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THE LIMITATIONS OF A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH TO CORRUPTION

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 March 2016

Cecily Rose
Cecily Rose*
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor, Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies, Leiden Law School, [email protected].
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Abstract

International human rights law may serve as a language through which lawyers and others describe the harms resulting from corruption, but this approach has significant limitations as a legal framework. Despite a growing emphasis among scholars and practitioners on a human rights approach to the problem of corruption, this body of law does not provide a strong basis for addressing such conduct. International human rights treaties make no mention of corruption, and human rights treaty bodies have not brought conceptual clarity to the question of how corruption violates or undermines human rights. Given that human rights law binds States alone, it is also ill-suited to a phenomenon that typically occurs at the intersection of the public and private sectors. Even as a language for describing how corruption harms social and economic rights, human rights law has its limitations, some of which come into relief when compared with the field of development economics.

Keywords

briberydevelopment economicsembezzlementhuman rightsnon-State actors
Type
Articles
Information
International & Comparative Law Quarterly , Volume 65 , Issue 2 , April 2016 , pp. 405 - 438
Copyright
Copyright © British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2016 

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References

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26 Boersma (n 7) 302, 313.

27 Emphasis added. ICC Rome Statute Art 30(2)(b).

28 Boersma (n 7) 340–7; Ocheje (n 25) 777–9.

29 Goodwin and Rose-Sender (n 9); Rajagopal (n 21). See also M Buckley, ‘Anti-Corruption Initiatives and Human Rights: The Potentials’ in H-O Sano and G Alfredsson (eds), Human Rights and Good Governance: Building Bridges (Nijhoff 2002) 178–9.

30 Goodwin and Rose-Sender (n 9) 223–9.

31 See book review of Kumar (n 13) by Morag Goodwin in (2013) 11 ICON 265, 268.

32 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (adopted 20 December 2006, entered into force 23 December 2010) A/RES/61/177; Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (adopted 13 December 2006, entered into force 3 May 2008) 2515 UNTS 3.

33 Subcommittee on the Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, CAT/C/52/2, 20 March 2014, paras 72–100.

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35 ibid.

36 ibid, para 22.

37 Petty corruption may be defined as ‘everyday abuse of entrusted power by low- and mid-level public officials in their interactions with ordinary citizens, who often are trying to access basic goods or services in places like hospitals, schools, police departments and other agencies’. Transparency International, ‘FAQs on Corruption’ <https:// www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation/faqs_on_corruption/9/>.

38 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General Comment No 3: The Nature of States Parties Obligations (Art. 2, para 1 of the Covenant)’ (14 December 1990) E/1991/23, para 10.

39 ibid.

40 ICCPR art 2(1); B Saul, D Kinley and J Mowbray, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Commentary, Cases, and Materials (OUP 2014) 134. See also Warwick, BTC, ‘Socio-Economic Rights during Economic Crises: A Changed Approach to Non-Retrogression’ (2016) 65 ICLQ 249Google Scholar.

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42 ibid.

43 International Commission of Jurists et al., ‘Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (January 1997) UN Doc E/C.12/2000/13, para 14(g).

44 Art 17 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption defines embezzlement as: ‘the misappropriation of property or funds legally entrusted to someone in their formal position as an agent or guardian’.

45 See eg allegations that Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue, the son of the President of Equatorial Guinea, embezzled and laundered Equatoguinean oil revenues. M de la Baume, ‘A French Shift on Africa Strips a Dictator's Son of His Treasures’ The New York Times (Paris, 23 August 2012).

46 See below (n 119).

47 V Tanzi and H Davoodi, ‘Corruption, Public Investment and Growth’ (1997) IMF Working Group Paper WP/97/139, 7.

48 Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, ‘Concluding Observations: Philippines’ (1 December 2008) E/C.12/PHL/CO/4, para 14.

49 Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘Concluding Observations: Thailand’ (17 February 2012) CRC/C/THA/CO/3-4, para 21; Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘Concluding Observations: Nigeria’ (11 June 2010) CRC/C/NGA/CO/3-4, para 16.

50 ICESCR art 21. The United Nations Economic and Social Council established the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and assigned the Committee its monitoring functions under the Covenant. ECOSOC, ‘Review of the Composition, Organization and Administrative Arrangements of the Sessional Working Group of Governmental Experts on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (28 May 1985) Res 1985/17.

51 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Concluding Observations: Cambodia’ (12 June 2009) E/C.12/KHM/CO/1, para 14.

52 ibid.

53 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Concluding Observations: Democratic Republic of Congo’ (16 December 2009) E/C.12/COD/CO/4, para 11(a).

54 ibid.

