Trümmerfilme (“rubble films”) provide a first-hand, although cinematographic, view of postwar Germany. They depict the myriad of postwar living conditions and day-to-day problems. The German word Vergangenheitsbewältigung means “the process of dealing with the past.” This term captures the film directors' respective approaches to depicting the past as a process rather than a single act. The Trümmerfilme are essential for anyone studying the postwar period. Although the films do not provide a complete or uniform approach, they provide numerous insights into the predominant problems faced by Germans during the immediate postwar period. Through the depiction of these social conditions, the films provide insight into the origin of the Basic Law's commitment to the Sozialstaat.

Over the last decade, the admissibility decision-making of the European Court of Human Rights has been the focus of considerable attention in the analysis of the “mounting pressure on the Convention system,” but has enjoyed little critical analysis in legal, sociological or socio-legal literatures. This paper will argue that this combination of intense attention and critical neglect is paradoxical, and has produced fascinating and hitherto largely unnoticed discontinuities and incompatibilities between the rhetorical representation of the Court's admissibility decision-making in ongoing Convention reform debates and the published jurisprudence of the Court on those standards of admissibility.

In February 2011, a Bundesgerichtshof [BGH—Federal Court of Justice] decision caused a great media echo. The court convicted Germany's largest bank to pay about half a million Euros in damages for the breach of advisory duties. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, banking law evolved fast in German courts. The recent decision raises new questions concerning the advisory duties of a bank, when offering financial products to its clients. The article gives an insight to various factual backgrounds, which, as financial products of today, are somewhat complex. Another interesting aspect to this case is that there are numerous decisions of lower courts that dealt with the same product as the BGH did. The ruling is considered to be far-reaching and groundbreaking. This case note will look into the question how far this is true.

In four judgements of 13 January 2011 the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg returned to the issues raised in its earlier jurisprudence regarding preventive detention (“Sicherungsverwahrung”) under German criminal law. In its decision of 17 December 2009, M. v. Germany, the Court had held that the German Criminal Law's retroactive extension of confinement in preventive detention failed to meet the requirement of lawful detention “after conviction” under Art. 5 § 1 (a) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter “the Convention”), and violates the prohibition of retroactivity (Art. 7 § 1 of the Convention). The articles read as follows:

Judicial lawmaking in the GATT/WTO context has for some time drawn considerable attention. Some are inclined to show a sense of existentialist anxiety in view of the fact that legal practice does not neatly live up to the orthodox doctrinal order of things. Others see judicial lawmaking as (theoretically or practically) inevitable and tend to readily embrace it as a way of overcoming defunct political processes. Whatever its normative appraisal, as a matter of fact adjudicatory practice has developed some of trade law's cardinal norms. The rise and increasing sophistication of adjudication in the GATT/WTO context has also gone hand in hand with a surge of authority on the part of adjudicators and a larger overall detachment of the law from politico-legislative politics.

Legal Positivism is dead, isn't it? We are all legal realists now. We believe, by default, that what really matters in law emerges from some judicial process. We sense that the point of norm-production by adjudication is to accomplish something useful or good for either individuals or society at large. Practice trumps theory and policy implementation overrides respect for some scholarly edifice. What we do when we do law is to unreel formula and rhetoric. We engage in these exercises with the aim to have judges rule in favor of our clients. Should we be judges ourselves, we promote causes we deem to be noble and fine. Law is a tool. Skillfully mastered legal knowledge is a prerequisite for using it well.

The evolution of the protection of fundamental rights in Europe is on the brink of entering a new phase, with the imminent accession of the European Union (EU) to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Assuming no unforeseen obstacles arise, the EU will soon become the 48th HCP to the Convention, and the first non-state signatory. This is a unique situation with clear legal and political consequences. Pre-accession negotiations between the Council of Europe and the EU have effectively concluded. The CDDH Informal Working Group on the Accession of the European Union to the Convention (CCDH-UE), established under the aegis of the Council of Europe's Steering Committee on Human Rights (le Comité Directeur pour les Droits de l'Homme (CDDH)), met regularly from July 2010 until June 2011, tabling the Draft Legal Instruments on the Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights (Draft Accession Agreement) on 30 June 2011.

My story is a story about American Legal Realism. It is part of an attempt to understand what Realism was by addressing the question, “Why is the study of Realism a subject of legal history and not of current events?” Of course, the “answer” to such a question is made up of several partial answers, of which what follows is but one. Others would talk about the relationship between legal doctrine and capitalist economic development or about legal theory and political philosophy or about legal theory and legal practice, to name a few examples. However, this partial answer can best be approached by examining how a simple idea about law - the liberal idea of the rule of law in its guise as the “rule theory of law” - has had in its rise and in its demise an impact on legal education and to attempt to understand why that is so. My attempt however, requires that I start my story back aways with Christopher Columbus Langdell and the Harvard Law School.

