This contribution aims to assess whether the Constitutional Treaty (CT) succeeds in achieving a systematic “fit” between the legislative procedures and the relevant underlying competences. The system to be developed here aims at promoting democratic legitimacy, transparency and efficiency in the EU's legislative process. This is undertaken under the assumption that systematization might contribute to achieving these fundamental aims. Obviously, such a system needs to rely on generalization and simplification to a considerable extent; it cannot provide more than a model which must necessarily be subject to exceptions.

In a candid interview in 1991, when he was 60, Jacques Derrida let the cat out of the bag. For all his academic achievements and popular acclaim, his abiding dream for himself remained that of his youth “becoming a professional footballer.” In this mere aside, Derrida revealed as much about himself as both philosopher and person (if they can be separated) as in almost all his voluminous writings, speeches, reviews, and interviews. How fitting, therefore, that this passing remark should take us from the expressive margin into the subversive heart of this man of thought and reveal him as a frustrated man of action; the philosophical life was only a consolation for a more fulfilled life as sporting hero. Yet, in so many ways, so much can be learned and understood about the Derridean oeuvre by treating its author as a footballer, as someone who plied his trade on the fields of sporting endeavour than in the classrooms and libraries of the world. Indeed, if Derrida had played football, both philosophy and life might have been the better for it. Not because he would have spared the world his philosophical interrogations, but because he might have made even more of an impression on the sensibilities and senses of his times. It is as a footballer of attacking flair, not as an intellectual of defensive legend, that I will remember Derrida best. While it is hard to imagine the suave Derrida in the garishly-coloured synthetic shirt of his favourite team with a number “7” and “Derrida” emblazoned on the back, there is a genuine excitement at the prospect of him tantalising and tormenting the opposition in his own version of “the beautiful game.” He knew that those who knew nothing of football knew nothing of life.

The Africa Caribbean Pacific–European Union (ACP-EU) Development and Trade Cooperation Relationship is currently regulated by the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. This agreement, which has been described as “the only one of its kind in the world” is based on the three pillars of politics, trade, and development between the EU and its Member States on the one hand and a group of developing countries on the other.

In the literature on emergent populism and nationalism in post-communist Eastern Europe, two main assumptions regarding the origins of the phenomenon can be distinguished. One line of argumentation holds that the unexpected resurgence of populism and nationalism after the collapse of the communist regimes is a direct result of the ‘valley of tears’ that characterizes the post-communist transformation from a communist, centrally planned system, to a democratic, market society. The ‘social costs’ of the transition and the still ‘incomplete’ nature of modernization make a large number of ‘modernization losers’ susceptible to mobilization by populist movements. The emergence of populist, nationalist movements should be understood as a radical form of protest against the degradation of the quality of life and widespread social dislocation and unemployment. A second explanation for the phenomenon is that populism and its naturalist, exclusivist portrayal of the nation is the result of the re-emergence of deeply, culturally ingrained perception of social belonging, and of the foundations of the polity, in which the social whole is considered prior to the individual, and in which local culture is valued differently from Western culture. In this explanation, the structural difference between Eastern and Western Europe is emphasized, a difference that can only be overcome by the former adopting the political model of the latter.

The reasons for the recent rise of Eastern European populism constitute a puzzling issue in political and scientific discussions. As Paul Blokker shows, Eastern European populism can neither be seen as a mere reaction to communism, nor as the “natural” consequence of the transition from a socialist economy to a liberal market model of production. Nor is populism just another form of ethnic nationalism, developed in Eastern Europe and juxtaposed to civic nationalism. The strong dichotomy between an ethnocultural and exclusive nationalism and a civic and inclusive nationalism does not exist in these terms and is the product of a scientific bias, and not a product of empirical observation.

With respect to space at least, philosophy is almost unanimous. A space comes into being as soon as a border is established and an observer looks at both sides of the border including at the border separating the sides. Without the border, no space, and the space has none. Without the observer, the same applies, even if there are only observers where distinctions are being drawn. Jacques Derrida was conscious of this. One of his questions is the perennial question of philosophy: what is space if, for a space to reveal itself, there is a boundary to be drawn, such that an observer may emerge looking at the space the boundary is brought forward in.

The constitutionalism of the Community legal order as an evolutionary process of transforming an international organisation into a constitutional legal order has found its latest expression in the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. This document evokes the language of the constitutional state when it refers to “this Constitution” in Article I-1 and expresses its gratitude to the “European Convention for having prepared the draft of this Constitution on behalf of the citizens and States of Europe.” However, ambiguity is not far behind. The length of the document resembles a carefully drafted prenuptial agreement rather than a constitutional text. Moreover, the reference to the Constitution cannot disguise the fact that it has been adopted as an international treaty in the usual procedure of an Intergovernmental Conference and will have to be ratified by each and every Member State to enter into force.

