Recent theorising about feminist judging has concentrated on appellate courts and their judgments. This paper develops a conceptualisation of feminist judging in lower, first instance courts, which are dominated by high case volume and limited time for each matter, with decisions given orally and ex tempore rather than in elaborated written judgments. Through careful accounts of the philosophy, goals and practices of conventional as well as newer, more engaged approaches to judging, the paper compares and contrasts feminist judging with other approaches to judging in the lower courts. This entails considering dimensions such as the judicial officer's orientation to substantive law and practice in court, concepts of fairness, ethical commitments, the view of the defendant, and judicial qualities and capacities.

This essay is about portraits: judicial portraits. It offers a case study of the interface between law and visual culture. Its object of enquiry is a collection of pictures (painted and photographic), depicting the sixteen Chief Justices of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Australia, from 1824 to the present day. The original paintings hang in the Banco Court, Sydney. The photographs and digital copies of all the images are on the Court’s website. Beginning with a brief review of socio-legal scholarship on the judiciary, the essay explores existing work on the visual image of the judge. In response to the limitations of that research, the paper turns to art historical scholarship to facilitate an analysis of the aesthetic and technological factors (the continuities and changes) that shape and generate the meaning of these judicial images. It explores the relevance of context upon meaning. The paper demonstrates a number of methodological approaches and reflects upon the contribution that a study of judicial pictures may make to socio-legal scholarship.

Compassion poses difficult challenges for the rule of law. The compassionate response is often cast as a deviation from settled law rather than a principled application of it. Compassion so understood is troubling, most obviously because it poses a challenge to overall fairness, notice and consistency. Although compassion is usually approached as a factor influencing substantive outcomes, I argue to the contrary that compassion cannot serve as a reliable indicator of who should prevail in legal debates. Whether compassion should inform substance is a normative question that must be answered in light of the purposes of the tribunal and the principles it seeks to advance. I propose instead that compassion's importance lies in its ability to aid decision-makers in understanding what is at stake for the litigant. In this sense, compassion is closely tied to humility: both are reminders of human fallibility and of the limits of individual understanding.

This paper examines the impact of body-worn video (BWV) on the police craft skills of close observation, note-taking, investigative analysis, report-writing and preparation of evidence for the courts. It explains how the technology functions and explores its surveillant, investigative, probative and regulatory applications. The evidence shows that policing tasks are being transformed by BWV cameras and analytics such as facial recognition. The paper argues that BWV exemplifies the automation of policing – the replacement of police labour with mechanical devices – and explores the implications of this for transparency, accountability, fairness and police discretion.

Recent surveys in the UK and the Netherlands indicate that there is widespread dissatisfaction with the justice system. But who are these ‘critics’ of the justice system? Most previous studies only produced general statistics, while the persons behind the figures remained invisible. By contrast, this article aims to put a face to these numbers and discusses two ways of analysing the profile of the critics. Based on a review of existing survey data, the article first looks at their ‘demographic profile’. Next, the article also considers a second, alternative, approach. Based on their level of legal awareness and legal identification, it distinguishes four different ‘normative profiles’: legalists, loyalists, cynics and outsiders. Moreover, the article shows how these normative profiles may be applied in future comparative studies on legal mobilisation and legal protest. It is concluded that combining both approaches will help us to look beyond common stereotypes and consider the critics of the justice system as real persons with genuine concerns about the administration of justice in their country.

Mental capacity and autonomy are often understood to be normatively neutral – the only values or other norms they may presuppose are those the assessed person does or would accept. We show how mental disorder threatens normatively neutral accounts of autonomy. These accounts produce false positives, particularly in the case of disorders (such as depression, anorexia nervosa and schizophrenia) that affect evaluative abilities. Two normatively neutral strategies for handling autonomy-undermining disorder are explored and rejected: a blanket exclusion of mental disorder, and functional tests requiring consistency, expression of identity, reflective non-alienation or lack of compulsion. Finally, we suggest ways in which substantivist alternatives to neutrality can be made more promising through increased transparency, democratic contestability of conditions for capacity and autonomy, and a historically sensitive caution concerning restrictions of liberty.

International courts (ICs) have found themselves dealing with issues that are ‘political’ in nature. This paper discusses the techniques of avoidance ICs have developed to navigate such highly political or sensitive issues. The first part discusses some of the key rationales for avoidance. Drawing on the discussion of the political question doctrine in US constitutional law, it shows how ICs may justify avoidance on both principled and pragmatic grounds. It then discusses the different types of avoidance strategies employed by ICs, based on examples from the Court of Justice of the European Union, the International Court of Justice and the East African Court of Justice. ICs are rarely upfront about avoidance strategies. Rather, ICs tend to avoid cases in a more subtle fashion, relying on procedural rules to exclude a case, or by resolving the dispute in a way that avoids the most politically sensitive questions and controversies.

