A paper about cross-cultural and cross-racial loving that emphasizes the need to understand and affirm the plurality in and among women as central to feminist ontology and epistemology. Love is seen not as fusion and erasure of difference but as incompatible with them. Love reveals plurality. Unity–not to be confused with solidarity–is understood as conceptually tied to domination.

The work of feminists in science may seem less voluminous and less theoretical than the feminist scholarship in some humanities and social science disciplines. However, the recent burst of scholarship on women and science allows categorization of feminist work into six distinct but related categories: 1) teaching and curriculum transformation in science, 2) history of women in science, 3) current status of women in science, 4) feminist critique of science, 5) feminine science, 6) feminist theory of science. More feminists in science are needed to further explore science and its relationships to women and feminism in order to change traditional science to a feminist science.

I argue for compatibility between feminism and medicine by developing a model of the physician-other relationship which is essentially egalitarian. This entails rejection of (a) a paternalistic model which reinforces sex-role stereotypes, (b) a maternalistic model which exclusively emphasizes patient autonomy, and (c) a model which focuses on the physician's conscience. The model I propose (parentalism) captures the complexity and dynamism of the physician-other relationship, by stressing mutuality in respect for autonomy and regard for each other's interests.

Moral philosphy, in both the Kantian and Utilitarian traditions, has it as an ideal to provide a set of principles which dominate all other considerations and which will consistently resolve all moral problems. This is often taken to imply that guilt or remorse is irrational if it occurs in circumstances in which one does ones duty but also harms others. This essay explores the possibility of giving up this ideal in favor of a more complex view of morality in which resolutions of conflict are worked out affectively rather than logically.

I have taken a Kantian approach to the issue of pornography and degradation. My thesis is that by perpetuating derogatory myths about womankind, for the sake of financial gain, the pornography industry treats the class of women as a means only, and not as composed of individuals who are ends in themselves. It thus de-grades all women, as members of this class, imputing to them less than full human status.

An atomistic model of society leads us to address injustices in terms of individual rights, but rights are curious possessions and don't always give the protection that's needed. Examples are patient's rights, children's rights and a fetus's right to life, all of which go wrong because they assume that the subjects are independent and autonomous. This assumption often fails. Rights work where people are in a position to press them; for others they give only a caricature of justice.

A continuing concern of many feminists and non-feminists alike has been to identify a distinctive feminist method of inquiry. This essay argues that this method question is misguided and should be abandoned. In doing so it takes up the distinctions between and relationships among methods, methodologies and epistemologies; proposes that the concern to identify sources of the power of feminist analyses motivates the method question; and suggests how to pursue this project.

In this article, Ms. Krieger explores the controversy concerning pregnancy disability leave presented by the case of California Federal Savings v. Guerra in light of Thomas Kuhn's model of scientific paradigm change and Carol Gilligan's theory regarding sex differences in moral reasoning. She argues that the controversy reflects a period of paradigm crisis in equality jurisprudence, brought about in part by the recent inclusion of greater numbers of women into the jurisprudential community.

In this paper, I explore the problematic relation between sex and gender in parallel with the equally problematic relation between nature and science. I also offer a provisional analysis of the political dynamics that work to polarize both kinds of discourse, focusing especially on their intersection (i.e., on discussions of gender and science), and on that group most directly affected by all of the above considerations (i.e., women scientists).

In this paper I argue against the view widely held among feminists that nurturing and competition are incompatible. I also explore the following two more specific objections against competition: (1) competitions are “mini-wars” which encourage hatred; (2) while not “miniwars,” competitions foster a war-like mentality. Underlying these objections is the fear that too strong a sense of self makes war likely by severing connection with others. I argue that because patriarchy encourages women to have too little sense of self, some competition may be useful.

I am concerned that, in our quest to end discrimination, we as feminists may be concentrating too much on equality and ignoring more basic issues of social justice. I argue that we must not lose sight of where we as a society are going in the effort to make sure we all get there together. The primary goal, after all, is not simply for women to get what men have, but justice for all.

Liberal feminism is not committed to a number of philosophical positions for which it is frequently criticized, including abstract individualism, certain individualistic approaches to morality and society, valuing the mental/rational over the physical/emotional, and the traditional liberal way of drawing the line between the public and the private.

Moreover, liberal feminism's clearest political commitments, including equality of opportunity, are important to women's liberation and not necessarily incompatible with the goals of socialist and radical feminism.

This paper identifies the founding project of traditional philosophy of language as an attempt to unify the diversity and individuality of spoken language in order to produce a transpersonal intelligibility. The supposed necessary truth that we cannot directly understand what others say which underlies such a project is exposed as a willful avoidance of the discourse of others typical of masculine styles of communication.

Linda Krieger's paper in this volume relies on the concepts of “equal” and “special” rights, and I focus my attention upon the bivalent view of equality which justifies the creation of special rights. Krieger argues, I point out, that equality of effect is a fundamentally more just consideration than equality of treatment, and special rights allow disad-vantaged groups to achieve this equality of effect.