This article studies Western (primarily Anglophone) representations of the Dan people (boat people) and the boat clusters on which they lived, relative to the mainland, in the island city of Guangzhou, focusing on 1842–1900. A change occurred over time, as the Dan went from being in close interaction with Westerners prior to the Opium Wars to being peripheral to Western interests and activities. This shift is evident in Western writings, and negative representations of the Dan came to dominate in the late nineteenth century. This mirrored changing sociospatial power relations between Westerners and the terrestrial Chinese, as Westerners increasingly gained access to the onshore city of Guangzhou itself, in part from the colonial island enclave of Shamian. Changing crosscultural interactions affected how the Chinese Others were perceived and ultimately how the Chinese whole was intertextually constructed in Western colonial discourse.

When do smaller states defer to and when do they defy stronger powers? How and why? This article traces and explains the changing patterns of deference and defiance in Malaysia's China policy. There are three findings. First, deference and defiance are essential elements in all inter-state relations, especially asymmetric ones. The greater the power asymmetry, the greater the inclination to defer and defy. Second, states often pursue defiance and deference concurrently and selectively, with approaches adapted in accordance with changing external and internal conditions. The concurrent adoption of the two behaviors often manifest in hedging, an insurance-seeking policy aimed at offsetting multiple risks by counteracting the effects of the other behavior: deference without defiance risks subservience and dependency; defiance without deference invites hostility and confrontation. Third, the specific patterns and proportions of the deference–defiance mix are attributable more to domestic than external determinants, i.e., the needs to balance security, prosperity, and autonomy, as necessitated by the prevailing pathways of elite legitimation. This explains why Malaysia's open deference vis-à-vis China has been accompanied by an indirect and quiet defiance especially in recent years, as best evidenced by the second Mahathir administration's dualistic approaches toward the Belt and Road, South China Sea, and Xinjiang.

This article is an institutional study on the history of the ill-fated Wusong Railway, China's first operational railway. The nine-mile light railway was built by the British firm Jardine, Matheson & Co. without the Qing government's permission. After negotiations with British diplomats, the Qing government agreed to purchase the line but the reformist governor-general Shen Baozhen later ordered it to be removed to Taiwan. Unfortunately funds were never provided for the rebuilding work. This article argues that it was the Qing government's failure to raise funds for capital-intensive projects that led to the railway's final destruction.

It has become known that the Confucius Institute (CI) and the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (Qiaoban) are operated as tools of state-led mechanism, or Chinese statecraft with the ultimate goal of expanding China's cultural soft power. Following the direction, Xi Jinping has been pushing the notion of the “Chinese dream,” focusing on the realm of Chinese traditional culture and launching a new state-led mechanism. This article examines an emerging state-led mechanism known as “Chinese Homeland Bookstores” (CHBs), which was proposed by a provincial government-financed state-owned enterprise, and recently expanded to Thailand and various Mekong countries. I contend that the entities, such as CHBs and also CI and Qiaoban, are being extensively utilized as part of a larger state apparatus supporting the regime's Chinese traditional culture campaign. However, the CHB case and those of other government-led institutions illustrate how they combine nation-state work with market-oriented business strategies, to effectively promote Chinese culture “going out” with a focus on financial sustainability.

After the Kuomintang of China (KMT) succeeded the Japanese government in Taiwan in 1945, officials continued to apply the then current method of categorizing Taiwanese aborigines into nine groups. However, since the 1980s, many aboriginal groups have launched Name Rectification Campaigns calling for “independence” from their originally designated groups.

Dutch records in the seventeenth century identify the Sakizaya as a distinct people, different from the Amis. The decline of the Sakizaya was initiated in 1878 by the Jia-Li-Wan event. After defeat by Qing soldiers, the Sakizayas obscured their identities by mixing themselves among the Amis. By the time that the Japanese began their ethnographic research in the early twentieth century, the Sakizayas had become relatively “Amis-ized,” and were regarded as a sub-branch of the Amis for both academic and official purposes. The Sakizaya's new ethnic group movement was initiated in 1990. Seventeen years later, on January 17, 2007, the Sakizaya gained official recognition as an independent aboriginal group.

