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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 March 2019
This contribution aims to assess whether the Constitutional Treaty (CT) succeeds in achieving a systematic “fit” between the legislative procedures and the relevant underlying competences. The system to be developed here aims at promoting democratic legitimacy, transparency and efficiency in the EU's legislative process. This is undertaken under the assumption that systematization might contribute to achieving these fundamental aims. Obviously, such a system needs to rely on generalization and simplification to a considerable extent; it cannot provide more than a model which must necessarily be subject to exceptions.
1 On the actual application of co-decision, see Armin von Bogdandy/Jürgen Bast/Felix Arndt, Handlungsformen im Unionsrecht, 62 Heidelberg Journal of International Law (HJIL) 77, 137-9 (2002).Google Scholar
2 Treaty Establishing the Constitution for Europe, Article I-9, Dec. 16, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 1 [hereinafter CT]; Articles 1 – 4 Protocol on the Role of the National Parliaments; Article 3 Subsidiarity Protocol.Google Scholar
3 Usually a third but it is a fourth in Article III-264 CT.Google Scholar
4 See Weatherill, Stephen, Better Competence Monitoring, 30 European Law Review (ELR) 23, 29 (2005); Schwarze, Jürgen, Ein pragmatischer Verfassungsentwurf, 38 Europarecht (EuR) 535, 546-7 (2003); Geneviève Tuts, La Convention: plus de clarté, de transparence, d'efficacité et de démocratie pour l'Europe, Revue de la Faculté de droit de Liège 341, 359 (2004); Markus Ludwigs, Die Kompetenzordnung der Europäischen Union im Vertragsentwurf über eine Verfassung für Europa, 7 Zeitschrift für Europarechtliche Studien (ZEuS) 211, 221-4 (2004); Rupert Scholz, Das institutionelle System im Entwurf eines Vertrags über eine Verfassung für Europa, in Der Verfassungsentwurf des Europäischen Konvents 100, 105-6 (Jürgen Schwarze ed., 2004); Philipp Dann, The Political Institutions, in Principles of European Constitutional Law 36 (Armin v. Bogdandy & Jürgen Bast eds., forthcoming October 2005); Franz C. Mayer, Competences – Reloaded? The Vertical Division of Powers in the EU after the New European Constitution, 3 International Journal of Constitutional law 493, 502 (2005); Franz C. Mayer, Die drei Dimensionen der europäischen Kompetenzdebatte, 61 Heidelberg Journal of International Law (HJIL) 577, 605-7 (2001); Paul Craig, Competence: Clarity, Conferral, Containment and Consideration, 29 European Law Review (ELR) 323, 343-4 (2004).Google Scholar
5 Article III-151 CT.Google Scholar
6 Articles III-161 and III-162 CT (to be implemented according to Article III-163 CT).Google Scholar
7 Within the CAP the Council shall, without consultation of the EP, adopt European regulations or decisions on the details of CAP (Article III-231 (3) CT); the Commission can fix certain countervailing charges (Article III-232 (2) CT; currently, Treaty Establishing the European Community, Art. 38, consolidated version Dec. 24, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33 [hereinafter EC Treaty]).Google Scholar
8 Article III-166 (3) CT.Google Scholar
9 On the quantity of delegated legislation, see von Bogdandy et al., supra note 1, at 139-42; Jürgen Bast et al., Legal Instruments in European Union Law and their Reform, 23 Yearbook of European Law 91, 126-7 (2004); Koen Lenaerts and Marlies Desomer, Simplification of the Union's Instruments, in Ten Reflections on the Constitutional Treaty for Europe 107, 114 (Bruno de Witte ed., EUI-RSCAS/AEL 2003), available at http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/Research/Institutions/EuropeanTreaties.shtml.Google Scholar
10 For similar criteria, see Peter-Christian Müller-Graff, Strukturmerkmale des neuen Verfassungsvertrages für Europa, 27 integration 186, 187-8 (2004); Tuts, supra note 4, at 346.Google Scholar
11 The latter only provides a rather rough distinction based on the exclusivity or non-exclusivity of competences and does not as such consider the extent of integration achieved, nor is it fully consistent with the legal bases in Part III. See Christiane Trüe, Das System der EU-Kompetenzen vor und nach dem Entwurf eines Europäischen Verfassungsvertrags, 64 Heidelberg Journal of International Law (HJIL) 391, 413 (2004). See also Weatherill, supra note 4, at 29-31; Stephen Weatherill, Competence, in Ten Reflections on the Constitutional Treaty for Europe, supra note 10, at 45, 52; Martin Nettesheim, Die Kompetenzordnung im Vertrag über eine Verfassung der Europäischen Union, 39 Europarecht (EuR) 511, 528 (2004); Matthias Ruffert, Schlüsselfragen der Europäischen Verfassung der Zukunft, 39 Europarecht (EuR) 165, 189-92 (2004); Schwarze, supra note 4, at 542-6; Craig, supra note 4, at 326. For a more detailed classification, Armin von Bogdandy and Jürgen Bast, Vertical Order of Competences, in Principles of European Constitutional Law, supra note 4, at 18; Ingolf Pernice, Eine neue Kompetenzordnung für die Europäische Union 6 (WHI-Paper 15/02), available at http://www.whi-berlin.de/pernice-kompetenzordnung.htm.Google Scholar
