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State-Systems and Revolutionary Challenge: Nasser, Khomeini, and the Middle East

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 January 2009

Maridi Nahas
Maridi Nahas
Affiliation:
University of CaliforniaLos Angeles
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Extract

Revolutions are momentous events that shake the foundations of societies, transforming their social and political structures and often signalling the triumph of a new ideology. It has long been noted that the international ramifications of revolutions are no less profound than their domestic impact. This is not only because revolutions often give rise to powerful states, thus potentially undermining the extant balance of power, but also because they sometimes infuse those states with norms and objectives that are antithetical to those subscribed to by other members of the international system. They also exert a demonstration effect beyond the boundaries of their country of origin, with a potential for triggering waves of revolution and counter-revolution both within and between societies.

Type
Articles
Information
International Journal of Middle East Studies , Volume 17 , Issue 4 , November 1985 , pp. 507 - 527
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1985

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References

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