A new movement has come to legal science. It strikes self-awareness into the minds of all jurists who falsely believe their deeds fully consistent with their ideals. It pierces and destroys these delusions and undertakes now, in light of new, less modest ideals, to justify our constant activity to ourselves: the creation of law. Yet, no matter how audibly our movement is simultaneously heralded in various fields, it still lacks unity and awareness of its power. Therefore, we venture an attempt here to summon all its best forces into unity: an attempt that deliberately ignores everything that separates discrete writers from one another, a unity that does not expect itself to be the system of any one person, nor the program of all of them, and therefore acts on its own responsibility.

In the framework of this project, both the WTO dispute settlement system and international investment tribunals are portrayed as core actors in judicial lawmaking. By weaving international trade law and investment law on the roughly timbered looms of imperfect treaty law, they have proven to be successful creators of the fabrics of a world trade order and of investment protection standards, respectively. Such effective lawmaking, on the part of particular “regimes,” has the potential to increase the fragmentation of international law. Consequently, international judicial institutions are not only spotted as originators of fragmentation, but—as interpreters of international law—also as addressees of strategies in response presented in the 2006 Report of the ILC Study Group on Fragmentation. It is the Study Group's comforting message that a considerable part of the difficulties arising from the diversification and expansion of international law can be overcome by recourse to a “coherent legal-professional technique.” The Fragmentation Report highlights that conflict resolution and interpretation cannot be distinguished: “[w]hether there is a conflict and what can be done with prima facie conflicts depends on the way the relevant rules are interpreted.” According to the Report, coherence can be established by interpreting legal norms with due regard to their normative environment.

The priority given to the development of research skills during doctrinal legal education often neglects the importance of equipping PhD students with the pedagogical skills necessary to fulfill their important educational role as academics. Thus, in many instances there is a significant gap in the requisite skill base that PhD students acquire when they complete their doctrinal education. This paper outlines a first step that has been taken to address this deficiency in postgraduate legal education in Ireland. The PhD community of the University College Dublin (UCD) School of Law convened an internal Syllabus Design Workshop in April 2010 in order to provide doctrinal students with an opportunity to design a university module and to explore the issues which arise in undertaking such an exercise. The first part of this paper outlines how the workshop was conceived and convened, and provides an account of the considerations that each student had to take into account in the design of a syllabus. From here, we address the content of the workshop and reflect upon some of the important issues which were raised. Finally, we offer a number of recommendations in relation to the development of doctrinal students as future educators. By highlighting the importance of uniting research and teaching, it is hoped that this paper will contribute to postgraduate legal education in Ireland, and also internationally.

In the following Article I will develop seven ideal-typical role models for (or caricatures of) legal scholars: the Oracle Scientist, the Prophet, the Law Reformer, the Humble Clerk, the Wise Pragmatist, the Self-Reflective, and the Media Star. Ten features will be used to characterize the ideal for each model: primary audience, ideal function, perverted form, influence on the law, prestige, measure of success, time scale, use of non-legal (moral or social/economic) arguments, precondition of existence, typical countries, and famous lawyers (representing themselves or at least proposing to other legal scholars to follow that specific role model).

Ever since the conceptual division of rights into three separate categories; civil, political and social, the legal status of social rights has been controversial. This divergence in views is illustrated by the decision of the Council of Europe in 1950 to protect civil and political rights through a judicial format where adherence to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) was ensured by the European Court of Human Rights, whereas social rights were addressed separately through the European Social Charter (“Social Charter”), with merely a reporting mechanism to the European Committee of Social Rights.

One of the main problems which has emerged in recent years in the debates of legal positivism has been a rather defensive twist in its self-understanding (i.e., its self-affirmation in terms of what it is not). Now, whereas such a negative approach does not in itself pose a problem, in the case of legal positivism it has led to a series of rearguard battles against claims stemming, on the one hand, in more general philosophic developments, and, on the other, in doctrinal legal scholarship. The result has been that some have wondered if between those conceptual and institutional demarcations, between the philosophic and the juridical departments, there actually remains anything for positivism to stand for. Is there anything it actually claims? Accordingly, a perceived dilemma of positivism has emerged along the following lines: insofar as legal positivism makes a sound claim, this claim is very weak and, by itself, not very interesting; insofar, however, as positivism tries to make a strong and interesting claim, this claim can be shown to be fundamentally misguided.

Lawmaking by judicial institutions requires legitimation. As international courts gradually play an ever more significant part in the shaping of international law, they share with any other lawmaker the need for a convincing basis of legitimacy. In the case of international courts, however, this need has to be addressed by taking into account their special function: that is, to review decisions made by other lawmakers (mainly domestic). The question of the legitimacy of judicial institutions is thus crucially connected with the standard they apply in reviewing such decisions.

Mark Mazower's latest book, No Enchanted Palace: the End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations intelligently weaves in the League of Nations as the primary informant of the United Nations to deconstruct any claims of discontinuities between the two institutions. In doing so, Mazower offers an eloquent polemic against the literature's tendency to idolize the United Nations' founding as a symbolic and material break from empire. Exploring the dark sides of its intellectual origins and early years, however, Mazower points to the decolonization movement to argue for the potential of the United Nations as a site of emancipatory struggle — his book concludes with a reinvestment in its promise of a more inclusive and just world order. The issue left to the reader, and which I hope to address in this review essay, is the legitimacy of Mazower's claim that the United Nations has indeed escaped its imperial heritage.