THE EXPERIENCE OF ‘COHABITATION’ BETWEEN MITTERRAND and Chirac - an enforced coalition between the effective heads of yesterday's government and yesterday's opposition - is a fascinating case-study in constitutional politics. How on earth will the constitution of 1958, which functioned in a reasonably consistent way from 1958 (or at least from 1962) to 1986, perform in the unprecendented situation created by the parliamentary victory of the Right?
As with all case-studies, there are some features specific to the situation. For instance, despite the general consensus that the prime ministership carries greater power, and that M. Chirac's newly-elected government is entitled to carry out its programme (‘the government governs, the president presides’, etc.), it is clear to everyone that the decisive contest for power will be the presidential election of 1988. The 1986 parliamentary election was in a sense a first ballot, or a primary, for the presidential stakes, and all of those principally concerned - Chirac, Barre, Giscard, Mitterrand and Rocard - have for some time calculated their actions in relation to the rendezvous of 1988.