Global social indicators have become a core point of interest of scholarship in law and other social sciences. The term ‘legitimacy’ is occasionally mentioned in this literature but without in-depth discussion. This paper aims to fill this gap by way of exploring the relationship between global social indicators and the concept of legitimacy. The crucial issue of such indicators is that, being drafted in a general fashion and based on a quantitative metric, they can be regarded as somehow ‘law-like’, thus raising questions about their legitimacy. This paper addresses these issues at both the general level of social theory and the operation of indicators in action.

Cultural appropriation is often defined as the ‘taking of intellectual property, cultural expressions or artefacts, history, and ways of knowledge’. Despite this apparent link to intellectual property, legal issues are only rarely mentioned in the current debate. Thus, to start with, this paper aims to fill this gap in identifying the possible bases in existing laws that may, at least in principle, justify claims of unlawful behaviour. As far as ethical considerations are concerned, the paper then notes a deep divide between those who fully endorse the notion of cultural appropriation and those who are resolutely opposed to it. This paper aims to give fair consideration to both sides of the argument, suggesting three categories of potentially unethical conduct. On this basis, the paper finally revisits possible legal responses from a normative perspective.

This paper examines the application of the latest iterations of EU data protection law – in the General Data Protection Regulation, the Law Enforcement Directive and the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the EU – to the use of predictive policing technologies. It suggests that the protection offered by this legal framework to those impacted by predictive policing technologies is, at best, precarious. Whether predictive policing technologies fall within the scope of the data protection rules is uncertain, even in light of the expansive interpretation of these rules by the Court of Justice of the EU. Such a determination would require a context-specific assessment that individuals will be ill-placed to conduct. Moreover, even should the rules apply, the substantive protection offered by the prohibition against automated decision-making can be easily sidestepped and is subject to significant caveats. Again, this points to the conclusion that the protection offered by this framework may be more illusory than real. This being so, there are some fundamental questions to be answered – including the question of whether we should be building predictive policing technologies at all.

The promulgation of the Turkish Civil Code of 1926, a nuanced translation of the Swiss Civil Code of 1907, has long been celebrated as an exceptionally thoroughgoing instance of ‘legal transplantation’. Despite their pervasiveness, such assessments cloud appreciation of the multifarious power dynamics at work in the Code’s preparation and implementation, especially the mechanisms through which it was made to serve Kemalist ideology’s twofold agenda of ‘modernising’ socio-legal relations while retaining – and, in certain instances, augmenting – those ‘traditional’ practices which early republican legislators and administrators found to be of especial value for their ‘nation-building’ project. The chief objective of this study is to reveal the inadequacies of the Turkish Civil Code’s standard characterisation as a ‘success story’ in comparative legal scholarship. Specifically, I demonstrate that the 1926 Code is best understood as the product of a deeply gendered tension between Kemalism’s dedication to a state-driven programme of national ‘modernisation’ and elements of the ‘tradition’ this programme was crafted for the sake of mobilising, radicalising and transforming.

Many constitutional questions in Israel are dealt with through the lens of the nation-state paradigm where the state is constitutionally associated with an ethnically and religiously defined majority group. Thus, many of the challenges that face Israeli society and the legal system are often presented as a result of an exceptionally antagonistic majority–minority relationship in a nation-state. This paper offers a novel way of analysing the Israeli constitutional regime using the framework of settler-colonialism. It argues that adding the settler-colonial lens will help better understand many features of Israeli constitutional law. Drawing on theoretical frameworks developed by theorists of colonialism, the paper explores a number of foundational aspects of Israeli constitutional law and demonstrates how they were shaped, and continue to be shaped, by settler-colonialism. The paper argues that settler-colonialism is one of the central features that animate Israeli constitutional law.

The article examines how the academic genre called the ‘anthropology of law’ or ‘legal anthropology’ developed under the disciplinary constraints of both the social and legal sciences. It first discusses its historical development and different trajectories and engages in a comparative analysis of similarities and differences between anthropologists, lawyers and sociologists of law. Finally, by looking at the ways in which cognitive and normative categories such as ‘legal anthropology’ are reproduced and changed through time, the article in itself is a legal anthropological exercise. The author concludes that there are hardly any identity markers left that would demarcate legal anthropology in a mutually exclusive way from other (sub)disciplines. The distinctiveness of legal anthropology rather lies in an accumulation of features, which make (legal) anthropology what it is, even if many features may be shared with other disciplines.

The globalisation of transitional justice as a framework for the resolution of conflicts is a remarkable phenomenon of the post-Cold War era (Bell and Craig, 2000). In different contexts this framework has significant consequences for women’s equality. This article asserts that a conceptualisation of gender that intersects with other dimensions of inequality in state formation provides an important tool for understanding contemporary transitional justice processes. This complex tool of intersectional analysis is used to explore the issue of women’s equality in Northern Ireland’s transition. This is applied to the problems of women’s absence from negotiations and the silence in these negotiations on matters to do with women’s day-to-day lives. The Good Friday/Belfast Agreement and the enactment of the equality legislation enacted in the Northern Ireland Act 1998 are the textual sites of analysis. These documents comprise the formal transitional framework for Northern Ireland. The article examines the theoretical tensions and practical implications inherent in universal claims for women’s equality in a situation where recognition of ‘difference’ is enshrined in both the equality legislation and the mechanisms for future democratic representation. The article concludes by suggesting that transitional justice discourse can benefit from the theoretical challenges posed by intersectionality and that social stability in NI and in other conflicted societies may be strengthened through addressing the corrosive impacts of inequality.

