Of all man's cultural badges, that of language is perhaps the most intimately felt and tenaciously defended. Even chauvinists who are prepared to concede under pressure that language, race, and culture are not the same thing—that their national ethnicity may be mixed, their religion imported, their culture synthetic to a degree—will still cling to the national language as the last bastion of irrational totemic pride. Hence, one of the most controversial features of the programs of westernization and modernization fostered by Kemal Atatürk in Turkey and Reza Shah in Iran was that of state-sponsored language reform, characterized chiefly by attempts to “purify” Turkish and Persian of their centuries-old accretion of Arabic loanwords. A case study of this process also affords some insight into the differing attitudes to national social reforms in Turkey and in Iran, and among the respective regimes, intelligentsia, and masses, which might help to explain why on balance one “succeeded” while the other “failed.”

The people of Turkey at the end of the War of Independence could hardly have imagined the long era of peace and national development that was to follow. They had just been through more than a decade of struggle to survive against the odds of warfare abroad and at home, epidemics, and serious interferences with the normal material means of livelihood. Loss of life and permanent disability were legacies for many families of the 1911–1922 period. Practically every community was affected in some life-threatening way by the ambitions of outside powers and their local allies or by the last Ottoman campaigns (the Balkans, North Africa, Gallipoli, the Russian front, Mesopotamia, Palestine, and the Hejaz). Only the independence struggle itself finally resolved the issues of territoriality, governance, and the right to reside in peace. The new Republic was founded in 1923.

Before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, a study of the economic relations between the two countries might have been based on the proposition that each country would maximize the gains to itself from the set of economic transactions consisting of bilateral trade, transit trade, and capital assistance to Afghanistan, its term structure, and repayment rates and schedule. Further, it could have been argued that the division of the gains from these transactions would have been a function of the demand and cost conditions in each country, as well as the relative bargaining positions of a small versus a large country, which could have been influenced by the availability of alternative sources for commodity trade and the supply of capital from the rest of the world.

The twentieth-century Ibadi imamate of “inner” Oman (1913–1955) constituted one of the world's last theocracies. In a demise unique for the mid-twentieth century, it became assimilated into one of the world's last absolute monarchies. The 1955 shift from theocratic to dynastic rule met initially with the support, or at least the acquiescence, of most of the tribesmen and notables of the interior. This acquiescence at first appears surprising because the fundamentalist Islamic religious and political principles for which the imamate stood continued to be properly supported. One of these principles for Ibadis was that the imām, the spiritual and temporal leader of the Islamic community, should be the most qualified of available candidates and chosen by a consensus of the community's religious men of learning and notables, a notion markedly at contrast with the ascriptive one of dynastic rule. Conflict between these two forms of rule is basic to much of Islamic political history and to that of pre-1970 Oman in particular.

Research in the West has clearly shown that attitudes developed in school greatly contribute to the views of students on societal and national issues, especially toward their country and leaders. In the newly independent and developing countries, the schools play an even more important role in value formation, since the material used in school is often prepared with a definite and clear objective of inculcating certain specific values in the young—above and beyond the task of imparting factual, scientific information. There, school teachers also are likely to convey attitudes and values different from those received at home, especially concerning development and national integration.

It is common knowledge of Iranian history that at the turn of the present century iran was undergoing important social transformations. A notable feature of this period that witnessed the rising movement for constitutional reforms was a heightening of social tensions and contradictions in a traditional society that had now become subject to potent forces of change from within and without. The disintegration of the political power of the Qajar dynasty went hand in hand with an accelerating trend of economic decline, while the social fabric of the country at large was unraveled by a growing tendency for outbursts of massive social agitation and popular unrest.