55 A Shleifer and R Vishny, ‘Corruption’ (1993) 108 Quarterly Journal of Economics 599.

56 The 1995 Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development also addresses corruption and human rights separately, but because it focuses on the private sector to a lesser extent than the UN Global Compact and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, these two instruments form the subject of this discussion. ‘Report of the World Summit for Social Development (19 April 1995) A/CONF.166/9, Annex I: Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development.

57 OECD, ‘OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ (2011 edn) section IV, paras 1–2.

58 ibid, chapeau.

59 ibid, para 76. The ‘core OECD instruments’ are: the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (adopted 21 November 1997, entered into force 15 February 1999) (1998) 37 ILM 1 (OECD Anti-Bribery Convention); OECD, Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (26 November 2009, amended on 18 February 2010) C(2009)159/Rev1/FINAL, C(2010)19; OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Tax Measures for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (25 May 2009) C(2009)64; and OECD, Recommendation on Bribery and Officially Supported Export Credits (18 December 2006) TD/ECG(2006)24.

60 ‘OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ (n 57) section IV, paras 1–7.

61 ibid, para 74.

62 United Nations Global Compact, ‘Overview of the Global Compact’ <http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html>.

63 United Nations Global Compact, ‘Global Compact Principle 1’ <http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/principle1.html>.

64 United Nations Global Compact, ‘Global Compact Principle 10’ <https:// www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles/principle-10>.

65 ibid.

66 ibid.

67 UNCAC Foreword, para 1.

68 See eg R McCorquodale, ‘Human Rights and Global Business’ in International Law beyond the State: Essays on Sovereignty, Non-State Actors and Human Rights (Cameron May 2011) 200–22 (originally published in S Bottomley and D Kinley (eds), Commercial Law and Human Rights (Ashgate 2002)) 89; Reinisch, A, ‘The Changing International Legal Framework for Dealing with Non-State Actors’ (2005) 13 Non-State Actors and Human Rights 37, 69–72Google Scholar.

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73 For a discussion of the Ruggie Principles see below Part IVC.

74 See eg Presbyterian Church of Sudan v Talisman Energy, 582 F 3d 244 (2nd Cir 2009).

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79 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR) para 8 (emphasis added).

80 See (n 76).

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88 Alston et al., Brief of Amici Curiae International Law Scholars in Support of Petitioners, Kiobel et al v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, et al, Supreme Court of the United States, No 10-1491 (21 December 2011) 17. The scholars are Philip Alston, Jose Alvarez, Cherif Bassiouni, Gaspar Biro, Douglass Casel, Andrew Clapham, Lori Fisler Damrosch, John Dugard, Richard Goldstone, Ryan Goodman, Vaughan Lowe, Chip Pitts, Dinah Shelton, Constance de la Vega, and David Weissbrodt. For more on amici curiae briefs submitted in this case, see Kohl, U, ‘Corporate Human Rights Accountability: The Objections of Western Governments to the Alien Tort Statute’ (2014) 63 ICLQ 665Google Scholar.

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90 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (adopted 15 November 2000, entered into force 29 September 2003) 2225 UNTS 209 (UNCTOC) arts 8, 10(1).

91 Art 2.

92 See generally Karavias (n 85) (ch 2 on corporate obligations under treaty law).

93 van den Herik (n 83); E De Brabandere, ‘Non-State Actors and Human Rights: Corporate Responsibility and the Attempts to Formalize the Role of the Corporations as Participants in the International Legal System’ in J d'Aspremont (ed), Participants in the International Legal System: Multiple Perspectives on Non-State Actors in International Law (Routledge 2011).

94 Brief of Amici Curiae International Law Scholars in Support of Petitioners (n 88) 17.

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96 De Brabandere (n 93) 276.

97 J Ruggie, Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’ (21 March 2011) A/HRC/17/31 (UN Guiding Principles). For the endorsement of the Framework by the UN Human Rights Council see UN Human Rights Council, ‘Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises’ (6 July 2011) A/HRC/RES/17/4. See generally R Mares (ed), The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Foundations and Implementation (Nijhoff 2012). On the aftermath of the Guiding Principles, see Aaronson, SA and Higham, I, ‘Re-righting Business’: John Ruggie and the Struggle to Develop International Human Rights Standards for Transnational Firms’ (2013) 35 HumRtsQ 333Google Scholar; M Addo, The Reality of the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (2014) 14 HRLR 133.

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99 UN Guiding Principles para 2.

100 ibid, para 3.

101 See also Knox (n 98) 64 (the UN Guiding Principles are ‘avowedly consistent with the law as it is rather than the law as it might someday be’).