The paper examines the changing nature of publicity in the courts, tracing three distinct but interconnected phases of publicity using Jeremy Bentham's theory of open justice and publicity as a framework. The first phase is press coverage, with the news media chronicling the justice system for the general population, most recently including televised court proceedings. The second is the appointment of Courts Information Officers, occurring as early as the 1930s and growing in impact since the 1990s, established to facilitate the relationship between courts and the news media. The third and final phase is the Internet, including social media, resulting in changes to news media models and driving contemporary practices of court-generated media. The paper concludes that, while media and communication practices have changed radically since the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the concept of publicity has shifted, Bentham's approach to open justice remains salient for twenty-first-century courts’ communication.

The 2019 Global Health Security Index (GHS Index) assessed the US and the UK as the two countries best prepared to address a catastrophic pandemic. The preparedness rankings of this index have had little correlation with the actual experiences of COVID-19 in various countries. In explaining this disrepancy, the paper argues that better indicators and more data would not have fixed the problem. Rather, the prevailing paradigm of global health security that informs instruments such as the GHS Index needs to be interrogated. This dominant paradigm narrowly conceptualises global health security in terms of the availability of a technical infrastructure to detect emerging infectious diseases and prevent their contagion, but profoundly undertheorises the broader social and political determinants of public health. The neglect of social and political features is amplified in instruments such as the GHS Index that privilege universalised templates presumed to apply across countries but that prove to be inadequate in assessing how individual societies draw on their unique histories to craft public health responses.

In this paper, we seek to radically reframe the legal construct of consent from a disability perspective. Drawing on feminist scholarship and human rights standards around ‘free and informed consent’, we apply a concept of freedom to negotiate to laws regulating both consent to sex and medical treatment – key areas in which the legal agency of people with disabilities (especially people with cognitive disabilities) is routinely denied, restricted or ignored. We set out the essential ingredients for reframing consent: namely, legal personhood, freedom to negotiate and understanding. We also outline conditions (i.e. coercion, undue influence and power imbalances) that impede valid consent. This represents a first attempt to move beyond labelling adults with certain disabilities as lacking the ‘mental capacity’ necessary to give valid consent – in order to explore in more depth particular expressions of consent or refusal and seek new validity criteria, beyond the label of ‘mental incapacity’.

The comprehensible style of legal texts seems to be a predominantly linguistic problem. This is how the plain-legal-language movements present it. But, while plain-language statutes have been on the agenda for decades in every civilised country, laws still become more and more complicated. The paper attempts to explain this controversy. First, it argues that comprehensibility has more aspects beyond the linguistic or stylistic one. Sometimes it is the linguistically simplest texts that raise the most serious comprehensibility problems. The paper refers to two pieces of corpus linguistic research that provide evidence that vocabulary and grammar in themselves do not explain the incomprehensibility of the legal texts. Second, for a more subtle handling of the comprehensibility problem, the paper offers a framework of three typical pragmatic situations – the processual, the problem-solving and the compliance settings – where comprehensibility problems arise in different ways. The conclusion of the paper is that, contrary to the usual explanation that the main reason for incomprehensibility is that, in law, clarity and accuracy can be only employed at each other's expense, it is rather the systemic and interpretive character of law and the growing importance of technical rules that hinder the understanding of legal texts.

This paper will explore the difficulties facing law in promoting compassion and responding to caring relationships. These include the difficulties in determining whether a person has demonstrated compassion and in enforcing any legal requirement for compassion. The paper will use the ethics-of-care literature to critique two key legal tools: human rights and the concept of best interests. These concepts are typically designed to promote individualistic abstract understandings of the self, which are problematic when used in the setting of intimate relationships. However, this paper will suggest that it might not be necessary to abandon the concepts of rights and best interests. They may be useful for setting the boundaries for a space in which appropriate care and compassion can be exercised. It will also be suggested that both rights and best interests are not immune from a relational analysis and might, with appropriate modification, be used to promote the exercise of compassionate relational care.

Transableism is a term which refers to moving between states of being able and disabled by choice rather than by happenstance. Insofar as this may imply a choice to become dependent, claims upon the healthcare system are likely to result. In this piece we aim to explore some ethical and legal implications of such claims. In order to do so, we draw upon current debates over the place of autonomy, beneficence and paternalism in public health ethics, the taxonomy of disability and the status of persistent unexplained physical symptoms (PUPS).