Article contents
Abstract
Moral philosphy, in both the Kantian and Utilitarian traditions, has it as an ideal to provide a set of principles which dominate all other considerations and which will consistently resolve all moral problems. This is often taken to imply that guilt or remorse is irrational if it occurs in circumstances in which one does ones duty but also harms others. This essay explores the possibility of giving up this ideal in favor of a more complex view of morality in which resolutions of conflict are worked out affectively rather than logically.
- Type
- Research Article
- Information
- Hypatia , Volume 2 , Issue 1: Special Issue: Philosophy and Women Symposium , Winter 1987 , pp. 7 - 23
- Copyright
- Copyright © 1987 by Hypatia, Inc.
References
Freud, Sigmund. 1914. On narcissism: An introduction. In General psychological theory. New York: Collier Books.Google Scholar
Freud, Sigmund. 1925. Some psychical consequences of the anatomical distinction between the sexes. In Standard Edition. Vol. XIX. London: Hogarth Press.Google Scholar
Hume, David. 1740. Treatise on human nature, Selby‐Bigge edition, 1880. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Klein, Melanie. 1975. Love, guilt and reparation and other essays, 1921‐45. London: Hogarth Press.Google Scholar
Kohlberg, Lawrence. 1981. Essays in moral psychology; Volume 1, The philosophy of moral development. New York: Harper & Row.Google Scholar
Mahler, M., Pine, F., and Bergman, A. 1975. The psychological birth of the human infant. New York: Basic Books.Google Scholar
Winnicott, David. 1958. Psychoanalysis and the sense of guilt. In Psychoanalysis and contemporary thought, ed. Sutherland, John D.London: Hogarth Press.Google Scholar
- 6
- Cited by