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From Theocracy To Monarchy:Authority And Legitimacy In Inner Oman, 1935–1957

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 January 2009

Dale F. Eickelman
Dale F. Eickelman
Affiliation:
Department Of AnthropologyNew York University
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Extract

The twentieth-century Ibadi imamate of “inner” Oman (1913–1955) constituted one of the world's last theocracies. In a demise unique for the mid-twentieth century, it became assimilated into one of the world's last absolute monarchies. The 1955 shift from theocratic to dynastic rule met initially with the support, or at least the acquiescence, of most of the tribesmen and notables of the interior. This acquiescence at first appears surprising because the fundamentalist Islamic religious and political principles for which the imamate stood continued to be properly supported. One of these principles for Ibadis was that the imām, the spiritual and temporal leader of the Islamic community, should be the most qualified of available candidates and chosen by a consensus of the community's religious men of learning and notables, a notion markedly at contrast with the ascriptive one of dynastic rule. Conflict between these two forms of rule is basic to much of Islamic political history and to that of pre-1970 Oman in particular.

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Articles
Information
International Journal of Middle East Studies , Volume 17 , Issue 1 , February 1985 , pp. 3 - 24
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1985

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References

Author's note: The field research on which this essay is based was funded by National Science Foundation grant BNS-7907127 (September 1979–August 1981) and a Fulbright-Hays Faculty Research Abroad award (September–December 1982). A key sign of the strength and confidence of any polity is the ability of those in it to engage in a critical discussion of events in the immediate past and their implications for later developments. For this reason I especially wish to thank my official sponsor in Oman, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour, and official and nonofficial Omanis who supported my work at various stages. Brigadier (ret.) Malcolm G. Dennison and Brigadier Colin Maxwell, Personal Advisor to H. H. the Deputy Prime Minister for Security and Defense, participants in many of the events of the 1950s described in this essay, have generously commented on an earlier version of this essay, as have Karen I. Blu, New York University; Michael Bonine and Richard Henderson, University of Arizona; John Peterson, the Foreign Policy Research Institute; and John Wilkinson, University of Oxford. All interpretations and opinions in the essay remain my sole responsibility.Google Scholar

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2 See Eickelman, Dale F., “Religious Tradition, Economic Domination and Political Legitimacy: Morocco and Oman,” Revue de l'Occideni Musulman et de la Méditerrannée, 29, 1(1980), 17–30;CrossRefGoogle Scholar and “Knowledge in Inner Oman,” Journal of Oman Studies, 6, 3(1980), 163–172.Google Scholar

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4 Population figures are derived from unofficial estimates prepared by the Directorate-General of Statistics of the Development Council in 1980. For an essential technical review of the various population estimates available for Oman, see World Bank, Technical Assistance and Special Studies Division, Europe, Middle East and North Africa Projects Department, “Field Report: Assessment of the Manpower Implications of the Second Five-year Development Plan, Sultanate of Oman” (Washington, 1981), pp. 202–208 (mimeo.). The estimate of the numerical strength of Oman–s various sectarian groups is mine.Google Scholar

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7 An English translation of the body of this agreement is given in Peterson, John, Oman in the Twentieth Century: Political Foundations of an Emerging State (London, 1978, p. 175. Following the Saudi occupation of Buraymi oasis (on the northernmost fringe of “inner” Oman) in 1952, the Sib Agreement was used to support the case that the imamate constituted an independent government. an argument resurrected in the late 1950s by supporters of the imamate government in exile.Google Scholar Yet as Peterson specifies, Ibid., pp. 174–176, the Sib Agreement makes no mention of recognition of the imam nor the imamate government. The imam himself was a signatory, but only in his capacity as a notable of the interior. Foreign recognition and “sovereignity” were not issues raised by the Sib Agreement.

