This article aims to offer a definition of the international rule of law. It does this through clarifying the core objectives of a rule of law and examining whether the international system could include them. It demonstrates that there can be a definition of the international rule of law that can be applied to the international system. This definition of the international rule of law is not dependent on a simplistic application of a national rule of law, as it takes into account the significant differences between national and international legal systems. It seeks to show that the international rule of law is relative, rather than absolute, in its application, is not tied to the operation of the substance of international law itself, and it can apply to states, international organizations and non-state actors. It goes further to show that the international rule of law does exist and can be applied internationally, even if it is not yet fully actualized.

Engaging democratically elected assemblies in national decision-making over the extraterritorial use of force seemingly provides a secure check on executive abuses of power. Many liberal democracies therefore maintain constitutional requirements that their elected national assembly must authorize decisions to use military force. By comparison, the UK Parliament has historically played a limited and often indirect role in authorizing the use of force. From the vote on the Iraq War in 2003 onwards, however, the UK Parliament's role has increased to the point where, in August 2013, the defeat of a Government motion seeking approval for the use of force undermined efforts to build an international coalition to intervene in the ongoing Syrian conflict. Whilst debate regarding this shift has hitherto concentrated on the degree to which parliamentary oversight of the war prerogative is desirable, in this article we consider what Parliament's evolving role heralds for the general relationship between domestic and UN mechanisms. We challenge the underlying assumption that Parliament's interventions mark an indisputably positive development in constraining the use of force. When coupled with the focus upon the doctrine of humanitarian intervention which has accompanied many controversial exercises of UK military force since the end of the Cold War, the involvement of Parliament in the decision-making process risks hollowing out UN Charter safeguards. Successive UK Governments have acquiesced to the extension of Parliament's role, with the effect of shifting the locus for legitimating uses of force away from UN institutions, where the UK cannot control the actions of other States, and into a domestic sphere which is susceptible to executive influence.

This article explores the question whether the territorial application of a treaty extends to unlawfully annexed territory. In this context, it examines State succession and the territorial application of treaties under general international law, as well as the moving treaty-frontiers rule and the extraterritorial application of certain treaties, specifically with respect to annexed territory. The article concludes that, while in some cases there is scope to find that a treaty applies extraterritorially in annexed territory, notably as a result of its object and purpose or its provisions, there may also be room, subject to the provisions of the treaty, for a limited form of treaty succession in such territory. Limitations to the obligation of collective non-recognition offer theoretical and practical support for this position.

The CJEU judgment in West Tankers created much controversy on the question of whether issuing an anti-suit injunction in order to protect the integrity of arbitration agreements should fall within the scope of the arbitration exclusion in Article 1 of the Brussels I Regulation (2001). The negative answer of the Court has been since challenged many times by academics and practitioners and new approaches were proposed during the drafting of the Brussels I Recast. Although the Court had not since considered whether the Recast modified the legal regime, in Gazprom the Advocate General gave his opinion on the basis that it had. The Court in Gazprom, however, saw the enforcement of an arbitral award ordering cessation of court proceedings to be a distinct issue which is not covered by the Brussels I Regulation. This article discusses first the applicability of the Brussels I Regulation to the enforcement of arbitral awards ordering anti-suit injunction as a final relief. Secondly, it examines anti-suit injunctions issued by Member State courts in the post-Recast era. It aims to reveal the extent to which an order for cessation of court proceedings (or an anti-suit injunction) to protect the integrity of arbitration agreements is permissible under existing law.

International human rights law may serve as a language through which lawyers and others describe the harms resulting from corruption, but this approach has significant limitations as a legal framework. Despite a growing emphasis among scholars and practitioners on a human rights approach to the problem of corruption, this body of law does not provide a strong basis for addressing such conduct. International human rights treaties make no mention of corruption, and human rights treaty bodies have not brought conceptual clarity to the question of how corruption violates or undermines human rights. Given that human rights law binds States alone, it is also ill-suited to a phenomenon that typically occurs at the intersection of the public and private sectors. Even as a language for describing how corruption harms social and economic rights, human rights law has its limitations, some of which come into relief when compared with the field of development economics.

The jurisdictional framework of the Singapore courts has become more nuanced with the establishment of the Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC) on 5 January 2015 and the signing of the Hague Convention on the Choice of Court Agreements 2005 (Hague Convention) on 25 March 2015. Although the Hague Convention has yet to be incorporated in domestic law, it is expected this will happen in the near future. The SICC project, on the other hand, is part of Singapore's strategy to promote the jurisdiction as an international dispute resolution hub. In essence, the SICC is a domestic specialist court established to deal with international commercial litigation. Adapted from the arbitral model but underpinned by judicial control, central to the SICC framework are party autonomy and flexible procedural rules. The Hague Convention complements the SICC project by increasing the number of jurisdictions in which Singapore judgments will be recognized and enforced. These 2015 developments—key to establishing Singapore as the regional hub for dispute resolution—requires careful working out and an evaluation is needed of the jurisdictional regime that applies to the SICC and the internal allocation of jurisdiction as between the SICC and the Singapore High Court sans the SICC, as well as the impact of the Hague Convention. This article focuses on explaining the in personam jurisdictional rules of the Singapore High Court that now includes the SICC division. Its chief objective is to offer the international community an overview of the working framework of Singapore's version of an ‘international’ commercial court.

A quarter of a century after the High Court of Australia's landmark ruling in Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd, this article examines the application of the modern-day forum (non) conveniens doctrine in Australia. It outlines the prevailing view in the academic literature which claims that the Australian doctrine is functionally different from its English counterpart, articulated in Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd. Through a detailed assessment of the case law and commentary, this article questions that widely accepted orthodoxy and demonstrates it to be unpersuasive and reconceptualizes our understanding of the forum (non) conveniens doctrine in Australia. Its main contention is that while, theoretically, there may be a narrow conceptual space between Spiliada and Voth, it is so narrow as to be practically non-existent.

The 2015 Paris Agreement represents a historic achievement in multilateral diplomacy. After years of deeply discordant negotiations, Parties harnessed the political will necessary to arrive at a climate change agreement that strikes a careful balance between ambition and differentiation. The Paris Agreement contains aspirational goals, binding obligations of conduct in relation to mitigation, a rigorous system of oversight, and a nuanced form of differentiation between developed and developing countries. This article will explore the key building blocks of the Paris Agreement—ambition and differentiation—with an eye to mining the text of the Agreement for its interpretative possibilities and underlying politics.