Population movements have always played a major role in the life of Islam and particularly the Middle East. During the nineteenth century, however, the transfer of vast numbers of people from one region to another profoundly altered the social, ethnic, and religious structure of the Ottoman state—that is, the Middle East and the Balkans. The footloose tribes of eastern Anatolia, Syria, Iraq, and the Arabian peninsula were spurred into motion on an unprecedented scale by economic and social events, and the Ottoman government was forced to undertake settlement measures that had widespread effects. The Ottoman-Russian wars, which began in 1806 and occurred at intervals throughout the century, displaced large groups of people, predominantly Muslims from the Crimea, the Caucasus, the Balkans, and the Mediterranean islands. Uprooted from their ancestral homelands, they eventually settled in Anatolia, Syria (inclusive of the territories of modern-day Jordan, Lebanon, and Israel as well as modern Syria), and northern Iraq. These migrations continued until the time of the First World War. In addition, after 1830 waves of immigrants came from Algeria—especially after Abdel Kader ended his resistance to the French—and from Tunisia as well. These people too settled in Syria at Damascus.

Throughout one hundred years, Zionist ideology has dictated national settlement planning in Israel. In this highly dynamic society, political processes significantly affected the planning environment, and major planning goals were clearly derived from this reality, while being evaluated against social values. Negligence in the planning process was most critical in the formulation of conflicting long-range goals that impeded implementation. Goal conflict was especially harmful when economic planning was not as sound at a time when geopolitics, security, and defense goals were primarily pursued. Within the fundamental goals, incremental decisions—to construct new communities or extend existing ones—were also implemented. Antiplanning variables slowed down execution only to some extent, but their impact may increase in the future.

Analyzing the relationship between ideology and settlement implementation national planning concepts (through historical perspective), a subject that has received little attention in the past, contributed some analytical policy insights. Clearly, goal hierarchy or the domination of certain goals is sometimes required. However, in order to resolve conflicts, an effort should be made to decrease the differences in weights among goals. Thus, tension could be reduced to facilitate implementation. It is also possible to trade off one goal for another. Compromising among incompatible goals is a crucial matter to Israeli national settlement planning. There should be more balance in the allocation of resources economic objectives on one hand, and geopolitics, security, and defense goals the other. In addition, an attempt should be made to reduce the influence of antiplanning variables. Some of them, such as domestic or international political pressures, are more difficult to control; others are easier to influence. Specific attention should be devoted to achieving a higher professional level in planning, and more opportunity should be provided to experts to contribute input to decision-making processes.

Naguib Mahfouz's realistic treatment of his subject matter in Midaq Alley (Cairo, 1947) stands in sharp contrast to the symbolic mode of Tayeb Salih in Season of Migration to the North (Beirut, 1966). The style of Mahfouz here is simple, clear, and direct. His characters are common people who belong to the lower strata of life in Cairo and, more specifically, in the “Midaq Alley” of Cairo, this dark enclosed street which literally grinds down its inhabitants (as its Arabic name suggests), then carries on, indifferent to their plight.

This article, which draws largely from Arabica press sources from 1885 to 1900, seeks to sharpen our view of social attitudes reflected in the activities of local Freemasons in Egypt and Syria during the last decades of the Ottoman Empite. A number of earlier historians have attached considerable importance to pre- and post-1908 masonic orders and Ottoman politics. Too few, however, have tried to analyze ways in which essential social themes, some widely recognized as having importance across international and intercultural lines, were viewed through the perspective of late 19th-century Freemasonry. A first task in this introduction, therefore, will be to see how Masons in Europe and the Middle East viewed, or were presumed to view, a number of such social themes in general terms. We will then turn to one specific issue which clearly assumed more than passing importance as a propagandistic cause pursued by a small but influential group of Masons in Syria and Egypt over nearly two decades' time. We may tentatively suggest that the purpose of such endeavors was to encourage majority acceptance of the relevance and value of a cause espoused for the body politic as a whole, without necessary reference to its original, here clearly minority, proponents.

In my contribution to a volume edited by Roger Owen, I have studied the economic development of Palestine from the Crimean War up to the beginnings of the first Jewish Aliya. In this article I propose to investigate the concomitant demographic development of Palestine, that is, of the Livās of Jerusalem, Nablus/Balqā', and 'Akkā, during roughly the same period.

