The evolving global order and regional dynamics have profoundly impacted China-Southeast Asia relations. As the world grapples with the geopolitical implications of intensified US-China competition, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations countries find themselves navigating a complex interplay of opportunities and challenges. The US-led Indo-Pacific strategy has significantly reshaped the geopolitical landscape, yet Southeast Asia’s relations with China are marked by interwoven challenges and opportunities. This special issue includes six papers that cover Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia, and the Philippines, illustrating how small and medium-sized states navigate an increasingly multipolar world. A central theme across the papers in this special issue is the critical role of domestic factors in shaping each country’s relationship with China.

The only extant complete Ekottarikāgama, viz. Zengyi ahan jing 增壹阿含經 T125, has presented modern scholarship with significant challenges. This study departs from the assumption, demonstrated in prior work, that the extant collection is due to *Dharmanandin and Zhu Fonian (and not Saṅghadeva, as wrongly held by tradition and the Taishō). The study first systematically reviews and coordinates prior scholarship on a number of possible anomalous features of T125, such as possible Mahāyāna-ish elements, Sarvāstivādin elements, merged discourses, and material found only late in Pāli and other mainstream canonical parallels. We show that these anomalies are not evenly distributed, but cluster in certain patches of the collection. The second part of the study then presents new, internal (stylistic) evidence that shows that these anomalies tend to be correlated with evidence that associates some discourses in the collection with Zhu Fonian's style in original works, and with later texts. On this basis, we argue that the collection underwent modification after the death of Dao'an 道安 in 385, and suggest, more speculatively, that some of these modifications likely stemmed from the hand of Zhu Fonian.

From 1860 to 1900, a modern system of property rights emerged in the International Settlement in Shanghai. This paper examines the largely overlooked process by which the Shanghai Municipal Council (SMC) brought about a system of well-functioning property rights through land surveys, mapping, and assessments. These methods worked hand-in-hand with road planning and construction in facilitating the expansion of the International Settlement to the Chinese-controlled area. Colonial officials, merchants, and Chinese intellectuals worked collectively and sometimes separately to generate knowledge about land and property by translating terms in the Chinese tradition. It argues that the efforts in institution-building and translation helped normalize the definition of property rights as things exclusively owned, strengthening the SMC's control over the land in Shanghai. These processes illuminate the relationship between empire-making and property rights by showing how property rights emerged and functioned in a semi-colonial context where multiple foreign authorities coexisted with the local government. The relatively secure system of property rights, which both foreign and Chinese merchants exploited, formed the foundation of a prosperous Shanghai in the twentieth century.

In this article we explore the practical conditions of ritual practices of Hui and Uyghur Muslims in China. Ceaseless conflicts among different religious ideas and elements exist, but they are integrated into religious pluralism, which meets the needs of Muslims' daily practices. Furthermore, we probe the reasons for the resulting religious harmony through investigating the historical process of the formation of religious pluralism, and showing present ritual performances in which there is a hierarchically built ritual structure functioning to make religious integration possible, though different opinions regarding diverse religious elements occur elsewhere among Hui and Uyghur Muslims. Finally, the discussion supports the related assertion that rituals can be reliable and effective ways of understanding the sociological and psychological functions of religions, or religious beliefs, and other related socio-cultural realities.

This article provides the first in-depth systematic comparison of foreign banking in pre-World War I China and Japan. As the article shows, after their entry into China and Japan, the presence and activities of foreign banks in China and Japan differed markedly, with these banks developing a much more prominent position in China. Making use of sources in German, English, Chinese, and Japanese, this article aims to explain why foreign banks in China and Japan developed so differently before World War I. It does so by first providing an overview of the development of foreign banks in both countries and then discussing their activities and development with regards to Chinese and Japanese financial institutions, trade finance, and public finance. The article shows that it was Japan's emphasis on financial reforms that led to the limited presence of foreign banks in that country.

