This contribution examines the responses of five health systems in the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic: Denmark, Germany, Israel, Spain and Sweden. The aim is to understand to what extent this crisis response of these countries was resilient. The study focuses on hospital care structures, considering both existing capacity before the pandemic and the management and expansion of capacity during the crisis. Evaluation criteria include flexibility in the use of existing resources and response planning, as well as the ability to create surge capacity. Data were collected from country experts using a structured questionnaire. Main findings are that not only the total number but also the availability of hospital beds is critical to resilience, as is the ability to mobilise (highly) qualified personnel. Indispensable for rapid capacity adjustment is the availability of data. Countries with more centralised hospital care structures, more sophisticated concepts for providing specialised services and stronger integration of the inpatient and outpatient sectors have clear structural advantages. A solid digital infrastructure is also conducive. Finally, a centralised governance structure is crucial for flexibility and adaptability. In decentralised systems, robust mechanisms to coordinate across levels are important to strengthen health care system resilience in pandemic situations and beyond.

Despite the acceleration in the use of digital health technologies across different aspects of the healthcare system, the full potential of real-world data (RWD) and real-world evidence (RWE) arising from the technologies is not being utilised in decision-making. We examine current national efforts and future opportunities to systematically use RWD and RWE in decision-making in five countries (Estonia, Finland, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom), and then develop a framework for promotion of the systematic use of RWD and RWE. A review assesses current national efforts, complemented with a three-round consensus-building exercise among an international group of experts (n1 = 44, n2 = 24, n3 = 24) to derive key principles. We find that Estonia and Finland have invested and developed digital health-related policies for several years; Germany and Italy are the more recent arrivals, while the United Kingdom falls somewhere in the middle. Opportunities to promote the systematic use of RWD and RWE were identified for each country. Eight building blocks principles were agreed through consensus, relating to policy scope, institutional role and data collection. Promoting post-market surveillance and digital health technology vigilance ought to rely on clarity in scope and data collection with consensus reached on eight principles to leverage RWD and RWE.

It is known that social inequities result in health disparities in outcomes, highlighted in the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. This commentary discusses the actionable initiatives that have been implemented to address social inequities in healthcare in the United States. The publicly available social needs screening tools and International Classification of Disease Systems-10 Z codes for social determinants of health are introduced. In this context, policies, health system strategies and the larger role of implementation science in recognizing and alleviating the social needs are discussed.

Over the past decade, many health care systems across the Global North have implemented elements of market mechanisms while also dealing with the consequences of the financial crisis. Although effects of these two developments have been researched separately, their combined impact on the governance of health care organizations has received less attention. The aim of this study is to understand how health care reforms and the financial crisis together shaped new roles and interactions within health care. The Netherlands – where dynamics between health care organizations and their financial stakeholders (i.e., banks and health insurers) were particularly impacted – provides an illustrative case. Through semi-structured interviews, additional document analysis and insights from institutional change theory, we show how banks intensified relationship management, increased demands on loan applications and shifted financial risks onto health care organizations, while health insurers tightened up their monitoring and accountability practices towards health care organizations. In return, health care organizations were urged to rearrange their operations and become more risk-minded. They became increasingly dependent on banks and health insurers for their existence. Moreover, with this study, we show how institutional arenas come about through both the long-term efforts of institutional agents and unpredictable implications of economic and societal crises.

Health misinformation, most visibly following the COVID-19 infodemic, is an urgent threat that hinders the success of public health policies. It likely contributed, and will continue to contribute, to avoidable deaths. Policymakers around the world are being pushed to tackle this problem. Legislative acts have been rolled out or announced in many countries and at the European Union level. The goal of this paper is not to review particular legislative initiatives, or to assess the impact and efficacy of measures implemented by digital intermediaries, but to reflect on the high constitutional and ethical stakes involved in tackling health misinformation through speech regulation. Our findings suggest that solutions focused on regulating speech are likely to encounter significant constraints, as policymakers grasp with the limitations imposed by freedom of expression and ethical considerations. Solutions focused on empowering individuals – such as media literacy initiatives, fact-checking or credibility labels – are one way to avoid such hurdles.

Multimorbid patients who enter English NHS hospitals are frequently subject to care pathways designed to assess, diagnose and treat single medical conditions. Opportunities are thereby lost to offer patients more holistic, person-centred care. Hospital organisations elsewhere are known to use in-hospital, multi-specialty, integrated clinical care (ICC) to overcome this problem. This perspective piece aims to critically discuss barriers to implementing this form of ICC in the English NHS focusing on six key areas: information technologies, the primary–secondary care interface, internal hospital processes, finance, workload, professional roles and behaviours. Integrated care programmes currently underway are largely focused on macro (system) and meso (organisational) levels. A micro (clinical) level ICC, offering highly coordinated multispecialty expertise to multimorbid hospital patients could fill an important gap in the current care pathways.