This article intends to investigate the strategies of movement activists. It not only examines the concept of cultural construction, but also explains why this concept is so important in understanding the case of the Sakizaya.

What is the role of nostalgia in our increasingly dynamic and interconnected world? This special issue, Mobilizing Nostalgia in Asia, assesses the mobilization of nostalgia in the changing international order, and within individuated socioeconomic and cultural spheres. Its four articles examine the political and social dynamics that evoke, utilize, amend, and manipulate nostalgia for collective present needs and demands. This Introduction connects the issue's four contributions to three interconnected themes: the power of nostalgia, the plurality of nostalgia, and nostalgia as a process of creation.

Inside and outside China, it has been widely believed that in premodern China common people did not bring civil cases to magistrate's courts but settled them at the level of their clan, village or guild. However, David C. Buxbaum's research based on the Dan-Xin Archive and Shiga Shu¯zo¯'s study of legal memoranda show that people quite regularly turned to the magistrate's court to resolve civil disputes. During the Qing dynasty, legal cases were divided, not in civil or criminal terms, but according to how serious the offence was. The less-serious offences were civil cases that included disputes concerning marriage and inheritance, land and property, money and loans, and minor battery. Whereas the latter category, criminal cases in today's terms, were handled with the intention of maintaining legal stability, magistrates involved with civil cases tried to strike a reasonable balance by examining each case on an individual basis. However, how the law was applied to civil cases remains a subject for future research.

How to conceptualize the broad dissemination of economic concepts in colonial South Asia? This article uses an essay by a mid-nineteenth-century Bengali, Peary Chand Mittra, as a point of departure to approach this problem in South Asian historiography. In the first part, the essay locates the conditions of possibility for Mittra's political-economic analysis of Bengal's agrarian social order within an imperial and commercial space of extended interdependencies. The aim is not to explain the specificity of Mittra's politics so much as to highlight his recourse to political-economic concepts to ground his analysis. In the second part, the essay suggests that the grounding of political economy's colonial histories within histories of imperial space needs to be supplemented by closer attention to new normative impulses and aspirations emerging directly from agrarian society in the region. This second emphasis provides better grounds for grasping the depth and durability of political economy's reach into political and ethical claims across social space in the Subcontinent in the twentieth century. It thus broaches the necessity of subaltern histories of political economy.

The two most notable forms of law in the Ming and Qing periods were state law and private contracts. They were thought to exist separately, as the saying went: “The state has laws while individuals have private contracts.” Scholars have also held the same view; they have contrasted the two, defining the former as vertical, authoritative and a political tool to govern the state, and the latter as horizontal, voluntary and a tool to regulate economic activities of individuals. Social agreements that were instituted in order to maintain order in villages, however, had characteristics of both; on one hand they were contracts drawn up voluntarily by the villagers, but on the other hand, they also had the aspect of commands given by village leaders for ordinary members to observe. The opening section looks at studies that have been made on written law and private contracts. The following section examines how village compacts were instituted and how they were enforced. Three types of village compact are examined – village regulations, village compacts based on the Confucian moral code, and alliances connected with rent-resistance movements. Part Two will discuss the nature of coercive commands and voluntary contracts, both of which commonly coexisted in a unique mixture in village compacts, and will then expand the conclusion drawn from the discussion above to the level of the state, to present a new framework for understanding the relationship between statutory law and private contracts, and that between state authority and social power.

Dissemination of a scientific theory often follows a circuitous route. It is a widespread notion supported by eminent scholars that the noted linguist and religious scholar F. Max Müller is responsible for the dissemination of the Aryan Invasion Theory (AIT), and thus played into the hands of imperial interests. In this article, we argue that there were other stakeholders in the process of the widespread acceptance of AIT. In particular, Brahmo Samaj, a prominent socio-religious reform association in nineteenth-century India, also played a major role in the spreading of AIT. Prominent leaders of Brahmo Samaj, actively or passively, collaborated with Müller in that process. We closely examine the development of affairs during that time and attempt to establish that the development of a scientific theory is not a unilateral process, but rather strongly influenced by the socio-political environments of the time.

