The article considers implications of contested multilateralism for the processes and normative standards of global constitutionalism. The focus is primarily on aspects of CM regarded as a mode of constitutional change, considering what to make of such a form of ‘extra-constitutional’ procedure. Research challenges for political science, law and normative political theory are identified. Challenges by CM to the stability of international law are argued to be overdrawn. Of greater concern is that CM lends itself to piecemeal adjustments rather than reforms with an eye to the systemic effects. However, these worries must be tempered by the non-ideal nature of the present legal structure which should make us wary of imposing normative standards drawn from settings where institutions are fully just and generally complied with.

This essay analyses the consequences of contested multilateralism (CM) for the level of constitutionalisation of specific multilateral institutions. We argue that CM has implications for institutions’ constitutional quality in particular if it is polity-driven and not (merely) policy-driven, that is, when actors’ employment of alternative institutions stems from their dissatisfaction with the political order of an institution rather than individual policies. Given the co-existence of constitutionalised and non-constitutionalised multilateral institutions in today’s international order, state and non-state actors can use alternative institutions to contest the constraining or discretionary character of an institution’s polity. We hold that CM is likely to have negative consequences for the constitutionalisation of multilateral institutions if it is employed ‘top-down’ by states to enhance their freedom to wield discretionary authority, but that it is likely to have positive consequence if it is employed ‘bottom-up’ by society actors to constrain the exercise of discretionary authority through multilateral institutions. We illustrate the empirical plausibility of our claims in two cases involving top-down contestation of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and bottom-up contestation of the World Health Organization (WHO).

The religious freedom clauses of the Indian Constitution attempt to mediate between the competing claims of individuals, religious groups and the state, in a manner that is born out of specific historical circumstances. This article examines the controversial questions of whether, and to what extent, the Constitution grants individuals (specifically, dissenters) rights against the religious communities to which they belong. Taking as its point of departure a landmark Supreme Court judgment that struck down an anti-excommunication law, the article argues that the Indian Constitution is committed to an ‘anti-exclusion principle’: that is, group rights and group integrity are guaranteed to the extent – and only to the extent – that religious groups do not block individuals’ access to the basic public goods required to sustain a dignified life. Moreover – and unlike most other Constitutions – an individual may vindicate this right directly against her community in a court of law, by invoking the Constitution. This remedy is justified both philosophically, and in the specific context of Indian history. In this manner, Indian constitutionalism offers a novel and innovative solution to the perennial problem of balancing individual rights to religious freedom against the claims of community.

Research on norms in international relations has recently focused increasingly on the localisation and translation of normative patterns. While there is a strong interest in studying local diversity as embedded in global contexts, the question of how to accomplish this still poses a methodological challenge. In order to make visible the different global, national, local, and situational dimensions of diffusion processes, this article applies the technique of ‘zooming in’ on the respective levels. The article studies the case of a mixed court in Shanghai at the end of the nineteenth century. The court is both a special court in the context of extraterritoriality and a representative case of hybrid normativity and decision making. As this article shows, the practices of the mixed court are not reducible to its single foreign, national or local components. On the contrary, it represents an original normative institution combining various normative and procedural elements. In describing this hybrid institution, the article refers to the concept of multinormativity, understood as an extension of what has been discussed as legal pluralism, since it does not take Western concepts of the law as a major point of reference.

This article proposes an alternative to more standard, neoclassical theories concerned with the proceduralisation of constituent power. It argues that more established theories of proceduralisation are insufficiently aligned to the sociological realities in which constituent power is located and expressed, and their residual fixation on the premises of classical constitutionalism impedes adequate understanding of constituent power in the global constitutional order of contemporary society. On this basis, the article offers a sociological examination of constituent power, which attempts to grasp constituent power in its objectively existing procedural form. In particular, it claims that constituent power now exists as an inner-legal function, activated through procedures within an increasingly differentiated legal system: whereas in classical theory constituent power was a primary political source of constitutional norms, it now appears only as a secondary expression of norms already contained within the global legal system. Rather than renouncing the idea of constituent power, however, the article uses its sociological focus to observe new procedural openings for the activation of constituent agency, adapted to the material/sociological fabric of contemporary society.