Nations was created.

75 First Report, p. 124.

76 Second Report, p. 10.

77 See the “Memorandum Concerning the Results of the Conversations Between the Government Delegation of the Republic of Austria and the Government Delegation of the Soviet Union,” in American Journal of International Law, Supplement Section of Documents, 49 (1955): 191.Google Scholar

78 A detailed analysis of the role of Austria in the United Nations is beyond the scope of this article. For such discussions in English, see Verdross, Alfred, “Austria's Permanent Neutrality and the United Nations Organization,” American Journal of International Law 50 (01 1956): 61–8CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Zemanek, Karl, “Neutral Austria in the United Nations,” International Organization 15 (Summer 1961): 408–22CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Koeck, Heribert F., “A Permanently Neutral State in the Security Council,” Cornell International Law Journal 6 (05 1973): 137–62.Google Scholar

79 To a somewhat lesser extent, neutral Sweden, a member since 1946, offers a similar precedent. Sweden, however, tends to take a more active role in political problems than does Switzerland or even Austria. For example, Sweden has not only sent officers abroad to serve in United Nations peace-keeping operations, but has also established a permanent military force to cooperate with the United Nations in its peace-keeping activities.

80 First Report, p. 111.

81 Ibid., p. 5.

82 Ibid., p. 11.

83 But the First Report largely dismissed this argument for non-membership. Instead, it found that membership would “tend to enhance” the Swiss mediatory role. P. 129.

84 Second Report, p. 11.

85 For a good, general discussion of this well-known theme, see Claude, Inis L. Jr, Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization (4th rev. ed.; New York: Random House, 1971), pp. 312–34.Google Scholar

86 Second Report, p. 9.

87 U.K. Doc. S/7795, February 28, 1967.

88 Second Report, p. 10. Rhodesia is not the only example. United Nations action in regard to Namibia has created “ a new development” which “has recently corroborated what has been said on the subject of non-member States in relation to Article 2(6).” Ibid. The immediate reference apparently was to United Nations, Security Council Resolution 301, October 20, 1971, which stated in part: “The Security Council … agrees with the [World] Court's opinion … that it is incumbent upon States which are not Members of the United Nations to give assistance … in the action which has been taken by the United Nations with regard to Namibia.” (Italics added.)

89 Second Report, p. 5.

90 Ibid., p. 7.

91 First Report, p. 127.

92 Second Report, p. 6.

93 Ibid.

94 First Report. p. 127.

95 Ibid., p. 134. A public opinion poll in 1967 indicated just this. See “Poll Indicates Many Swiss Oppose Joining the U.N.,” New York Times, 09 16, 1967, p. 14Google Scholar. Recent developments in the United Nations concerning the Mideast, South Africa, and, in general, the manner in which the automatic majority of the developing states has been used have reinforced this hesitancy.

96 Second Report, p. 12.