The historical waterfront of Shanghai known as the Bund, one of the most impressive architectural landscapes in Asia, was described in the 1930s in Fortune magazine as having “the tallest buildings outside the American continent; the biggest hoard of silver in the world” and being “the cradle of new China”.1 At a time when the US economy was in ruins and much of China was besieged by civil war, Shanghai's foreign concessions provided a safe haven for Chinese and foreign investors. With the influx of hot money, Shanghai experienced an unprecedented building boom. Notable among these real estate developers was Sir Ellice Victor Elias Sassoon (1881–1961, hereafter Victor Sassoon) who transferred much of his wealth from India to Shanghai and then transformed the Shanghai skyline. Inspired by American skyscrapers, Sassoon decided to build the first skyscraper in Shanghai, which would also be the first in the Eastern hemisphere, even though Shanghai's muddy ground had never supported a building of that height before. This article documents how the evolution of treaty port architecture in China owed much to Victor Sassoon. Its innovations – from the advent of skyscrapers, with their Art Deco style and mixed-use function, to the engineering methods and financial arrangements that built them – bore Sassoon's stamp. As will be seen, Sassoon's experiment paid off handsomely.

In the currency system of early modern Japan, concurrent with gold coins and silver ingots issued under monopoly by the Tokugawa shogunal government from the beginning of its rule, in 1636 a new standard for copper coins was introduced with the Kan'ei tsūhō 寛永通宝, and subsequently a three-currency system spread throughout the country. Prior to that, no central Japanese authority had issued its own copper currency since the ancient imperial court discontinued minting coins bearing its own era-names in the tenth century. In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, imitation Chinese Song copper coins minted domestically, known as kyōsen 京銭, played an indispensable role in interregional payments, while separate regional coinages circulated in many of the feudal domains. Imitation Song coins from Japan were also in such strong demand in Southeast Asia that merchants Japanese as well as foreign made large profits by exporting them. The decision to mint the Kan'ei tsūhō arose in part from a strategy to unify the currency domestically, and also to prevent further production and export of the kyōsen at a time when the Tokugawa government was seeking to limit and control foreign trade. This study explores the context in which the Kan'ei tsūhō was introduced, drawing on both documentary and archaeological evidence, to establish a more comprehensive picture of the new coinage than has previously been available. It will be demonstrated that currency unification within the Japanese archipelago represented a breakaway from the East Asian currency sphere, which was dominated by purer silver ingots and Song coins, both originals and later imitations. As a result of the diffusion of the Kan'ei tsūhō, coins circulating domestically tended to become increasingly homogenized nationwide, though in fact a greater degree of regionality and stratification remained than has previously been thought.

This article explores some of the benefits and limitations of Cultural Studies in Asian studies with particular reference to the expression of Asian-Australian identity in diaspora. It has been suggested that the influence of Cultural Studies – a discipline that is viewed as more globally relevant – may be an answer to the Asian studies “crisis”. In relation to the Cultural Studies approach to Asian-Australian identity, I argue that the discourse and rhetoric of Cultural Studies is highly beneficial in breaking down stereotypes and rebuilding the national narrative of identity. However, as a methodology it is not without limitations.

One early spring afternoon in 1982 I happened to find myself ambling along Fuzhou Road in Shanghai and coming by chance upon a small unattractive bookstore. The brown paint on its outer doors was peeling, the stucco surface of its exterior needed a good scrubbing, and more than a few tiles on its floor were broken. If then no different in appearance from the other bookstores I had earlier visited along this famous Shanghai book street, this store nonetheless boasted a strikingly different kind of stock: it specialized in selling second-hand Western books. While novels abounded on its shelves, the pre-war variety in hardback and the more recent in paperback, one thick non-fiction volume caught my eye. Entitled Domesday Book and Beyond, this classic 1887 treatment of early English history by the great English legal historian Frederic W. Maitland had long been on my reading list. Somehow a copy of it had ended up in this unpromising bookshop. When I opened the virtually virgin pages of this copy and noticed that it could be bought for a proverbial song, I readily leapt to the temptation and acquired it with delight.