Writers analyzing recent economic change among the Bedouin of South Sinai have not yet investigated institutions and events beyond the limits of their informants' memories. Marx, Perevolotsky, and Ben David refer, quite rightly, to the period following the Second World War as a time of economic change in Sinai. They note that in that period tribesmen tended to become unskilled laborers in new enterprises such as mining, road-building, and services, all generated by central governments that were then becoming exceedingly involved in Sinai. This trend, together with the growth of contraband in the 1940s and 1950s, modified traditional Bedouin economy by inducing a movement away from occupations based on the use of natural resources. A change in life-style followed, manifested primarily in a tendency to settle in villages such as El Milga and Abu Sileh near the Monastery of Saint Catharine, El Wad near El Tor, or Bir Zreir near Nweiba (see map).

The Ulema are the power that holds the Sultan and his people together—the medium of control. But they seldom meddle in politics. This premise was expressed by Ameen Rihani, an Arab traveller, in 1928, before either Sultan 'Abd al-'Aziz became king or Najd and its dependencies became the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Was Rihani correct in his conclusion? Is he right today? This article will endeavor to explore the term ulama in the Saudi context in the twentieth century. Later, an attempt will be made to discuss the participation of Saudi ulama in a number of key cases in the history of Saudi Arabia.

The house of Saud along with the house of Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of the Unitarian movement, were parties to a unique coalition in the eighteenth century. The coalition embraced the Unitarian movement, or Wahhabiyah, founded in the mid-eighteenth century, and members of the Arab noble house of Saud of Najd.

Acquiring a colony and making a colonial venture profitable are two very different affairs. Throughout the French protectorate period in Morocco (1912–1956), there was a sizable gap between colonial aspirations and realizations. Later, political and economic factors would be the primary cause. During the first two decades, however, this gap was caused by colonial idealism and ignorance of Moroccan environmental realities. French colonization in Morocco and the protectorate's first agricultural policy were based on legend rather than on sound economic logic. This article analyzes France's “wheat policy” in Morocco—the manifestation of a misguided colonial vision. Its purpose is both to help explain French colonialism in Morocco, and to paint the historical backdrop to modern irrigation agriculture in this country.

During the past decade, the Iranian economy has experienced two severe shocks. The first was the huge increase in oil revenues and the subsequent increase in government expenditures. The second was the Iranian revolution, with the concomitant flight of capital and production setbacks. The first shock produced in the Iranian economy severe inflation that, although not unfamiliar to the Iranians, has been unprecedented in scale and is still accelerating. Analysis of the causes of this inflation is important for understanding the course of events and for predicting future trends.

During the morning of December 8, 1942, a large group of university students paraded through the streets of Tehran to the parliament building on Baharistan Square to demand higher bread rations and prompt action on critical problems by an incompetent government and an inactive parliament. Spectators and organized groups from South Tehran added their numbers to the already large crowd. Police forces withdrew from the square and the demonstration became a riot. The crowd occupied the parliament building and moved toward the commercial district, smashing windows and signs and looting stores along the way. On the morning of December 9, students again instigated a march to the parliament building, but this time army troops firing machine guns met and dispersed them. Although city shops were closed on December 9, some reopened on December 10, and all reopened on December 11; normality had returned. The bread riot claimed over 20 people killed, 700 wounded, 150 arrested, and 150 stores sacked and burned.

A striking feature of medieval Persian poetry is the abundance of nature imagery that permeates every poetic genre, and especially imagery relating to gardens. The royal gardens and parks evoked in the descriptive exordia of the qasīda, the luxuriant gardens of romance that provide settings for tales of love, the spiritual gardens of mystical writings, the flowery haunts of rose and nightingale in the courtly ghazal—all provide eloquent testimony to the importance of the garden in Persian culture.

Revolutions are momentous events that shake the foundations of societies, transforming their social and political structures and often signalling the triumph of a new ideology. It has long been noted that the international ramifications of revolutions are no less profound than their domestic impact. This is not only because revolutions often give rise to powerful states, thus potentially undermining the extant balance of power, but also because they sometimes infuse those states with norms and objectives that are antithetical to those subscribed to by other members of the international system. They also exert a demonstration effect beyond the boundaries of their country of origin, with a potential for triggering waves of revolution and counter-revolution both within and between societies.