This article critically examines the insights that biology (including evolutionary analysis and neuroscience data) offers for understanding the relationship between family law and family stability. The paper initially considers evolutionary analysis, comparative anatomy, and neuroscience data to conclude that while the pair bond appears to be a universal feature of human societies, long-term fidelity is not. The second part of the paper considers the benefits and limitations of evolutionary analysis concluding, first, that evolutionary analysis, without connection to modern neuroscience or sociological data, remains highly speculative; second, that where the evolutionary analysis is borne out by modern neuroscience and/or sociological data, it is more persuasive, but often leads to obvious conclusions; and third, that undertaking this type of examination nonetheless leads to new insights or new questions that should prompt productive research.

The Homelessness Reduction Act 2017 represents the most significant change to the rights of homeless people in England for decades. Through an analysis of the history of homelessness legislation in England, but focusing on the ‘ground-breaking’ 2017 Act, this paper explores how the homeless population is represented and ‘constructed’ in this new legislation and what this tells us about the place of homeless people in our society. In so doing, this paper exposes how the 2017 Act – a state instrument of apparent homelessness prevention – can be read and understood as contributing to rather than obviating the marginalisation and social exclusion of homeless people.

The international community has experimented with a variety of tools for promoting the rule of law in weak states, yet with few successes. An innovative tool is hybrid commissions not supplanting the justice system of the target state but fighting impunity from within it. In this contribution I therefore seek to identify the factors that render this novel mechanism of rule of law promotion effective, arguing that a set of factors – support from the Attorney-General, civil society and powerful donors; as well as the commission’s institutional design, its strategy, and the personality of the commissioner – will determine if the changes initiated by the hybrid lead to a deeper transformation of the host state, or if there will be a rule of law rollback as soon as the commission leaves the country.

Scholars have long argued that transnational legal indicators (TLIs) suffer from significant validity problems. In response to such critiques, the World Bank (WB) reformed its Doing Business (DB) legal indicators in 2014. This paper evaluates two important results of this reform: the WB distinguished between the quality and performance (efficiency) of law indicators and also claimed that they are positively correlated. I argue that this distinction is based on two different utilitarian perspectives; therefore, these indicators try to quantify different aspects of laws. However, new empirical tests indicate that they are not correlated. The statistical tests on the DB Resolving Insolvency Indicators do not show any strong correlation, and the case of Turkey's WB-led insolvency-law reform suggests that the developing countries can even incur efficiency losses from legal-quality improvements. Thus, this study demonstrates that the 2014 DB reform reproduced the validity problems inside the new distinctions and connections between its indicators, potentially creating new misconceptions for policy-makers.

Many cetaceans are borderline persons and, as such, have a right to life. This is partly a normative and partly a positive legal claim. While many philosophers agree that cetaceans possess limited moral rights, it can also be shown that most states already behave as though they possess limited legal rights. The most basic of these, the right to life, reflects shifting contemporary norms – especially given scientific evidence as to cetacean sentience, intelligence and autonomy – and the consolidation of customary international law. The recent decision of the International Court of Justice in Whaling in the Antarctic (2014) includes important obiter dicta to this effect and arguably suggests an avenue for future doctrinal development in this area. Nevertheless, while the cetacean right to life already exists, there are a number of obstacles that preclude its enforcement. Perhaps the most significant of these remain the traditional status of the world's oceans as a global commons and the weak sovereignty of international law.

Complexity and uncertainty often animate the desire for regulatory approaches seeking to fix, limit and constrain. But what if, instead of doubling down on ‘solid’ regulation, we also make room for ‘liquid’ regulatory approaches? We interrogate this question through deep empirical analysis of the developing regulatory framework around a form of Melanesian cultural property known as water music. We argue that, although both solid and liquid regulatory forms exist in all normative orders, we have recently seen an increasing emphasis on solid forms of regulation (legislation, registers, etc.) with respect to cultural property. As an effort to consider alternative approaches, we identify a range of liquid regulatory strategies drawing from our case-study. We show how attention to temporality, relationality and situatedness can impact upon the degree of liquidity of individual regulatory approaches, and how they can cumulatively impact the solidity or liquidity of the overall regulatory system. Finally, we identify the different ways in which gendered power and forms of accountability emerge in contexts of solid or liquid regulatory strategies.

