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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 March 2019
“If your Imperial Majesty will be graciously pleased to take off your clothes, we will fit on the new suit, in front of the looking glass.”
Taking a look at the ECB of today means, to a certain extent, rethinking the emperor's idea. The European Central Bank is independent and seems almost untouchable in its field of responsibility. Its self-image is stamped by its special status outside the institutional structure of the European Union. However, the indefeasibility and with it the self-conception of the ECB was finally questioned by the European Court of Justice. The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe designs a new institutional setting and possibly constitutes a new understanding. The question is to what extent does this new institutional setting redefine the special status of the ESCB and the ECB, and how does it affect questions of democratic accountability and legitimacy.
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