12 In detail on the categorization of competences, see Christiane Trüe, System der Rechtsetzungskompetenzen 97 (2002); see also Müller-Graff, supra note 10, at 193-4, Martin Nettesheim, Kompetenzen, in Europäisches Verfassungsrecht 415, 439-45 (Armin von Bogdandy ed., 2003).Google Scholar
13 Also Conv/375/1/02 REV 1, Final Report WG V, 4 November 2002, p. 12–13, available under www.european-convention.eu.int.Google Scholar
14 Regarding the latter, see von Bogdandy et al., supra note 1, at 99.Google Scholar
15 Id. at 103-4.Google Scholar
16 On the current Treaties id. at 79; Jürgen Bast et al., supra note 9, at 93.Google Scholar
17 See von Bogdandy and Bast, supra note 11, at 12-17 (with a distinction between empowering and standards-establishing provisions).Google Scholar
18 Trüe, , supra note 12, at 117; von Bogdandy and Bast, supra note 11, at 18-19.Google Scholar
19 Trüe, , supra note 12, at 398.Google Scholar
20 Craig, , supra note 4, at 334-335; von Bogdandy and Bast, supra note 11, at 48.Google Scholar
21 See Case C-376/98, Germany v. EP and Council, 2000 E.C.R. I-8419; Case C-377/98, The Netherlands v. EP and Council, 2001 E.C.R. I-7079; Case C-491/01, British American Tobacco, 2002 E.C.R. I-11453.Google Scholar
22 Bogdandy, von and Bast, , supra note 11, at 28-29; Craig, supra note 4, at 334-335; Dann, supra note 4, at 8-10; Philipp Dann, Parlamente im Exekutivföderalismus 29 (2004). See also Trüe, supra note 12, at 188.Google Scholar
23 Or “non-regulatory powers”, see von Bogdandy and Bast, supra note 11, at 31.Google Scholar
24 See Part B. above.Google Scholar
25 This is to include both individuals and collectives as sources for legitimacy. For details on theories of democracy, see Uwe Volkmann, Setzt Demokratie den Staat voraus?, 127 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts (AöR) 575, 582 (2002); Armin von Bogdandy, Globalization and Europe: How to Square Democracy, Globalization, and International Law, 15 European Journal of International Law (EJIL) 885, 890 (2004). With a preference for the individual-based approach, see Thomas Schmitz, Das europäische Volk und seine Rolle bei einer Verfassungsgebung in der Europäischen Union, 38 Europarecht (EuR) 217, 226 (2003). See also Petersen, in this volume.Google Scholar
26 For this approach, see Leontin-Jean Constantinesco, Recht der europäischen Gemeinschaften 131 (1977); Paul Demaret, The Treaty Framework, in Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty 3, 4 (David O'Keeffe and Patrick Twomey eds., 1994); Siegfried Magiera, Die Einheitliche Europäische Akte und die Fortentwicklung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft zur Europäischen Union, in Gedächtnisschrift für Wilhelm Karl Geck 507, 510 (Wilfried Fiedler and Georg Ress eds., 1989); Mayer, Die drei Dimensionen der europäischen Kompetenzdebatte, supra note 4, at 626.Google Scholar
27 On the “dual dimension” of the EU, see Dimitris Tsatsos, Die Europäische Unionsgrundordnung, 22 Europäischen Grundrechte Zeitschrift (EuGRZ) 287 (1995), Stefan Oeter, Föderalismus, in Europäisches Verfassungsrecht, supra note 12, at 59, 88; Christian Calliess, Demokratie im europäischen Staaten- und Verfassungsverbund 3 (Göttinger Online-Beiträge No. 14, 2004), available at http://wwwuser.gwdg.de/~ujvr/europa/Paper14.pdf; Dann, supra note 22, at 2, 15 and 43 (Council); id. at 279 and 363 (European Parliament); Dann, supra note 4, at 34 (based on his model of “executive federalism”).Google Scholar
28 See Calliess, , supra note 27, at 8-9; Jürgen Bröhmer, Das Europäische Parlament: Echtes Legislativorgan oder bloßes Hilfsorgan im legislativen Prozess?, 2 Zeitschrift für Europarechtliche Studien (ZEuS) 197, 205 (1999); Georg Ress, Das Europäische Parlament als Gesetzgeber, 2 Zeitschrift für Europarechtliche Studien (ZEuS) 219 (1999). More direct legitimation could be provided by the citizens themselves in referenda, but, as shown above, such direct legitimation is not provided for in the CT. See Dann, supra note 4, at 15 and 20-2 (on the limits of the EP's powers and Commission legitimacy); id. at 16 and 22-7; Dann, supra note 22, at 306.Google Scholar