The last decade has been a time of changes in all branches of German company law. Whilst the changes in the law of civil partnerships go to the very fundaments of what was a firm belief for a hundred years in national law, the future of the private limited company is increasingly determined by the competition of regulators in the European common market. The European dimension of modern company law making is even more pervasive in the law of stock corporations where growing convergence can be noted in regard to the national approaches of the European Member States towards internal controls. A common denominator for most of the changes in German company law is the partly court driven, partly legislature driven attempt of a better adjustment of investor and creditor protection to evolving business needs. Looking on the changes from a wider angle that includes capital markets, however, there are signals for a shifting in the traditional approach of German corporate governance towards an increasingly market driven system.

Several fundamental questions concerning internet law come to a head over search engines. There are trademark cases, issues about the protection of minors and questions of liability. However, as far as we know, the fundamental role that search engines play in public communication based on the World Wide Web has not yet been subjected to any legal analysis. This seems to leave a significant gap in our knowledge, given the fact that the market for search engines tends to be monopolistic.

In his final publication Derrida argues for a rather wide notion of the concept of sovereignty. Sovereigns are not only public officers and dignitaries, or those who invest them with sovereign power – we all are sovereigns, without exception, insofar the sovereign function is nothing but the rationale of all metaphysics, anchored in a certain capability, in the ability to do something, in a power or potency that transfers and realizes itself, that shows itself in possession, property, the power or authority of the master, be it the master of the house or in the city or state, despot, be it the master over himself, and thus master over his passions which have to be mastered just like the many-headed mass in the political arena. Derrida thinks the sovereign with Aristotle: the prima causa, the unmoved mover. It has been often remarked that philosophy here openly reveals itself as political theology. Derrida thus refers to the famous lines of the Iliad, where Ulysses warns of the sovereignty of the many: “it is not well that there should be many masters; one man must be supreme – one king to whom the son of scheming Saturn has given the scepter of sovereignty over you all.”

In November of 2003, I received an e-mail from Diana, a 26 year old Hungarian Ph.D.-student of archaeology and Egyptology. She is also interested in gender studies, she wrote me, especially in the cult of female goddesses. She also sent me the article on this topic that she had recently published in the very mainstream Hungarian journal of religious studies, the Review of History of the Church. In this article, she refers to articles published in English, French, German and Italian, quoting sources in Latin and in Ancient Greek. In the e-mail, Diana asked for my help to give suggestions about literature on re-interpreting the role of women in religion because she was familiar with my work on populism, religion and gender. Before the reader starts believing that I am using this very precious occasion to celebrate the developing communication between two generations of female scholars in Hungary, I would like to continue the story with a police report issued on the 23 June in 2004. In this police report, it was announced that, posters announcing a meeting of the so-called Group of Hungarian Future had been placed on the main boulevard of Budapest Arrow Cross. As is well known, the Arrow Cross was the Hungarian Nazi Party before and during World War II. The Group which is so concerned about the so-called Hungarian Future has 27 members and the founder of this group is Diana.

When the true scale of what would later be called ‘crimes against humanity', ‘genocide’ and, specifically, ‘the Holocaust’ became clear in the aftermath of the Second World War, a number of questions were raised. First, is this a new type of crime, in which evil manifests itself in a radically different way than it had earlier? Some disputed this. Evil exists at all times and it has always confronted people with an abyss of atrocities. With Rawls, one might then say that every ‘great evil’ is sufficient in itself and that making comparisons is not necessary, even if the Holocaust cannot be detached from earlier ravages of evil such as the Inquisition and antisemitism. Others thought this question ought to be answered positively. Adorno and Levinas formulated their philosophies in part as a response to the unique character of the Holocaust. Even now, more than a half a century later, the events associated with the Holocaust form a rich source for public debate, scientific inquiry and literary expression. Secondly, the question has been raised as to how one is to cope with this modern form of political evil and with a new type of criminal offender. Some argued in favour of the familiar recourse to politics and international law. Specifically, political crimes ought either to be dealt with politically or to be considered in the light of the principle of international law: par in parem non habet jurisdictionem. So, ordinary criminal law is not applicable where the mutual conduct of states is concerned. Others, however, including the Allied governments in the period immediately following the termination of hostilities, argued that these crimes were such that punishment would be inevitable. This might give rise to legal problems, but these crimes ought to be dealt with to the extent possible by means of ordinary criminal procedure.

Taking a look at the ECB of today means, to a certain extent, rethinking the emperor's idea. The European Central Bank is independent and seems almost untouchable in its field of responsibility. Its self-image is stamped by its special status outside the institutional structure of the European Union. However, the indefeasibility and with it the self-conception of the ECB was finally questioned by the European Court of Justice. The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe designs a new institutional setting and possibly constitutes a new understanding. The question is to what extent does this new institutional setting redefine the special status of the ESCB and the ECB, and how does it affect questions of democratic accountability and legitimacy.