This paper analyzes the Jin Yong novel The Deer and the Cauldron through the lens of Etienne Balibar's theory of super-nationalism and supranationalism. The novel employs a pan-Asian racial ideology to expand national identity from Han Chinese to other ethnic groups (supranationalism) by introducing a racial Other, white Europeans, to unify warring groups. Simultaneously, Han culture is consistently uplifted as superior (super-nationalism). A critical sequence features the Kangxi Emperor asserting his legitimacy as the ruler of China to the protagonist Wei Xiaobao by claiming the Mandate of Heaven has passed from the Ming to the Qing dynasty. However, Han Chinese gallants and intellectuals constantly challenge his legitimacy because, as a Manchu, he is considered foreign. To resolve this issue, Wei Xiaobao begins constructing a racial national framework that includes Manchus. This paper further argues that Wei Xiaobao's moral relativism, unusual for a protagonist in martial arts fiction, enables the flexibility to redefine Chinese identity on racial grounds instead of moral or cultural. The Deer and the Cauldron illustrates the transition from the Mandate of Heaven to modern nation-state ideology in China, in the form of an irreverent martial arts fiction novel, crafted by the genre's greatest master.

This study investigates the impact of warfare on nuptial patterns, focusing on the trends and characteristics of age differences within marriage. Specifically, it explores the socio-demographic outcomes of the Imjin War (1592–1598) and post-war reconstruction in Korea, using the earliest extant Chosŏn household registers, compiled between 1606 and 1630. Individual-level microdata were derived involving 2,336 married couples based on 11,749 entries in these registers, covering four administrative districts located in the southeastern region of the Korean peninsula severely devastated by the war. Factors such as status, property, warfare, social practices, and legal regulations influenced spousal age differences. First, social rank and family wealth played pivotal roles, with age gaps widening as a husband's socio-economic status increased. Second, females born after 1580, whose first marriages were affected by the Imjin War and post-war circumstances, experienced an average marital age gap of about ten years. Third, this effect was further complicated by the imposition of socio-legal rules on remarriage; that is, the yangban entailed a pronounced age difference owing to the Neo-Confucian norm of chaste widowhood. This study enriches the understanding of historical marriage customs in Korea and offers insights for studies on age disparity in marriage.

This article explores the militarisation of the North Korean police and the establishment of specialised units, including the Railroad and Maritime Police, and the Korean-Manchurian border guard. The analysis primarily draws from unpublished Soviet archival material. Contrary to the assumption that strengthening the North Korean police under Soviet military administration was aimed at providing a backbone to the North Korean regime, our examination reveals that, at least initially, it was driven by the urgent need to address immediate challenges in public security. The initial crisis arose with anti-trusteeship protests and worsened when the Soviets initiated land reform, coinciding with a series of terrorist attacks against North Korean politicians and Soviet military units. The article also sheds light on the background processes that led to the creation of specialised police units such as the Railroad Police and the Maritime Police. Contrary to common perceptions, these units were not designed to become military units from the outset. Soviet documents clearly reveal that their primary function was to assist the Soviets in guarding the North Korean railroad and coastline. The Soviets initiated and controlled the establishment of the Korean-Manchurian border guard to address issues on the northern border of Korea.

Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, China extended significant medical aid to international communities, aiming to combat the virus's spread and foster global solidarity. However, despite the appreciation expressed by recipient governments for China's assistance, the general public's perception of China did not significantly improve. This prompts the question: why did China's COVID-19 health diplomacy fail to resonate with foreign audiences? This article delves into the cases of Thailand and the Philippines to argue that public perceptions of countries providing aid can be heavily influenced by domestic political dynamics, particularly when incumbent governments already face legitimacy challenges prior to aid delivery. By scrutinizing the implementation of China's aid and the state-to-state relations between China and incumbent governments, political opposition forces can exploit any shortcomings or missteps, placing blame squarely on the incumbents. Given the existing distrust toward incumbent governments, the public is more inclined to accept messages propagated by opposition groups, thereby hindering any positive shift in perception toward China. This perspective complements existing research that predominantly focuses on the diplomatic strategies of donor countries, suggesting instead that the domestic politics of host countries play a pivotal role in shaping the effectiveness of foreign nations' efforts to cultivate favorable images among foreign audiences.

Post-independence national historical writings have often been seen as a product of nationalist advocacy and modern nation-state formation. Moving beyond this perspective, this article considers how political leaders took a direct role in promoting different kinds and forms of collective historical thoughts to strengthen their leadership. Specifically, the article explores an active engagement of independent Cambodia's leaders such as Prince Sihanouk, Lon Nol, and Pol Pot, who independently saw national historical understanding as one's own monopolized source of power. It also discusses how different historical accounts in the country were shaped by, and kept up with, other important factors such as Cold War confrontations and regional and global historiographical trends, including “Modernist” and “Marxist” approaches. Discussing these factors helps us understand more critically national historical accounts, which were closely intertwined with specific socioreligious and political circumstances such as political rule and legitimacy, widespread public anxieties, and geopolitical tensions. It also sheds light on the substantial impact of state-imposed historical interpretations on society. As informed by the Cambodian case, this impact can be seen in the implementation of state projects stirred by certain kinds of historical understanding which consequently transformed the living conditions of thousands of people.