This paper investigates perceptions of courtesans, gender and power from various perspectives, using both literary and non-literary sources and reconstructed lost books. Analysis focuses on representations of the celebrated courtesan, poet and painter Xue Susu (fl. 1575–before 1652) by writers of different backgrounds, gender and class. In late Ming times women participated in elite culture in unprecedented numbers. Courtesans gained prominence in the literati arts, playing a formative role in shaping cultural ideals. Late imperial Chinese discourse embeds the image of the courtesan in the formation of new beauty ideals and social negotiations of gender roles and power. Paradoxes abound, linking the courtesan with notions of chivalry, chastity and loyalism and depicting her in the context of national politics and warfare. The Ming/Qing texts reflect not only current perceptions of women and courtesans, but also the social and cultural aspirations, dreams, anxieties and desires of their authors.

In a single serving of boba tea, the non-human actors of the tall plastic cups, plastic dome lids, and the giant plastic straws dominate, but receive little attention. This article uses recent theories and discussions of new materialism to bring together cultural analysis of the boba tea consumption phenomenon that could be relevant for reflecting on a sustainable future. The article contributes to social research of waste by focusing on the mediating functions of plastic before it becomes waste. My central argument is that plastic is not merely a physical and impartial container in the contemporary food and beverage industry. It plays an indispensable role in the visualization, mass mediation, and consumption of the boba tea beverage. While current waste research often focuses on the “afterlife” of plastic waste as it relates to underclass waste workers, recycling economy and global waste trade, this article highlights the performative function of plastic as it changes the way we imagine time, gender, and waste. I show it is the plastic cup that enables boba tea to be so visually and gastronomically satisfying in an age when the photogenicity and “Instagrammability” of food and beverage have become more relevant to taste and distinctions.

Starting from the premise that all empire building involves ideological constructs justifying the violence that accompanies such efforts, this article concentrates on elucidating the case of the Portuguese in Asia, specifically in Japan. Although well beyond the formal Portuguese thalassocracy in Asia, the Japanese islands were exposed for about a century, between 1543 and 1640, to the informal presence of Portuguese traders and missionaries. The symbiotic relationship between these two groups was based on the experience that, in Japan, the trade was difficult to conduct, for violence was always lurking beneath the surface of the trading relationship. We know of several instances when such violence actually exploded into major armed clashes, and many other times violence was narrowly averted through the mediation of the missionaries.

Based on original research in the archives of Portugal and Spain, this article analyzes the records that the leaders of the Portuguese who came to Japan in the sixteenth century, the so-called capitães mores, have left behind. Finding that a significant number of these men were or later became members of the Order of Christ or were closely related to such members, it then explores their mindset through a survey of the function of this military order in Portuguese society of the late Middle Ages. The result is a group portrait of thirty-seven men who may be considered a representative sample of the Portuguese leading both the formal and informal empires in Asia. This portrait will clarify why both Japanese and Portuguese authorities agreed, at least during the second half of the sixteenth century, that the Jesuit missionaries were an indispensable presence in Japan.

This article attempts to demonstrate that the notion of “Islamic world” was a creation of the modern age, emanating from north-western Europe in the nineteenth century. The term incorporates two opposing ideological meanings: on the one hand, Europe representing modern, positive values is set against the Islamic world, representing pre-modern, minus values, while on the other hand, the Islamic world was the common bond among all Muslims for their solidarity and unification against European colonialism. The article goes on to investigate why, how and when precisely the two concepts of “Islamic world” were created under the influence of modern European thought. It is stressed that in much of today's discourse too we can still perceive the two different meanings of the term, and this has often led to confusion and misunderstanding in discussion. Modern historians have played a role in substantiating the ideology of the “Islamic world”, because modern historiography has often described political objectives as actual reality.