8 Letter from Shaykh Salim bin Rashid al-Kharusi (d. 1926), “the imam of the Muslims” (imām al-muslimīn), to Shaykh Muhammad bin Salim al-Ruqayshi, appointing him governor of Izki, June 16, 1917Google Scholar. Reproduced in al-Salimi, Muhammad ibn 'Abdallah, Nahdat al.a'yān bi-hurriyat 'Umān (Cairo. c. 1961). P. 367. Other letters of appointment use essentially the same language.Google Scholar

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11 See Wilkinson, “The Ibadi Imama,” for further discussion.Google Scholar

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17 In this respect, Barth, Fredrik, in “Factors of Production, Economic Circulation, and Inequality in Inner Arabia,”(Research in Economic Anthropology, 1(1978), 53–72, a study of the neighboring oasis of Bahla, is misleading. Barth treats the economic and political “systems” of the oasis as if they were self-contained.Google Scholar

18 Sayyid Ahmad bin Ibrahim, longtime Minister (nāzir) of the Interior (1939–1970) for Sultan Sa'id bin Taymur, related to me (interview in Muscat, July 28, 1980) one instance in which the late Sultan showed him a letter in which a prominent man of learning of the interior asked for funds from the Saudi monarch in order to resist the encroachment of the “British-influenced” Sultan of the coast. The envelope was mistakenly addressed to Sultan Sa'id. The letter which should have gone to Sultan Sa'id presumably went to his Saudi counterpart. Fortunately for the notable involved, the Sultan was only amused.Google Scholar

19 See Ibrahim Sa'id al-'Abri (d. 1975), “Kitāb tabsirat al-mu'tabirīn fī ta'rīkh al-'Abriyīn, 1961. Manuscript in possession of Jabir Musa 'Ali, Director of Education, Nizwa.Google Scholar

20 In the absence of cadastral surveys, reliable estimates of the extent of these various types of land are unavailable. No central registers exist; each plot is locally known by name and is not described in quantifiable terms. This situation of course favors continued local control of these lands.Google Scholar

21 See Eickelman, “Religious Knowledge in Inner Oman.”Google Scholar

22 Al-'Abri, Kitab, p. 160.Google Scholar

23 Shaykh Talib bin 'Ali al-Hina'i was responsible for this innovation. Shaykh Talio was a leading figure in the imamate and brother of Shaykh Ghalib bin 'Ali, who was briefly imam in Nizwa (1954–1955). Both brothers eventually fled to exile in Saudi Arabia, where Shaykh Talib became instrumental in organizing armed insurgency.Google Scholar

24 For example, in 1939 a young 'Abri shaykh had a “hit” placed on him by the imam. His assassins in the oasis of al-Nakhl (where he was at the time) killed the wrong man by mistake, so that the 'Abri managed to escape. He later managed to reverse the imam's decision (interview, June 22, 1980). The imam also sought unsuccessfully to arrange for the Bani Hina to kill Shaykh Sulayman bin Himyar who, although ostensibly a supporter of the imamate, frequently acted against its policies. Shaykh Sulayman was too powerful for the imam to challenge directly (interview, Sayyid Ahmad Ibrahim, Muscat, August 30, 1980).Google Scholar

25 Interview. Sayyid Ahmad Ibrahim, Muscat, July 28, 1980.Google Scholar

26 Interview with Shaykh Ahmad's son, Shaykh Sa'id Ahmad al-Kindi, Nizwa, June 1, 1980.Google Scholar

27 Shaykh Ibrahim's move may have been prompted by a major disagreement with the imam. In 1939 Shaykh Ibrahim was accused of “making war against Islam” (i.e., defying the imam's authority) by not delivering to the imam some 'Abriyin accused of initiating a serious intertribal dispute. Shaykh Ibrahim was imprisoned in the Nizwa fortress for several months for this alleged offense before being pardoned by the imam. He subsequently became reconciled with the imam and by 1945 had become chief qadi of Muscat. Shaykh Ibrahim provides his own account of the 1939 incident in Kitab.pp. 131–132.Google Scholar