From the seventeenth to the twentieth century, rivers played a key role in the colonization of Hokkaido, a northern island in the Japanese archipelago. The Kushiro River, in eastern Hokkaido, was transformed into infrastructure, a process which shaped the institutions, strategies, and practices of territorial control during the transition from the Tokugawa shogunate (1603–1868) to Imperial Japan (1868–1947). Trade between local Ainu communities and the shogunate's vassals contributed to a river-based territoriality. Later in the 1800s, as the island became territory of the modern state, the river was further converted into infrastructure through settler colonialism, industrial development, land reclamation, and the dispossession of indigenous communities. This transformation empowered the state to probe territories, exert control over labor, and access natural resources. Drawing on research on the political ecology of rivers, this paper focuses on two hydrosocial functions that emerged during the process of reworking river basins into legible and governable spaces: the transportation conduit and the water delivery system. The river's transition from a living system to infrastructure coincided with and furthered the establishment of colonial settlements and the expansion of the Japanese state's imperial reach.

In Japan, the discipline of food culture studies has developed since the 1970s under the initiative of Naomichi Ishige. Ishige's works have been referenced widely, but no one has attempted a critical reading of his writings. Therefore, the objective of this paper was to trace his life and contributions to the development of Asian food culture studies. Ishige's first contribution was to identify the commonality in Asian food cultures, tightly connected to rice and umami. Second, Ishige greatly contributed to institutionalising an interdisciplinary dialogue on food cultures in Japan and Asia. In fact, food culture studies are a product of food modernity because their disciplinary development has been conditioned by an increasing globalisation of food systems and the collapse of modern family systems since the 1970s and 1980s. Third, this paper analyses Ishige's food philosophy. Unlike Asian food culture studies in general, which mainly focuses on the genealogy of specific foods and dietary practices before modernisation, Ishige was also a careful observer of food modernity. His food philosophy, backed by long-term civilisational perspectives, was full of balanced ideas about how to cope with the loss of family meals, economic inequalities, and the rise of nutritional sciences during his period.

In the past, Vietnam was impacted by numerous epidemics, particularly during the Nguyễn Dynasty from 1802 to 1883. Based on data from the Đại Nam Thực Lục (1961) (The Veritable Records of the Great South), this article investigates the frequency and nature of these epidemics, identifies the types of common diseases at that time, and explores the underlying causes of these outbreaks. The study further examines the Nguyễn Dynasty's strategies for managing these health crises. During these outbreaks, the dynasty faced significant challenges, with frequent epidemics leading to high death rates, widespread social disruption, and economic decline. The dynasty's primary preventive measures, heavily reliant on spiritual practices like prayer, highlight the limited medical understanding at the time and the constraints of its socio-political framework. However, there was a progressive shift towards the incorporation of Western medical innovations, particularly in the vaccine approach to treat diseases like smallpox. This transition not only marked a critical evolution in the local healthcare approach but also set the stage for more systematic medical advancements in Vietnam during the colonial period (1884–1945).

During the “steam century” between 1830 and 1930, major political and economic entities in Europe, Asia, and the Americas became increasingly connected by steam navigation and railway transportation. Against this global backdrop, steam navigation was established and became regular on the formidable Upper Yangzi River in China between the 1870s and the 1920s. This breakthrough hinged on developments in the methods of tackling rapids (tan) – fierce and unpredictable currents descending like small waterfalls. Previous studies have mostly focused on how agents of the British Empire and other imperial powers tried to solve such constraints in steam navigation through charts, sailing directions, and other initiatives to make the Upper Yangzi riverscape legible. Incorporating previously unused archives, this article highlights how local environmental and social conditions shaped the steam shipping system on the Upper Yangzi River. This article argues that rapids, as well as local boatmen's experiential knowledge of them, propelled British and other foreign agents to transform their ways of organizing steam shipping in terms of vessel design, crew recruitment, and infrastructure allocation. More broadly, this article exemplifies the need to look beyond imperial agents and employ more locally situated perspectives to explain the technological developments underlying the modern world.