It is observed in the Introduction of this special issue that the rule of law has been an integral part of the development of democratic systems of government in national states and features powerfully within contemporary ‘good-governance’ promotion in the Global South by development financial institutions (DFIs). However, the rule of law is predominantly used to emphasise the importance of stability of contract and protection of property in connection with transnational development projects (TDPs) and does not so much focus on the general stability of (e.g. indigenous) rights, access to justice and fairness. Thus, it is important to deviate from a narrow interpretation of the rule of law and include the role of all types of actors in safeguarding this rule of law.

This article examines the representations of law and legal actors offered within two classic American films: To Kill a Mockingbird and Judgment at Nuremberg. It has previously been argued that these films belong to a ‘heroic tradition’ within American cinema; one that idealises both men of law and man-made law and that had its golden age from the mid-1950s through to the end of the 1960s. It is argued here that these films offer a more complex and far less certain portrayal of the law and legal actors. This is examined first by considering the context in which these films were made, and second, the depictions of law and legal actors that they offer.

Sri Lanka’s Constitution authorises the state to limit certain fundamental freedoms on the grounds of specific public interests. This article examines how this constitutional limitation regime has become vulnerable to majoritarian influence. It uses a case study approach, supplemented by key informant interviews, to delve into Sri Lanka’s constitutional practice with respect to limitations on fundamental freedoms such as the freedom of religion or belief, and the freedom of expression. The article illustrates how organs of the Sri Lankan state have equated notions of ‘public interest’ with the majority community’s conceptions of ‘security’, ‘order’, ‘health’ and ‘morals’. It argues that this practice reflects a cleavage between the moral legitimacy and the legal claimability of fundamental freedoms of minorities and satirists in Sri Lanka. It concludes that legal regimes designed to guarantee fundamental freedoms offer very little protection to minorities when the underlying politics driving the application of law is majoritarian.

This paper analyses the visualisation of rape and sexual assault in legal and scholarly language. It begins with a critique of the Court of Appeal ruling in R v. Evans (Chedwyn) and its forensic examination of the details of a female rape complainant's consensual sexual activity with other men. The case is analysed in light of a visual metaphor used by Ellison and Munro to describe the removal of popular misconceptions about rape. The paper contextualises that discussion with reference to the idea of the male gaze and its affirmation of a phallocentric cultural and social world in which the objectification of female difference is entrenched. The paper finally challenges that assessment, however, sketching an alternative approach to visual-critical scholarship that embraces interdisciplinarity and a literary sensibility to break (or at least to loosen) the association between the prurient eye of the male voyeur and the criminal justice gaze.

There is a remarkable resonance between recent findings about medical malpractice litigation and theories about the evolution of co-operation and reciprocity among humans. This should not be altogether surprising: theories of reciprocity seek to explain the behaviours we exhibit when we interact to punish or confer benefits on each other; while civil liability litigation may be just one of modern society’s ways of compelling otherwise unrequited reciprocity. The link between the two fields of study is worth exploring nonetheless. Just as behavioural economics and evolutionary theory offer useful insights for those of us who study legal phenomena, data about the behaviour of people accessing legal institutions may be useful to those who build behavioral theories. This essay is therefore, in a way, a lawyer’s effort to return the favour.

The issue of women serving as judges has been a contentious one in Egyptian society for nearly eight decades. While other Muslim majority countries started appointing women judges as early as the 1950s and 1960s, it was not until 2003 that the Egyptian government announced the appointment of its first ever female judge. Despite the approval of Egypt's religious scholars, her appointment was fiercely contested, among both the general public and the legal profession. In this paper we explore the question of why the appointment of women as judges provokes so much controversy in Egyptian society, and in the judiciary in particular. We show that the debate reveals a preoccupation with the proper place of women in society. With both traditionally educated religious scholars and people lacking formal religious training justifying their point of view by resorting to religious argumentation, the debate is also a clear example of the fragmentation of religious authority in Islam.

