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How Fabius Lost: the French Elections of 1986*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2014

David A.L. Levy  and
Howard Machin
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Extract

THE 1986 ELECTIONS PRODUCED ONE OF THE MOST DRAMATIC results in recent French history, after one of the most unexciting campaigns. It is clear that the marked a break with the previous experience of the Fifth Repu Is lic.

What was the nature of this break? First, the campaign began in a context where defeat seemed inevitable for the President's majority in parliament. Secondly, there was a new electoral system which affected the campaign, the competition and the results. Thirdly, the results showed considerable changes in French voting behaviour. Fourthly, there were some important changes in the influence and nature of the parties themselves. Fifthly, and perhaps most importantly, despite the collapse of the two-block part system, a majority hostile to the President was elected to par l 'ament. The President responded by staying in office, and appointing the leader of the largest party in the new majority as prime minister. The other original feature of these elections was that they were held less than two years before a presidential election. Much of the changed behaviour of voters, parties and leaders reflected not only the circumstances of the elections of 1986 but also those foreseen in 1988.

Type
Research Article
Information
Government and Opposition , Volume 21 , Issue 3 , 01 July 1986 , pp. 269 - 285
Copyright
Copyright © Government and Opposition Ltd 1986

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References

1 See Bauchard, P., La Guerre des deux roses, Paris, 1986, pp. 321–3Google Scholar.

2 SOFRES, Opinion publique 1986, Paris, 1986, pp. 64–84.Google ScholarPubMed

3 SOFRES, op. cit., pp. 61–2.

4 Le Monde, 18, 19–20 January 1986.

5 Le Gall, G., ‘Sondages: l’etat de l’opinion’, Revue Politique et Parlementaire, 921, Jan.‐Feb. 1986, p. 13.Google Scholar

6 SOFRES, op. cit., pp. 61–2. Point, 3 March 1986; G. Le Gall, op. cit., p. 7.

7 Interviewed on TF1, 2 March 1986; reported in Le Monde, 4 March 1986; Le Monde, 19 January and 9 February 1986.

8 Le Figaro, (SOFRES poll), 8–9 March 1986, p. 8.

9 Charlot, M., ‘L’émergence du Front National’, Revue Française de Science Politique, Vol. 36, 1, 1986, pp. 30–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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12 According to the Liberation‐BVA, (18 March 1986) exit poll, 38% of those with higher education voted PS.

13 12% of ‘regularly practising’ and 24% of ‘occasionally practising’ Catholics voted for Mitterrand in 1981 whilst in 1986 the equivalent figures were 16% and 3%. Le Nouvel Observateur, (exit polls) 1 June 1981 and Table B.

14 Chevènement, J‐P., ‘Election Report’, Antenne 2, 16 03 1986 .Google Scholar

15 See Table B and Ysmal, C., Le Comportement electoral des Français, Paris, 1986, pp. 27, 67 Google Scholar; SOFRES poll in La Croix, 14 02 1986 .Google ScholarPubMed

16 Schonfeld, W., ‘Le RPR et 1’UDF à l’épreuve de l’opposition’, Revue Française de Science Politique, Vol. 36, 1, 1986, pp. 14–28 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Ysmal, C., ‘Un colosse aux pieds d’argile: le RPR’, Les Temps Modernes, Vol. 41, no. 465, 04 1985, pp. 1872–92.Google Scholar