Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 March 2019
The last decade has been a time of changes in all branches of German company law. Whilst the changes in the law of civil partnerships go to the very fundaments of what was a firm belief for a hundred years in national law, the future of the private limited company is increasingly determined by the competition of regulators in the European common market. The European dimension of modern company law making is even more pervasive in the law of stock corporations where growing convergence can be noted in regard to the national approaches of the European Member States towards internal controls. A common denominator for most of the changes in German company law is the partly court driven, partly legislature driven attempt of a better adjustment of investor and creditor protection to evolving business needs. Looking on the changes from a wider angle that includes capital markets, however, there are signals for a shifting in the traditional approach of German corporate governance towards an increasingly market driven system.
1 Decisions by the Federal Court of Justice: BGHZ 146, 341. The most important developments in German company law are reported on a regular basis in the Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW). Most recently on civil and commercial partnerships: Heribert Hirte, Die Entwicklung des Personengesellschaftsrechts in Deutschland in den Jahren 2003 bis 2004, NJW 718 (2005).Google Scholar
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