This study examines the literature on learning lessons from the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic to make a conceptual and empirical contribution. The conceptual contribution suggests a simplified policy transfer framework for learning lessons from the proliferation of approaches involving an expanding and confusing mix of hypotheses, questions, criteria, domains, constructs, factors and criteria. This is then used to review the literature of lessons from COVID-19. This fuses the three reasons for transfer failure and the context-mechanism- outcome configuration of realist approaches to suggest three simple criteria of informed transfer (outcomes); complete transfer (mechanisms); and appropriate transfer (context). The empirical contribution suggests that it is difficult to learn lessons from the existing literature. The conceptual framework suggests that lessons about successful transfer involve a clear idea of policy success, understanding how the policy instrument or mechanism links with success in the original context, and how ‘fungible’ it is to the new context. Put another way, the ‘COVID lessons industry’ may itself need to learn that lessons about policy transfer should be informed, complete and appropriate.

Nurse workforce shortages put healthcare systems under pressure, moving the nursing profession into the core of healthcare policymaking. In this paper, we shift the focus from workforce policy to workforce politics and highlight the political role of nurses in healthcare systems in England, Spain, Sweden, and the Netherlands. Using a comparative discursive institutionalist approach, we study how nurses are organised and represented in these four countries. We show how nurse politics plays out at the levels of representation, working conditions, career building, and by breaking with the public healthcare system. Although there are differences between the countries – with nurses in England and Spain under more pressure than in the Netherlands and Sweden – nurses are often not represented in policy discourses; not just because of institutional ignorance but also because of fragmentation of the profession itself. This institutional ignorance and lack of collective representation, we argue, requires attention to foster the role and position of nurses in contemporary healthcare systems.

In the article, ‘Learning Lessons from the Covid-19 Pandemic’, Powell (2022) rightly implies that there is a profusion of confusion in the ‘industry’ which has grown up around lesson-learning from the pandemic. His contribution sets out a helpful framework for classifying or making attempts at lesson-learning. He combines the tripartite classification of inadequate approaches to policy-learning and policy transfer developed 30 years ago by Dolowitz and Marsh (‘uninformed-incomplete-inappropriate’), which he inverts to produce a classification of approaches which are informed, complete and appropriate, with the framework of ‘outcome-mechanism-context’ from realistic evaluation. (I use the term realistic rather than realist, as the latter implies an epistemological stance as opposed to what was intended, which is that evaluation takes account of complexity in a realistic manner.) This produces a classification, and possibly an ‘ideal type’, of informed outcomes, complete mechanisms and appropriate context. Powell rightly implies that no overall conclusion is available from the literature reviewed. He does however imply that different approaches may work in different settings. This is true in one sense but misleading in another. This commentary argues that such ‘relativism’ is not only dangerous in practice but mistaken in theory.

It must have been early 2000, around the start of the new Millennium. I was working as a junior lecturer/researcher at the then Institute for Health Care Policy and Management at Erasmus University in Rotterdam, the Netherlands. Still barely familiar with Dutch health care as a policy system, let alone with European health care policy systems I decided that it would be a good idea to attend a seminar of the recently established European Health Policy Group. I had heard good stories about this new multidisciplinary group, founded by Elias Mossialos and Adam Oliver. My PhD thesis supervisor, Tom van der Grinten, also went there, as did some of my colleagues from the Department of Health Economics and Health Insurance, people like Erik Schut and Wynand van de Ven for example. They were close colleagues of me, although our respective disciplines from which we studied health care policy were different.

The World Health Organization (WHO) is tasked with the ‘attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health’, yet, it is widely struggling to meet this mandate, and COVID-19 has revealed significant limitations of the organisation. Despite clear guidance provided by the institution as to how best to respond to the pathogen, many governments departed from WHO's guidance in their response efforts. Is this a new crisis for WHO? Does WHO need to restore its legitimacy in the eyes of the global community? As renewed calls for changes to WHO emerge, in this perspective we lay out the obstacles WHO face to become the WHO ‘we’ need. The assumption is that UN member states need an empowered and well-funded organisation. Yet, many years of discussion of reform of WHO have failed to lead to meaningful change, and glaring challenges remain in its financing, governance and politics, which are considered in turn. The reality may be that we have the WHO that UN member states need – one that can provide guidance and advice, but also take criticism for health governance failures when states want to avoid blame or responsibility. We discuss this, by analysing three key areas of WHO'S challenges: mandate and scope; structure, governance and money and domestic vs international.