29 On this problem, see Ress, supra note 28, at 221-24; Marcel Kaufmann, Europäische Integration und Demokratieprinzip 337 (1997); Dann, supra note 4, at 10-15; Dann, supra note 22, at 76-122.Google Scholar
30 See, e.g., Müller-Graff, supra note 10, at 198; Ruffert, supra note 11, at 181-82; Oeter, supra note 28, at 100. On the limits, see Dann, supra note 4, at 35-39; Dann, supra note 22, at 163 and 269.Google Scholar
31 This is indeed the opinion of the German Federal Constitutional Court, as expressed in the Maastricht (“Brunner“) decision. BVerfGE 89, 155. See Kaufmann, supra note 29, at 224 and 337. For comments, see, e.g., Ress, supra note 28, at 219-20; Thomas Schmitz, Integration in der Supranationalen Union, 94-6 (2001); Oeter, supra note 27, at 93-107; Dann, supra note 22, at 281.Google Scholar
32 Ruffert, , supra note 11, at 181-82.Google Scholar
33 On this approach, see Schmitz, supra note 31, at 492; Schmitz, supra note 25, at 217; Ress, supra note 28, at 221-22.Google Scholar
34 See Ress, , supra note 28, at 229; Calliess, supra note 27, at 7. Based on the concept of a plurality of overlapping (regional, state, supra-state) peoples, Schmitz, supra note 25, at 219.Google Scholar
35 See Schmitz, , supra note 31, at 95.Google Scholar
36 Differentiating further in this vein, Schmitz, supra note 25, at 228-234.Google Scholar
37 See Weatherill, , supra note 4, at 49.Google Scholar
38 See Bogdandy, von et al., supra note 1, at 133-36.Google Scholar
39 On the consequences of a strict delimitation of competences, see Trüe, supra note 12, at 188 and 589; von Bogdandy and Bast, supra note 11, at 50; Mayer, Competences – Reloaded? The Vertical Division of Powers in the EU after the New European Constitution, supra note 4, at 498; Udo Di Fabio, Some Remarks on the Allocation of Competences Between the European Union and its Member States, 39 Common Market Law Review (CMLR) 1289, 1298 (2002); Weatherill, supra note 11, at 46; Dann, supra note 4, at 36 (also regarding the matching consensual way of decision-making).Google Scholar
40 On the defects of the CT here, see Mayer, Competences – Reloaded? The Vertical Division of Powers in the EU after the New European Constitution, supra note 4, at 496; Trüe, supra note 12; Christiane Trüe, EU-Kompetenzen für Energierecht, Gesundheitsschutz und Umweltschutz und die Position der Euratom nach dem Verfassungsentwurf des Konvents, 59 Juristenzeitung (JZ) 779 (2004).Google Scholar
41 Schmitz, , supra note 31, at 474-75.Google Scholar
42 See Tuts, , supra note 4, at 346 and 356. On the conflict of these principles, also Dann, supra note 22, at 6-7.Google Scholar
43 It was generally avoided to invest the EU with a legitimacy independent from the Member States, see von Bogdandy and Bast, supra note 11, at 36.Google Scholar
44 See Dann, , supra note 4, at 37-38; Dann, supra note 22, at 387; Calliess, supra note 27, at 18. Measured against state constitutions, see Kaufmann, supra note 29, at 229.Google Scholar
45 See Müller-Graff, supra note 10, at 196-8; see also Elisabeth Rumler-Korinek, Kann die Europäische Union demokratisch ausgestaltet werden? Eine Analyse und Bewertung aktueller Beiträge zur “europäischen Demokratiedebatte”, 38 Europarecht (EuR) 327, 339-40 (2003). On the need for “consociational practices” to compensate for the lack of homogeneity and national subsidiarity, see Oeter, supra note 27, at 107-109.Google Scholar
46 Kokott, J. and Rüth, A., The European Convention and its Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe: Appropriate Answers to the Laeken Questions?, 40 Common Market Law Review (CMLR) 1315, 1322 (2003).Google Scholar
47 Previously Vedel-Commission, EC-Bull. Suppl. 4/1972; Art. 34 and following provisions; Draft Treaty 1984 of the EP; Commission, EC-Bull. Suppl. 2/1991, p.127.Google Scholar
48 Kokott, More optimistic and Rüth, , supra note 46, at 1324; Johann Schoo, Finanzen und Haushalt, in Der Verfassungsentwurf des Europäischen Konvents 66 (Jürgen Schwarze ed., 2004).Google Scholar
49 See Calliess, , supra note 27, at 28.Google Scholar
50 Pointing to the irreconcilability of exclusive competence and the cumbersome decision-making system, see von Bogdandy and Bast, supra note 11, at 22-3.Google Scholar
51 See Tuts, , supra note 4, at 355.Google Scholar
52 Regarding the early warning mechanism, see Pernice, supra note 11, at 22-4; Weatherill, supra note 4, at 31-33.Google Scholar
53 On the call of the CT for its own continuing reform, see Bast, in this volume.Google Scholar
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