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Memory, Politics and Law – The Eichmann Trial: Hannah Arendt's View on the Jerusalem Court's Competence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Thomas Mertens

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When the true scale of what would later be called ‘crimes against humanity', ‘genocide’ and, specifically, ‘the Holocaust’ became clear in the aftermath of the Second World War, a number of questions were raised. First, is this a new type of crime, in which evil manifests itself in a radically different way than it had earlier? Some disputed this. Evil exists at all times and it has always confronted people with an abyss of atrocities. With Rawls, one might then say that every ‘great evil’ is sufficient in itself and that making comparisons is not necessary, even if the Holocaust cannot be detached from earlier ravages of evil such as the Inquisition and antisemitism. Others thought this question ought to be answered positively. Adorno and Levinas formulated their philosophies in part as a response to the unique character of the Holocaust. Even now, more than a half a century later, the events associated with the Holocaust form a rich source for public debate, scientific inquiry and literary expression. Secondly, the question has been raised as to how one is to cope with this modern form of political evil and with a new type of criminal offender. Some argued in favour of the familiar recourse to politics and international law. Specifically, political crimes ought either to be dealt with politically or to be considered in the light of the principle of international law: par in parem non habet jurisdictionem. So, ordinary criminal law is not applicable where the mutual conduct of states is concerned. Others, however, including the Allied governments in the period immediately following the termination of hostilities, argued that these crimes were such that punishment would be inevitable. This might give rise to legal problems, but these crimes ought to be dealt with to the extent possible by means of ordinary criminal procedure.

Type
Articles: Special Issue: Confronting Memories – Memory, Politics and Law
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 6 , Issue 2: Article: Special Issue - Confronting Memories: European „Bitter Experiences“ and the Constitutionalization Process , 01 February 2005 , pp. 407 - 424
Copyright
Copyright © 2005 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

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