28 Al-'Abri, Kitab, p. 133.Google Scholar

29 An evaluation of Sayyid Sa'id's competence in Arabic as of 1926 is found in India Office [10], RI 15/6/55, Burrett to Political Resident, Bushire, March 30, 1926. Soon after this assessment, the Sultan's Arabic improved rapidly.Google Scholar

30 See 10, R/15/6/357, “Muscat Intelligence Summary for 1–16 January 1936,” for a report of correspondence from the imam concerning taxes levied at the coastal town of Sur; and the Intelligence Summary for 16–31 July 1939 for reports of the Sultan's gifts to shaykhs of the interior and counter-subsidies from the imam made possible by a large gift from Omanis in Zanzibar. For a contemporary British appraisal of the first years of his rule, see 10, RI 15/6/216, “Note on the position and personality of Sultan Said,” August 16, 1937.Google Scholar

31 10, R/15/6/211. Consul to Political Resident, Bushire, January 4, 1941. In a telegram to the Sultan in Karachi (where he was on vacation) on January 30, 1941, the British consul in Muscat reported that the imam had just succeeded in appointing a governor in 'Ibri, which except for Buraymi is the northernmost oasis of the interior. This advance on the part of the imam was important because of the limits it placed upon renewed oil exploration.Google Scholar

32 IO (telegram), RI, May 28, 1945, cited in Peterson, Oman, p 54.Google Scholar

33 Interview, Sayyid Muhammad bin Ahmad, August 31, 1980. In a related incident which illustrates the intricacy of the politics of traditional legitimacy, Shaykh 'Isa bin Salih al-Harthi, paramount shaykh (tamīma) of the powerful Hirth tribe of the Sharqiya, died in 1946. In the ensuing struggle for tribal leadership, the imam eventually favored one successor among the various contenders from the tribe's elite. The imam appointed Shaykh Ahmad Muhammad al-Harthi, one of the contenders for leadership of the Hirth, as the first governor of Bilad Bani Bu Hasan. The appointment isolated Shaykh Ahmad from the struggle over Hirth leadership, but its unintended consequence was to establish a close working relationship between him and the Sultan. Shaykh Ahmad was later to play a leading role in furthering Sultan Sa'1d's assimilation of the interior.Google Scholar

34 In the 1960s, the Sultan characterized assertions of his candidacy as “nonsense” (Peterson, Oman, p. 194), a notion confirmed by Sayyid Ahmad Ibrahim (interview, Muscat, July 28, 1980) and others.Google Scholar

35 IO, R/15/6/361, Muscat Intelligence Summary for October 16–31, 1948; Foreign Office 37 1/82166, Chauncey to Political Resident, July 12, 1950.Google Scholar

36 Thesiger, Wilfred, Arabian Sands (Harmondsworth, 1964), p. 324.Google Scholar

37 IO, R/15/6/389, letter from Bird to Political Agent, Muscat, November 14, 1948.Google Scholar

38 The original reports and correspondence concerning this incident are located in the Buraymi file, Folder I (February 18, 1948 to February 3, 1952) of the Petroleum Development Oman [PDO] archives, Petroleum Museum, Mina al-Fahal, Muscat. For another account of Bird's visit, see Kelly, J. B., Eastern Arabian Frontiers (New York and London, 1964), p. 40. Brigadier Cohn Maxwell, who has served in Oman's armed forces since 1952 and who was personally responsible for surveying Oman's northern and southern frontiers on behalf of Sultan Sa'id, states that the Sultan was keenly aware of the significance of boundary issues and carefully preserved all documents related to them. Interviews with Brigadier Maxwell, October 7, 1980, and December 13, 1982.Google Scholar

39 IO, R/15/8/62/51, telegram, Chauncey to Political Resident, June 22, 1951. See also Kelly, Frontiers, p. 160.Google Scholar