102 UN Guiding Principles para 6.

103 ibid.

104 ibid.

105 ibid.

106 ibid 7.

107 ibid 8.

108 See also Knox (n 98) 65 (noting that the responsibility to protect is grounded in societal expectations rather than human rights law).

109 UN Guiding Principles 6.

110 ibid 13–14.

111 ibid, para 6.

112 ibid 13.

113 ibid 21.

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117 Aidt (n 115).

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120 Mauro, ‘Corruption and the Composition of Government Expenditure’ (n 119) 277.

121 ibid 264.

122 ibid 277.

123 ibid 278.

124 ibid.

125 Gupta, de Mello and Sharan (n 118); Mauro, ‘Corruption and the Composition of Government Expenditure’ (n 119); Delavallade (n 118); G d'Agostino, JP Dunne and L Pieroni, Corruption, ‘Military Spending and Growth’ (2011) <http://carecon.org.uk/DPs/1103.pdf>.

126 Gupta, Davoodi and Tiongson (n 118) 771.

127 ibid.

128 ibid 757–8.

129 Paolo Mauro, Why Worry About Corruption? (n 119) 2.

130 See (n 118).

131 See eg Tanzi (n 118); Mauro, Why Worry about Corruption? (n 119).

132 Smarynska, B and Wei, Shang-Jin, ‘Corruption and Composition of Foreign Direct Investment: Firm-Level Evidence’ (2000) National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 7969Google Scholar; Wei, Shang-Jin, ‘How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors?’ (2000) 82 Review of Economics and Statistics 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hakkala, KN, Norbäck, P-J, and Svaleryd, H, ‘Asymmetric Effects of Corruption on FDI: Evidence from Swedish Multinational Firms’ (2008) 90 Review of Economics and Statistics 627CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Asiedu, E and Freeman, J, ‘The Effect of Corruption on Investment Growth: Evidence from Firms in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Transition Countries’ (2009) 13 Review of Development Economics 200Google Scholar.

133 Tanzi and Davoodi (n 47).

134 V Tanzi and H Davoodi, ‘Corruption, Growth, and Public Finances’ (2000) IMF Working Paper, WP/00/182; Gupta, SDavoodi, H and Alonso-Terme, R, ‘Does Corruption Affect Income Inequality?’ (2002) 3 Economics of Governance 23CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

135 Hodge, A, Shankar, S, Rao, DS Prasada and Duhs, A, ‘Exploring the Links Between Corruption and Growth’ (2011) 15 Review of Development Economics 474, 475Google Scholar; Asiedu and Freeman (n 132).

136 Mauro, Why Worry About Corruption? (n 119) 5–6; Gupta, Davoodi and Alonso-Terme (n 134); Tanzi (n 118).

137 See n 53.

138 ibid.

139 See eg Rajogopal, B, ‘Corruption, Legitimacy and Human Rights: The Dialectic of the Relationship’ (1999) 496 Connecticut Journal of International Law 495Google Scholar; Gathii, JT, ‘Defining the Relationship between Human Rights and Corruption’ (2009) 31 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 125Google Scholar; M Sepúlveda Carmona and J Bacio-Terracino, ‘Corruption and Human Rights: Making the Connection’ in Boersma and Nelen, Corruption & Human Rights: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (n 9); M Boersma, ‘Corruption as a Violation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Reflections on the Rights to Education’ in Boersma and  Nelen (n 9).

140 Mauro, ‘Corruption and the Composition of Government Expenditure’ (n 119) 278.

141 Tanzi and Davoodi (n 47) 21.

142 Bardhan, P, ‘Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues’ (1997) 35 Journal of Economic Literature 1320Google Scholar; Svensson, J, ‘Eight Questions about Corruption’ (2005) 19 Journal of Economic Perspectives 19Google Scholar.

143 Svensson (n 142) 33.

144 Bardhan (n 142); Tirole, J, ‘A Theory of Collective Reputations (With Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality)’ (1996) 63 Review of Economic Studies 1Google Scholar.

145 Bardhan (n 142).

146 ibid 1337.

147 ibid.

148 P Mauro, ‘The Persistence of Corruption and Slow Economic Growth’ (2004) 15 IMF Staff Papers 1, 4, 16.

149 Fisman, R and Miguel, E, ‘Corruption, Norms and Legal Enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets’ (2007) 115 Journal of Political Economy 1020Google Scholar.

150 ibid 1026.

151 ibid 1022.

152 ibid.

153 ibid 1046.

154 See eg Kofele-Kale (n 8).

155 United Nations Convention against Corruption, ‘UNCAC Signature and Ratification Status as of 1 December 2015’ <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html>.