The ideological conflicts of Japan's subnational politics have tended to be interpreted as either being largely muted or contained within national dimensions. Following two decades of substantial decentralization and growing local autonomy, however, a diversity of new ideological responses to local issues have appeared. These include neo-liberal parties and executives in wealthier regions such as Tokyo and Osaka or a rising regionalist identity politics such as that found in Okinawa. Nativist right and populist left along with single-issue parties are also now fielding candidates for subnational elections. Despite this increasingly crowded field, there is still no systematic understanding of the divergent ideological worldviews and dimensions of conflict operating at the subnational level. Nor do we know how these worldviews “deviate” from the traditional “norm” of a progressive vs. conservative conflict dimension assumed to characterize Japanese subnational politics. This paper begins to fill this gap by investigating the campaign discourse of gubernatorial candidates both before and after the pandemic outbreak. We find that the language, and underlying ideological orientation, of these candidates can be separated into four clusters: “mainstream”, “old left”, “neo-liberal”, and “fringe”. In addition, “regionalist” and “new left” populism can also be identified in select elections.

Pandemics present opportunities for states to acquire emergency powers by narrativizing pandemics as “acts of God,” “acts of war,” “acts of outsiders,” “sanitation-hygiene,” or “acts of the invisible enemy.” These narratives conveniently justify the imposition of undefined and often unrestrained constitutional or extra-constitutional emergency powers to reshape individual, social, and governance modalities. These narratives conveniently establish the setting for states to justify the imposition of broad emergency powers by determining the plot of pandemic-appropriate modalities for individuals, society, and governance mechanisms and classifying the characters of pandemic as protagonists and antagonists as per the plot and settings of the preferred narrative. This article attempts to reveal the theoretical and applicational interconnections between state-sponsored narratives and exercise of emergency powers during the pandemic governance in plague, cholera, influenza, and Covid-19 pandemics.

The International Political Science Association (IPSA) is a unique case against the common perception that Beijing has the upper hand when the two regimes by the Taiwan Strait contest to join international (non-governmental) organisations. Beijing relentlessly pushes international organisations to acknowledge the One China principle; Taipei also relentlessly denies this principle while it seeks to join. In the 1980s, Chinese and Taiwanese political scientists, representing their own regimes, applied Track II diplomacy to compete over membership of this organisation. IPSA membership mattered to both regimes and their political scientists. After many years of Track II competition, The Chinese Association of Political Science in Taipei became a “collective” member without compromising on how to name itself in April 1989. As a result, Beijing's counterpart withdrew from the IPSA. This situation has now persisted for over thirty years. The IPSA case not only challenges the current understanding of Cross-Strait relations but also throws light on the theoretical understanding of Track II diplomacy.

This article demonstrates the ambivalent sentiments of Koreans toward China as represented by the ideological construction of Hanja (traditional Chinese characters) and Chinese Mandarin embodied in Korean media. Adopting discourse analysis to examine what is described by different language ideologies, this article investigates language discourses concerning Hanja and Mandarin, locating the former mainly within linguistic nationalism and the latter within linguistic instrumentalism. This article puts forth two suggestions. First, investigating linguistic nationalism in relation to the use of Hanja not only displays negative and antagonistic attitudes toward China and the use of Hanja as an embodiment of humiliating historical experiences but also shows ambiguity, fluidity, and vulnerability of Korean national identity. Second, in contrast to Hanja, Koreans' heated enthusiasm to learn Mandarin shows their affection for China as a global market and becomes intertwined with linguistic instrumentalism, embodying an articulation of neoliberalism by reproducing structures of inequality.

No country in Southeast Asia is as close to China as Cambodia is at present. Under Hun Sen's leadership, Cambodia has actively participated in the Belt and Road Initiative and repeatedly blocked ASEAN's statements on the South China Sea (SCS). How can we better understand Cambodia's embrace of China? We argue that Hun Sen chose to embrace China due to the convergence of challenges posed by Cambodia's domestic opposition forces and international democratic pressures. The more severe the domestic political challenges, the more Hun Sen and his ruling party need China's support. Since Hun Sen remains the most powerful figure in Cambodia despite his recent resignation as prime minister, whether Cambodia's dependence on China can be altered depends on the ability of the West to modify its approach and attitude toward Hun Sen, his successor, and their domestic opponents. Nevertheless, regardless of how the future unfolds, domestic politics is likely to play an important role in Cambodia's foreign alignments in the foreseeable future.