40 This letter and related ones were published in Arabic in a Karachi newspaper, al-Arab, January—February 1953. Translations were made by the Iraq Petroleum Company, (PDO, Henderson to British Residency, Bahrain, DO/PCC.2-A/3445, March 23, 1953). Henderson surmised that the correspondence was probably “leaked” from the imam's side; the Sultan made no copies available. The original Arabic texts were not preserved in the PDO archives. To confirm the authenticity of the letters, I retranslated the texts into Arabic in December 1982 for one of the imam's former advisers, who stated that the retranslation approximated the letters he saw in 1952.Google Scholar

41 Interviews, Brig. Cohn Maxwell, October 7, 1980, and December 13, 1982; letter to author dated March 5, 1983. See also Peterson, Oman, p. 68.Google Scholar

42 See IO, R/15/8/62/51, Political Resident, Bahrain to Foreign Office, December 19, 1950, for an account of the first of Sulayman bin Himyar's repeated attempts throughout the 1950s to sell oil exploration rights to the interior.Google Scholar

43 The letter translated in the PDO archives is dated September 27, 1952/Muharram 8, 1372. Details of the imam's assembly to discuss the Saudi letter are from Shaykh Ahmad Muhammad al-Harthi, interview, Muscat, November 17, 1982.Google ScholarSee also Kelly. Frontiers, p. 161.Google Scholar

44 Interview, Shaykh Ahmad Muhammad al-Harthi, Muscat, November 18, 1982.Google Scholar

45 Peterson, Oman, p. 194, citing a 1975 letter from Shaykh Muhammad ibn 'Abdallah al-Salimi.Google Scholar

46 'lbri area report for September 1955 (Boyle), PDO archives; interview, Col. Malcolm Dennison. Muscat, October 9, 1980.Google Scholar

47 Letter. Brig. Cohn Maxwell, March 5, 1983; 'lbri representative's report for December 1955 (Boyle), January 11. 1956, PDO archives.Google Scholar

48 Shaykh Ahmad Muhammad al-Harthi, later to assume temporary control of the fortress Niawa and to play a significant if usually indirect role in its administration, was one of the few leaders of the interior consulted in advance by the Sultan. For a journalist's account of the trip,Google Scholar see Morris, James, Sultan in Oman (New York, 1957).Google Scholar

49 The Sultan himself did not read the speech. He handed it to Shaykh Ahmad al-Harthi in front the assembled notables to read on his behalf. Interview with Shaykh Ahmad, Muscat, November 18, 1982. Some of those present later informed a British officer present in Nizwa at the time that “the Sultan made a powerful and terrifying impact” (letter to author from Brig. [ret.] Malcolm Dennison, March 23. 1983). Later in Nizwa the Sultan personally delivered a short speech to the Muscat and Oman Field Force (Morris, Sultan, p. 81).Google Scholar

50 'Abdallah 'Ali al-Qatbi, now Undersecretary of the Ministry of the Interior, participated as a youth in this expedition to Muscat. I am grateful to him for his account of the event (interview, Muscat, November 15, 1982).Google Scholar

51 Interview, Muscat, October 27, 1982.Google Scholar

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53 Interview with a major tribal leader, Muscat. October 23. 1982.Google Scholar

54 Interview with a governor for the former Sultan, Muscat, September 1980; interviews, Omanis resident in Bahrain and Kuwait in the 1950s, Muscat, November 1982.Google Scholar

55 Interview. Brig. Colin Maxwell. Muscat, December 14, 1982.Google Scholar

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57 Interview, Muscat, October 1982. It is useful to speculate that since a shaykh-dominated tribal militia offered no effective competition to the British-officered armed forces, advocacy of a negotiated end to the insurgency would have enhanced the influence of loyalist shaykhs of the interior over the Sultan and his policies. It should be added that in 1960 British Political Residency officials, acting on behalf of the Sultan, initiated an unsuccessful series of meetings with rebel leaders in Beirut to seek an end to the insurgency (Peterson, Oman, pp. 184–185).Google Scholar

58 Letter, Brig. Cohn Maxwell, March 5, 1983.Google Scholar

59 Interview with a loyalist shaykh, March 1980.Google Scholar

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61 Peterson, Oman, p. 207.Google Scholar

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