Based on an ethnographic study located in Botswana, I move beyond conceptions of the local as physically or territorially grounded to one that examines how it is constituted through links between persons and land derived from life histories extended over several generations. This not only takes account of a specific site in which social relations are bounded and locally constituted but also of how perceptions of locality are discursively and historically constructed. Viewing land as both a tangible and intangible universe constructed through social relationships, I highlight ways in which individuals, as part of a ‘local’ community, find their life courses shaped by wider transnational and global processes, including law, that have an impact on their everyday lives. For some, this provides opportunities for upward mobility and future gains, while others find scope for action severely curtailed. In documenting these uneven, diverse effects of globalisation, what emerges are processes of ‘internalisation’ and ‘relocalisation’ of global conditions, allowing for the emergence of new identities, alliances and struggles for space and power within specific populations. Thus what exists in the here and now as a form of temporality is constantly remade, drawing on the past while fashioning new prospects for the future.

This article explores the cultural and legal contexts in which the construction of childhood sexual abuse has taken place over the past three decades in the United States. It also explores a theoretical debate that pits ‘logico-scientific’ accounts of reality against narrative accounts of reality. This debate is of central importance to the study of social and legal responses to childhood sexual abuse, which is categorised in this article as a problem of sexual and domestic violence from a feminist perspective. Some feminists argue that narratives may serve an empowering function in legal and other institutions by giving voice and legitimacy to survivors of sexual and domestic violence. Other feminists argue that narratives of domestic and sexual abuse that fail to identify the social systems of inequality associated with abuse may produce hyper-individualistic and depoliticising accounts of these problems. In this article, the author argues, with Ewick and Silbey, that it is possible to specify the kinds of narratives that contribute to political discourse and confrontation surrounding issues of childhood sexual abuse. The strategic use of social science and expert testimony in criminal and civil court cases, the construction and cultural significance of autobiographical narratives, and the proliferation of narratives in popular media that deal with child sexual abuse are all discussed. It is argued that autobiographical accounts of child sexual abuse, such as those of Dorothy Allison and Maya Angelou, internally illuminate the contexts of inequality which perpetuate abuse and shape the lives of survivors, while discourses in legal institutions and popular media tend to reproduce hegemonic constructions of women, children, and the problem of childhood sexual abuse.

This paper elaborates what the author considers to be a promising alternative to the orthodox ‘conflict model’ of pregnancy: a model of adjudication based on an understanding of pregnancy as a property relationship. The conflict model, which purports to balance the rights and interests of the pregnant woman against those of the foetus, is now widely acknowledged to be unsatisfactory. This paper argues for the complete abandonment of the conflict model in all its guises, and the adoption of a new ‘property model’ of pregnancy. The property model, it is argued, has several distinct advantages over traditional or orthodox ways of debating and adjudicating pregnancy: it explains and justifies features which currently appear as inconsistencies or contradictions in the current law, and provides possible solutions to contested issues such as surrogacy, the ‘rights’ of fathers in decision-making about pregnancy, and the role of the state in setting limits on abortion.

This paper uses the last few decades’ developments in the area of shared parenting to explore power within the framework of autopoietic theory. It traces how, prompted by turbulence from the political subsystem, family law has made several unsuccessful attempts to solve the perceived problem of post-separation dual-household parenting. It agrees with Luhmann and Teubner that closed autopoietic systems’ developments are limited by their normative and cognitive frameworks, and also argues that changes which have occurred in family law show that closed social systems do not function in total isolation. It considers power as ego's ability to limit alter's choices. In our functionally differentiated society, with its recent proliferation of communication, power appears more diffuse and impossible to plot into causal one-way relationships.

Lord Kames (Henry Home) (1696–1782) was a well-known jurist, philosopher and judge in the Scottish Enlightenment, whose writings on aesthetics and literary criticism, especially, were very significant in the eighteenth century and later, not only in Britain and the United States, but also in France and Germany. His works on law and legal history were important mainly during his lifetime, but at least one aspect of his legal writings deserves special attention today: his concept of property, which he never stated as one comprehensive theory. Nevertheless, it pervades most of his work. This article seeks to extract and piece together, from a number of his legal and non-legal works, the elements of this quite original property theory which comprises legal-doctrinal, philosophical-theoretical, historical, sociological and psychological, aesthetic-moral and economic aspects. Together these elements can be restated as a surprisingly coherent property system, which may enrich discussions in modern property theory.